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ABSTRACT
DIFFUSION OF RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES
Khatera Alizada
Old Dominion University, 2016
Director: Dr. David C. Earnest

This study examines the global diffusion of renewable energy policies: feed-in tariffs
(FIT) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS). Existing studies of policy diffusion have failed to
differentiate between four possible mechanisms of policy diffusion: emulation, suasion, learning
and competition. To test these competing explanations, the study uses a mixed-method research
design that combines statistical analysis of time-series cross-sectional data with an agent-based
model of diffusion processes. The findings of the statistical analysis show strong support for the
suasion (European Union Membership, Clean Development Mechanisms) and emulation
mechanisms (cultural similarity or common language) in the diffusion of FIT. In the diffusion of
RPS there is strong support for suasion mechanism (European Union Membership and Clean
Development Mechanisms), and emulation (common colonial history and language similarity).
There is no support and weak support for competition and learning respectively. The study
identifies future areas for research on the emulation, suasion, learning and competition
mechanisms.
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1
INTRODUCTION

Contrary to what rational self-interested actors would do based on costs, benefits and
utility maximization, some of the top oil exporters in the world have adopted renewable portfolio
standards (RPS) or feed-in tariffs (FIT) in less than a decade. These countries include Iran and
the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East; Kazakhstan in Asia; Nigeria and Algeria in Africa;
Norway and the United Kingdom in Europe; and Brazil in the Americas (Network 2014, U.S.
Department of Energy and Administration 2012). Not only is Norway a top non-renewable
energy producer, the share of renewable energy in the country’s final energy consumption was
65 percent in 2012 (Eurostat 2014). Despite being the top oil exporters in the world, however,
these countries have adopted renewable energy policies. One possible explanation for this puzzle
is policy diffusion, the spread of new policies in the international system. Does adoption of
renewable energy policies in one country affect the probability of adoption in others? If so which
mechanisms explain the diffusion of renewable energy policies?
This study looks at the adoption of renewable energy polices at the national government
level as a consequence of diffusion and of actors involved in the processes of diffusion. What is
diffusion? “Diffusion occurs when one government’s decision about whether to adopt a policy
innovation is influenced by the choices made by other governments”(Graham, Shipan, and
Volden 2013, 675) Diffusion is associated with external determinants. However, there is no
consensus among scholars whether internal or external determinants are more important in policy
adoption.
There is limited literature on renewable energy policy adoption and diffusion
mechanisms. The literature mainly focuses on internal characteristics of states. There are

2
separate studies about US states (Matisoff 2008, Jenner, Ovaere, and Schindele 2013), Europe
(Jenner et al. 2012) and developing and emerging economies (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). A
comprehensive study is needed to encompass broader geographic regions. There is a gap in the
literature about the systematic studies of diffusion mechanisms, their links with different actors
and with renewable energy policy adoption. This study will contribute by examining the role of
actors in these different processes.
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006) argue that governments’ policy decisions are
interdependent to decision of other countries. They identify four discrete diffusion mechanisms:
coercion, competition, learning, and emulation through which policies diffuse (Simmons,
Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) argue that diffusion studies
often have failed to control for alternative diffusion mechanisms. For example, those that test for
the competition mechanisms seldom control for alternative mechanisms. The same happens with
other camps. This study will fill this gap by controlling for alternative diffusion mechanisms,
which will also address the problem of over determination. Some studies do not make clear
distinctions between the mechanisms while testing for the effects of these mechanisms. They do
not test for which diffusion mechanism has taken place, but rather test only whether diffusion has
occurred (Stadelmann and Castro 2014) This study will draw the distinction through operational
measures of the independent variables that are associated with each of these mechanisms
applying the suggestions of (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007) .
Theories of diffusion make assumptions about the primary actors, their motivation to
behave in certain ways, the information on which they base their decisions, and their objectives.
There is a gap in the literature about a systemic analysis of the interaction among the primary
actors (internal, external and go-betweens). “The existence and nature of the linkages among
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internal, external, and go between actors may influence which diffusion mechanisms are used”
(Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 675). Therefore, to understand the notion of
interdependence of countries in making policy decision, it is important to understand the
diffusion mechanisms and how they relate to primary actors in policy adoption and the link
between the primary actors. According to Braun and Gilardi (2006) diffusion mechanisms affect
effectiveness and payoffs, which drive policy change.
Policies are chosen by people who have different preferences, goals and capabilities, but
studies only look at how they cluster geographically without paying attention to the actors who
are involved in policy making (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 684). There are three sets of
actors who are crucial in policy adoption: the internal actors in policy adopting government, the
external actors from which policies are adopted, and the go-betweens who are involved across
multiple governments (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013).
The internal actors within a country who influence potential policy adoption are
politicians, electorates, policy advocates, interest groups and appointed officials. To understand
policy adoption, one needs to understand the actors, their goals, preferences, capabilities and the
environment within which they act. Federal governments play the role of facilitator in diffusing
policies across states and international organizations across countries (Graham, Shipan, and
Volden 2013).
In terms of external actors who may affect potential policy adopters, it is important to
understand what causes external actors to innovate. For example, governments with expertise
may be the leaders of diffusion processes and might be more likely to provide the information for
potential adopters. Likewise, some states will be more likely to imitate wealthy governments
who may be bigger in size and more likely to succeed in norm creation. So it is important to
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know the features of the external governments that make policy diffusion more or less likely.
The earlier adopters will respond strategically as competition arises through business-friendly tax
schemes and effective regulatory norms.
The go-betweens are the third parties that neither belong to the governments of potential
adopters nor to the governments from which policy diffuse. They may be think tanks,
academicians, research institutes, mass media, migrants and intergovernmental organizations.
“Studying each of these three types of actors and the interactions between them is crucial to a
better understanding of politics of policy diffusion” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013).
“Precisely when external and go-between actors (as well as the internal actors themselves) utilize
each of the mechanisms, and to what ends, has not been studied systematically, but is ripe for
future exploration” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 693). Filling this gap in the literature,
this study will look at the link between the crucial actors and diffusion mechanisms.
First the study provides a review of the most efficient renewable energy policies. The
literature identifies feed-in tariffs (FIT) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as the most
efficient renewable energy policies. Then it looks at the mechanism through which policies
diffuse and the involvement of crucial actors in these processes. Then it discusses the alternative
explanations to policy adoption. It follows with presenting the research design, results and the
conclusion.

RPS AND FIT: THE MOST EFFICIENT RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES
Saidur et al. (2010) find that “FIT, RPS, incentives, pricing law & quota system” are the
most efficient wind energy policies adopted by countries across the globe. An RPS policy
requires electricity retailers to have a certain share of their electricity come from renewable
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sources of energy (Jenner, Ovaere, and Schindele 2013). “In contrast, the FIT is a mode of price
regulation that stimulates investment by giving fixed price incentives to producers” (Jenner et al.
2012, 3). Saidur et al. (2010, 1745) define energy policy as the following: “Energy policy is the
manner and the country’s strategy in which a given entity (often governmental) decides to
address issues of energy development along with the development of the energy industry to
sustain its growth including energy production, distribution and consumption.” However, they
only look at wind energy policies. In another study Solangi et al. (2011) find that the most
successful solar energy policies are FIT, RPS and incentives. “These policies provide significant
motivation and interest for the development and use of renewable energy technologies” (Solangi
et al. 2011, 2149). All the countries that consume solar energy have some sort of policy related
to solar energy.
While these policies may have limitations, they are the ones widely used and considered
appropriate to the context of the countries that adopted them. Table 1 depicts countries that
adopted FIT and RPS. A total of 69 countries enacted FIT and fifteen countries adopted RPS by
2013 (Network 2014).
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Table 1 Countries FIT/RPS Year of Adoption
Year Cumulati Countries added that year (FIT)
ve
1978 1
1983
1990 2
1991 3
1992 4
1993 6
1994 9
1996
1997 10
1998 11
1999 14
2000 14
2001 17
2002 23

United States*
Germany
Switzerland
Italy
Denmark, India
Luxembourg, Spain, Greece
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Portugal, Norway, Slovenia

2008 50

Armenia, France, Latvia
Algeria, Austria, Brazil, Czech Republic,
Indonesia, Lithuania
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, South Korea,
Slovak Republic
Israel, Nicaragua
China, Turkey, Ecuador, Ireland
Argentina, Pakistan, Thailand
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican
Republic, Finland, Macedonia, Moldova,
Mongolia
Iran, Kenya, Philippines, Tanzania, Ukraine

2009 54

Japan, Serbia, South Africa, Taiwan

2003 28
2004 30
2005 34
2006 37
2007 45

2010 59

Cumula Countries added that
tive
year (RPS/Quota
Policies)

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Malta, UK
2011 64
Ghana, Montenegro, Netherlands, Syria,
Vietnam
2012 68
Jordan, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda
2013 69
Kazakhstan
Source: (Network 2014)

1

Italy

2
3

Australia
UK

5

Japan, Sweden

6

Poland

7

China

11

Chile, India,
Philippines, Romania

12

South Korea

14

Albania, Israel

15
15

Norway

7

Table 2 FIT/RPS Adoption by Geographic Region
#

The Americas
1

USA

2
3
4

Dominican
Republic
Brazil
Ecuador

5

Argentina

6

Nicaragua

7
8
9
10

Chile*
Honduras
Peru
Panama

11

Uruguay

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

European
Union
Germany
Italy #

Europe Africa

Asia

Middle East Oceania

Switzerl Algeria
and
Norway# Kenya

India#

Israel#

Sri lanka # Iran

*Australi
a
#Palau

Denmark Turkey Tanzania Armenia Syria
Luxembour Albania# South
Indonesia# Jordan
g
Africa#
Spain
Croatia Mauritius South
United Arab
Korea#
Emirates #
Greece
Macedon Ghana#
China#
ia
Sweden# Moldova Nigeria
Pakistan
Portugal# Ukraine Rwanda
Thailand
Slovenia Serbia Uganda
Mongolia
France
Bosnia Senegal# Philippines
#
Latvia
Montene
Japan#
gro
Austria
Taiwan
Czech
Malaysia#
Republic
Lithuania#
Vietnam
Cyprus
Kazakhstan
Estonia
Maldive
Hungary
Tajikistan
Slovakia
Ireland
Bulgaria
Finland
Malta
UK#
Netherlands
Poland*
Romania*

Source: (Network 2014): regular font countries with FIT; *countries with RPS, # countries
that have both RPS and FIT. In this table countries with that unknown year of adoption and
countries that have discontinued from the policies are included.
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Table 3 Countries with National RPS/FIT by Income Level
Numbe FIT (high
r
income)
Austria
Croatia
Cyprus
Denmark

Upper Middle
Income
Albania#
Algeria
Argentina
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
China#

Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Israel#
Italy#
Japan#
Latvia
Lithuania#
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Portugal#
Slovakia
Slovenia
Switzerland
UK#
Chile*
Norway#
Poland*
South Korea#
Australia*
Sweden#
Source: (Network 2014)
countries with RPS only

Lower Middle
Income
Armenia
Ghana#
Honduras
India#

Low
Income
Kenya
Rwanda
Tajikistan
Tanzania

Indonesia#
Moldova

Uganda
Kyrgyzstan
#

Dominican Republic Mongolia
Hungary
Nicaragua
Iran
Nigeria
Jordan
Pakistan
Macedonia
Philippines#
Malysia#
Sri Lanka#
Maldives
Syria
Panama
Ukraine
Peru
Vietnam
Serbia
Senegal#
Thailand
Turkey
Palau#
Romania*
South Arica#

regular countries with FIT, #countries with RPS and FIT, *

9
The United States (US) adopted PURPA policy (1978), which was an early version of the
FIT. Seven countries including (Brazil, Czech Republic, Mauritius, Spain, South Africa, South
Korea, and the United States) have discontinued the policy. Seven countries (Honduras,
Maldives, Peru, Panama, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Uruguay) have adopted FIT but their years of
adoption are unknown. Countries including Ghana, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Malaysia,
Palau, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and United Arab Emirates adopted RPS/Quota
policies, but their years of adoption are unknown (Network 2014). Any countries with known
year of adoption that initially adopted the policies are included. However, those with unknown
year of adoption are not included in this study. There are countries that have adopted the policies
at the local level. However, this study does not include the countries that have adopted the
policies at the local level, it only includes the countries that have adopted the policies at the
national level. And it does not make any analysis about the implementation of these policies. The
literature on diffusion mechanisms reviewed in this study implies rationalist and
normative/constructivist thinking. The aim here is to explore and better understand how and to
what extent these approaches influence the processes of diffusion of renewable energy policies.
Conventional constructivist approaches focus on “how ideational factors influence policy
outcomes” (Saurugger 2013, 889) and analyze “how ideational factors (worldviews, ideas,
collective understanding, norms, values, cognitive schemes, etc.)” influence political behavior
(Saurugger 2013, 888). Rejecting the rationalist assumptions that material factors are the main
driving force, constructivists argue that ideational factors are the main independent variables
(Mueller 2003). Emulation and learning mechanisms follow the logic of appropriateness. States
do things for reasons other than instrumental rationality. They may desire to seek legitimacy and
or credibility. Learning may occur through demonstration effects or through socialization. On
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the other hand, competition and suasion mechanisms follow the rationalist model where states
respond to sanctions and incentives. States do things to advance their interest with a rational
approach of cost and benefit analysis.
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LITERATURE REVIEW: DIFFUSION MECHANISMS

Before defining diffusion mechanisms it is important to define policy innovation and the
conditions under which diffusion occurs. Walker (1969, 881) defines innovation as “a program
or policy which is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how
many other states may have adopted it.” Similar words that are used to convey the term diffusion
are “convergence” and “race to the bottom”. Braun and Gilardi (2006, 299) define diffusion as “a
process where choices are interdependent, i.e. where the choice of a government influences the
choices made by others and conversely, the choice of a government is influenced by the choices
made by others.” According to Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013, 675) “Diffusion occurs when
one government’s decision about whether to adopt a policy innovation is influenced by the
choices made by other governments.”
According to Leichter (1983) seven circumstances lead to policy diffusion.
These were the need or desire to 1) remodel a nation’s political institutions; 2) deal with a
new or unique situation; 3) respond to a situation requiring relatively quick policy action;
4) change an existing but unsuccessful policy; 5) gather information during the initial
stages of the policy making process; 6) emulate a specific policy known to adopting
nation; and 7) avoid the policy mistakes of other nations (Leichter 1983, 233).
In addition, when the decision makers see that their states are deprived of some needs that
others have already responded, they are more likely to adopt new programs (Walker 1969).
According to Berry and Berry (Sabatier, 2007) the primary difference between various
diffusion models are the channels of communication and influence. Berry and Berry (2007)
argue that states emulate each other for three reasons: learning, competition and coercion.
A diffusion mechanism is thus a “systematic set of statements that provide a plausible
account of how two variables are linked.”(Braun and Gilardi 2006, 299). In an effort to answer
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how and why policies diffuse Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013, 684) divide policy diffusion
mechanisms and processes into four categories: learning, competition, coercion and
socialization.
Braun and Gilardi (2006) focus on learning, competition and cooperative
interdependence, coercion, common norms, taken-for-grantedness, and symbolic imitation.
Aside from proximity, competition, imitation (similar attributes), emulation (successful policy)
influences states to adopt policies (Karch 2007).
According to Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006) policy diffusion occurs when
countries’ decisions to adopt policies are influenced by similar decisions in other countries.
Sometimes this process occurs through the behavior of international organizations, private actors
or organizations. Theories of diffusion highlights diverse tools such as “Bayesian learning to
rational competition through hegemonic domination to unthinking emulation of leaders”
(Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).
In addition, diffusion mechanisms may be interrelated. For example, governments may
learn how to compete better with one another (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). Financial
incentives can enhance learning and norm diffusion. The Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) contributes to greening India’s energy policy in two ways: through transfer of technology
or leapfrogging, and norm diffusion under the conditions that is embedding economic activities
into local context and path dependencies are given due consideration (Benecke 2009).

SUASION
In the suasion form of diffusion, strong countries impose their policy preferences on
weaker states where weaker states would not adopt those policies otherwise (Daley and Garand
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2005; Gilardi 2005). This mechanism relates to the hegemonic stability theory, which claims that
the dominant state enforces a stable global economic order and provides public goods
(Kindleberger 1986). In the case of renewable energy policies, a hegemon arguably provides an
environmental public good—clean air. The mechanism applies to situations where powerful
countries themselves adopt certain policies and impose it on weaker countries. However, in the
case of renewable energy policy, not all strong countries themselves adopt these policies. Berry
and Berry (2007) argue that states adopt a policy adopted elsewhere because of coercion or
pressure on states in a federal system to confirm to regional or national standards. Federal
governments play the role of facilitator in diffusing similar policies across states and
international organizations across countries (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013).
Hegemonic countries can influence or coerce other countries. To examine this effect
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) use former colonizers’ policy adoption effect on the developing
countries as they continue to have strong economic and political ties. Another example of
diffusion through financial incentive is the spread of environmental ministries in transitional
democracies. Aklin and Urpelainen (2014) examine the spread of national environmental
ministries. They find that during democratic transition period, international factors influence
democratizing countries to adopt environmental ministries. However, the study does not directly
examine policy adoption or diffusion. “[S]tudies linking policy diffusion to soft coercion should
show that the policy ideas actively promoted by strong countries are more likely to be put into
practice in weaker countries structurally or situationally dependent on them”(Simmons, Dobbin,
and Garrett 2006).
International organizations can also coerce countries to adopt identical policies. Powerful
countries and international organizations can use financial incentives to affect policy change.
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International organizations like the IMF and the World Bank influence countries to liberalize
their economies through financial incentives and loans. Kelemen and Sibbitt (2004) show that
economic liberalization and political fragmentation affect the spread of American style legal
system around the world.
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) argue that the international climate regime and the
emission targets of transition countries under the Kyoto Protocol are not strict enough to force
countries into action. But there are specific international climate policy components such as the
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) that target developing countries and provide them with
financial incentives. In a study, Benecke (2009) asks how and to what extent the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) contributes to greening India’s energy policy and argues that
in two ways CDM contributes: through transfer of technology or leapfrogging and norm
diffusion under the conditions that embed economic activities to the local context, and path
dependencies are given due consideration (Benecke 2009).
The European Union can use its coercive power to impose policies (e.g. renewable
energy targets) on its members. While EU imposes renewable energy targets, it does not impose
the adoption of RPS/FIT. Countries around the world and specially EU countries have set targets
to decrease their energy dependence through domestic generation of renewable energy (Eurostat
2014). Countries with the highest change target from 2012 to 2020 are the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Malta and Luxembourg while Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus,
Ireland, and Italy are on the top of the list in terms of energy dependence. It is interesting to see
Norway, which is the highest oil producer in Europe, but also has the highest (64.5%) renewable
energy consumption. It is followed by Sweden, Latvia, Finland, and Austria. On the other hand,
Malta, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Cyprus and Belgium had the lowest share of
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renewable energy consumption in 2012. They have set the highest targets to increase their
renewable energy consumption by 2020.
Jenner et al. (2012) examine the effect of EU membership, representing EU Directive
2001/77/EC on generation of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) on policy
adoption (RPS, FIT). It has been the first binding directive that obliges state legislators to
support RES-E. Therefore, it can be treated as a coercion mechanism.
Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) look at factors that affect renewable energy adoption. Their
dependent variable is adoption of non-hydro renewable energy (NHRE), which is measured by
the per capita NHRE per kilowatt hours (kWh) in developing countries between 1980-2010. The
external independent variables include adoption of Kyoto Protocol and official development
assistance (ODA), which are instruments of coercion from an international organization. They
find a negative effect from openness and aid, and a weak influence of the Kyoto Protocol
(Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013).There is not enough pressure from international climate change
regime to achieve climate goals. Since Kyoto Protocols are not binding therefore, it will not be
used as a measure of coercion. Saikawa (2013, 13) uses international aid as a proxy for
international pressure or coercion by using "Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other
official aid values as a share of GDP (in percentage)" on the adoption of emission standards.
“[T]he preferences of the U.S. government, the European Union, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank may shape policies in countries reliant on those
entities for trade, foreign direct investment, aid, grants, loans, or security” (Dobbin, Simmons,
and Garrett 2007). The IMF or the EU set conditions for loans, aid or other incentives. Powerful
countries may set conditions themselves or through international institutions. Powerful countries
may act unilaterally and change the status quo, which influences the weaker country to alter their
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policy as well. Gruber (2000) gives the example of the effect of US and Canada’s decision to
liberalize on Mexico’s liberalization even before it was ready to do so.
Unilateral policy leadership may solve coordination problems when there exist multiple
equilibria that require nation-states to coordinate their policies. Nation-states may follow the
leader as focal points (TC. 1960). The models that leaders provide may be well examined.
Garrett and Weingast (1993) argue that Germany’s model of central bank and political structure
was adopted by the EU without Germany seeking to influence Europe. Dobbin, Simmons, and
Garrett (2007) suggest some ways to test for coercion. One way to illustrate that coercion
mechanism is at work is testing for adoption of a policy while countries are negotiating trade,
accession to the EU or the World Trade Organization (WTO), or loan disbursement from the
IMF. In addition, studies should illustrate that countries subject to aid, loans or security
dependence are adopting policies promoted by powerful actors. When carrot or stick is involved
from the go-between actors or external actors in the process of diffusion, it falls under suasion
mechanism.
According to Braun and Gilardi (2006), the payoff of policy diffusion is a function of
voting rewards and policy rewards. Coercion and symbolic imitation impact payoffs and affect
the policy component while electoral payoffs is a more domestic determinant rather than external
one. In vertical coercion, actors who are neither part of the adopting government nor government
from which policy diffuse impose their policy preferences through carrots and sticks. In
horizontal coercion one external government can impose pressure on a country to adopt a policy.
Asymmetric power is important in coercion. Powerful states or international organizations can
apply sanctions and issue linkages, “making behavior in one policy area contingent on behavior
in another” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 693). One needs to review the nature of these
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agreements for any stick or carrots attached to them to categorize the diffusion as coercion where
a change will be associated to the payoffs rather than the effectiveness. To further examine the
nature of these relationships or the links between the crucial actors interaction terms are used.
In the suasion/coercive mechanism of policy diffusion, the most important relationship
among actors are vertical. When internal actors are structurally or situationally dependent on
strong external actors, the suasion mechanism is at use in the diffusion process (Simmons,
Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). When external actors or go-betweens have the capability and have
interest in changing policy of others, they use coercive strategies to change policies. Unilateral
policy leadership of external actor may change the status quo for the internal actors (TC. 1960).
As go between actors, national policy makers or international organizations in federal system and
international organization may use coercive strategies through grants and aid requirements, preemptive laws, sanctions or military force to influence internal actors (Graham, Shipan, and
Volden 2013).

COMPETITION
Competition theorists have these assumptions:
First, they assume that the policy under examination has the potential to affect the flow of
international production and capital or the attractiveness of a nation’s exports…Second,
they assume that the policies that diffuse have consequential effects in the short to
medium term… Third, competitive models assume an information-rich (in fact, close to
perfect) environment…Finally … competition theorists assume that the most important
relationships are horizontal” (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).
Competition is more decentralized than the coercion mechanism of policy diffusion. This
mechanism focuses on the attractiveness of economic policies in the international market for the
buyers and investors. “Simplifying regulatory requirements, ameliorating investment risks, and
reducing tax burdens are often viewed as policy choices that can, quite quickly, make a local
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investment more attractive, exports more competitive, and an economy more vital” (Simmons,
Dobbin, and Garrett 2006, 792). Mooney illustrates that competition matters in the early phase of
the adoption process. Countries with similar economic structures can use competition diffusion
mechanisms. Membership to similar economic and regional blocs can be used as a proxy for
competition (Stadelmann and Castro 2014).
The geographic proximity of states influence neighboring states in policy adoption
(Karch 2007). The jurisdiction proximity influences some policies adoption but not others. For
example, “In policy areas where outcomes, externalities, and citizen or business mobility across
jurisdictional boundaries are plausible, we should expect to see competitive processes working in
the diffusion of policy innovations” (Tucker, Stoutenborough, and Beverlin 2012). When a
policy outcome is contained within the jurisdiction it is less likely that the policy adoption will
occur in the neighboring state. By adopting policies states want to avoid being competitively
disadvantaged (Berry and Berry 2007).
Berry and Baybeck (2005) use close geographic proximity as a proxy for competition. A
regional diffusion model focuses on regions and proposes that states are influenced by the states
in geographic proximity. They assume that neighboring states influence the potential adopter and
the probability of a state adopting a policy is related to the number of its neighbors that have
already adopted it. Fixed region models divide nation-states into specific regions and argue that
states adopt policies if other states within the same region adopted it (Berry and Berry 2007,
229). According to Berry and Berry (2007) one realistic assumption is that states are influenced
by nearby states depending on the distance between states vary their influence. Matisoff (2008)
finds that the percentage of neighboring states that adopted RPS has statistically significant and
positive effect on renewable energy programs and policies adoption.
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Berry and Berry (2007) argue that states adopt policies being adopted elsewhere to
compete with other states to have an advantage over other states or to avoid being disadvantaged.
Competition and efficiency cause states to liberalize their economies. For example, Kelemen and
Sibbitt (2004) show that economic liberalization and political fragmentation affect the spread of
American-style legal systems around the world.
According to Baccini, Lenzi, and Thurner (2013) oil producing countries join energy
related international governmental organizations (IGOs) if their competitors, main trade partners
in the energy sector, other oil and gas producers and consumers joined the organizations. In
addition, countries that share oil and gas pipelines also join energy IGOs. States use energy IGOs
to make them better off in the energy market.
Prakash and Potoski (2006) argue that countries adopt ISO 14001, a voluntary
environmental regulation, if their main export markets have done so. Vogel Cooper (1995)
argues stringent emission standards in California prompted car companies to adopt the standards
so that they can sell their products in California. After, acquiring the technology, these
companies pressured their domestic governments to adopt higher standards so that the companies
profit in the domestic markets. Saikawa (2013) argues that countries adopted emission standards
regulations to be competitive in international automobile market: “Adoption by importers creates
pressure (direct export pressure, that is, a 'California effect') and in other adoption by economic
competitors create pressure (indirect export pressure) to adopt such standards…” (Saikawa 2013,
2). Saikawa (2013) states that adoption of automobile emission standards creates competitive
advantage for exporting country if the importing country adopted the standards. The competitive
advantage declines as the number of countries adopting the standards increases. He creates four
independent variables to test the effect: exporting countries emission standard, importing
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countries adoption status, the interaction term of the two previous variables and the log of
number of standards.
In the competition mechanism, the most important relationships among actors are
horizontal (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). External and internal actors who compete are
more likely to have similar economic structures (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). In national
policy governments or international organizations in federal system and international
organization “may help restructure competitive environments, such as with the European Union
facilitating the reduction of trade barriers or the US Constitution limiting inter-state regulation of
commerce by the states” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 693).
Internal actors use competition mechanism when they do not want to be competitively
disadvantaged (Berry and Berry 2007). Policies diffuse from external actors to internal actors
when they are competitors or trading partners (Berry and Berry 2007). In other cases external
and internal actors compete in third-country markets or they might be competing for a third
country’s investment in the case of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Dobbin, Simmons, and
Garrett 2007).
Internal actors use competition mechanisms when externalities, citizen and business
mobility across jurisdictional boundaries are plausible. According to Tucker, Stoutenborough,
and Beverlin (2012) geographic proximity influences policy diffusion because of competition.
“In policy areas where outcomes, externalities, and citizen or business mobility across
jurisdictional boundaries are plausible, we should expect to see competitive process working in
the diffusion of policy innovation” (Tucker, Stoutenborough, and Beverlin 2012). When a policy
is contained within a jurisdiction it is less likely that the policy diffusion occurs in the
neighboring states because of competition.
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LEARNING
According to Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006, 792) the learning mechanism
suggests that success or failure of a policy mostly affect the policy adoption elsewhere especially
among those countries with similar experiences. Spread of successful policy is labeled as
learning (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 644). Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet (2009) propose
that learning increases in the later stages as knowledge accumulates. In addition, there are
specific projects such as renewable energy-related capacity-building under development and
environmental finance initiatives of international climate policy that target developing countries
that can be a depiction of learning (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). Similarly, one of the reasons
that democracy spread in post-communist countries is the success of earlier efforts. (Bunce and
Wolchik 2006).
Berry and Berry (2007) argue that states emulate each other because they learn from each
other when they adopt policies perceived successful elsewhere. Chandler (2009) argues that RPS
spread among US states through interstate learning. He finds positive association of neighboring
effects. In the learning mechanism, evidence of success increases the probability of adoption.
This connection fades when moving towards emulation.
Some studies examine the effect of renewable energy policies on the adoption of
renewable energy resources (Carley 2009; Pfeiffer, Mulder 2013). There are mixed results.
However, studies do find that energy diversification decreases foreign energy dependence which
increases energy security (Aslani, Helo, and Naaranoja 2014). Carley (2009) examines the
association between renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and the percentage of renewable
energy in electricity generation across US states. The result shows that RPS is not a predictor of
renewable energy mix as part of electricity. The study finds that for each additional year the
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renewable energy increases with an RPS policy. Salim and Rafiq (2012) find that Carbon
Dioxide (CO2) emissions is a significant factor in renewable energy sources consumption.
Research focusing on the learning mechanism should show that the efficacy of a policy
increases the likelihood of its adoption elsewhere (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007).
However, many studies are lacking evidence of efficacy in policy diffusion. They rather assume
the spread of a policy as the learning effect.
States learn about the economic benefits of renewable energy sources and adopt the
policies. Schreurs (2012) argues that economic benefits to small and medium size businesses
motivates Germany’s renewable energy adoption. Gallagher (2013) argues that economic motive
is a key factor in renewable sources adoption. Economic benefits from major wind energy
manufacturing companies motivate countries to promote renewable sources technologies
(Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf 2012). Apergis and Payne (2010) examine the relationship
between renewable energy consumption and economic growth organization for economic
cooperation and development (OECD) member countries. They find that there is a bidirectional
relationship between economic growth and renewable energy consumption. The variables that
were statistically significant included real gross domestic product (GDP), renewable energy
consumption, real gross fixed capital formation, and the labor force (Apergis and Payne 2010).
Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) look at factors that affect renewable energy adoption.
The dependent variable is adoption of non-hydro renewable energy (NHRE), which is measured
by the per capita NHRE per kilowatt hours (KWh) in developing countries between 1980-2010.
The independent variables include adoption of Kyoto Protocol, trade intensity, net foreign direct
investment (FDI) inflow, renewable energy technology (RET) policies, growth in electricity
consumption, official development assistance (ODA), secondary enrollment, hydro share, coal
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production, gas production and per capita income. The study controls for Kyoto Protocol, ODA,
trade intensity and FDI, which are measures of diffusion. Economic and regulatory instruments,
per capita income and schooling level, and stable democratic regimes have positive and
statistically significant effect on NHRE. There is a negative effect from openness and aid,
institutional and strategic policy support programs, growth of electricity consumption and fossil
fuel production. Diverse energy mix increases the probability of NHRE adoption. There is a
weak influence from Kyoto Protocol and no significant effect from financial sector development
(Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013). Aslani, Helo, and Naaranoja (2014) find that increasing renewable
energy capacity by implementing the action plan saves $4 billion in expenditure on natural gas
imports. Energy diversification reduces energy dependency and increases energy security in
Finland.
The findings of a study by Al-mulali, Fereidouni, and Lee (2014) reveal that renewable
energy consumption; non-renewable energy consumption in electricity generation; gross fixed
capital formation; total labor force; and total trade have a positive effect on economic growth in
Latin American countries. Renewable energy consumption is more significant than nonrenewable energy consumption in electricity on economic growth. The reason is that renewable
energy consumption in electricity constitutes more than half of electricity generation (Al-mulali,
Fereidouni, and Lee 2014). Yildirim, Saraç, and Aslan (2012) examine the role of renewable
energy on economic growth in USA. The result shows that renewable energy consumption from
biomass waste has a positive and significant relation on real GDP. The other variables including
total renewable energy consumption, geothermal energy consumption, hydro-electric energy
consumption, biomass energy consumption and biomass-wood-derived energy consumption,
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employment and investment were not statistically significant (Yildirim, Saraç, and Aslan 2012).
Countries learn about the effectiveness of a policy as other countries adopt it.
In the learning mechanism, external actors increase the knowledge about a policy’s
effectiveness. Their policy adoption does not have externality on the internal actors or potential
adopters. External actors are not actively seeking to change policies of potential adopters using
carrots and sticks. Internal actors are more active and are seeking effective public policies. They
learn from others about the success and political viability of policies adopted elsewhere
(Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). As go-betweens, national governments or international
organizations in federal system and international organization can facilitate learning (Graham,
Shipan, and Volden 2013). For example, the EU can have a learning effect on European
countries in transition or through capacity building projects under “development and
environmental finance initiatives of international climate policy” for developing countries
(Stadelmann and Castro 2014).

EMULATION
The emulation mechanism focuses on the role of shared cultural beliefs, norms, common
language, history, and religion as having significant effect on policy diffusion, which cannot be
explained by learning and competition (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006, 792). Socially
accepted norms and policies may diffuse even when countries are not developmentally ready to
implement them. For example, many developing and developed countries sign international
conventions on human rights as a sign of commitment to global norms. International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), NGOs, policy professionals, and academics can influence
governments to adopt new policies.
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On the other hand, Stadelmann and Castro (2014) combine learning and emulation. They
use common language, colonial experience or membership to similar economic and regional
block to examine learning and emulation effects.
Such learning-imitation due to socially constructed policy norms (Simmons et al., 2006)
is more likely to take place in case of neighboring countries, or countries within the same
region (MacGarvie, 2005), because such peers are more likely to meet in common forum
and exchange information with each other (Berry and Berry, 2007). In addition, countries
with cultural, historic or economic commonalities are also more likely to learn from each
other (Simmons and Elkins, 2004) or even to compete for markets, e.g. for RE
technology. Adoption of policies from culturally or historically similar countries can be
understood as learning or emulation of peers “with psychological proximity”, an idea
based on constructivist theories… (Stadelmann and Castro 2014, 416).
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) find that EU membership and common colonial history
have statistically significant and positive effect on FIT adoption and financial incentives through
tax reduction, grants, and concessional loans. Common colonial history and Global
Environmental Facility (GEF) funding have statistically significant and positive effects on
framework policies (strategies, plans, generic law). Only EU membership has a positive and
statistically significant effect on renewable energy target adoption.
Isomorphism in organizational theory refers to “the mechanisms leading one unit in a
population to resemble other units facing the same set of environmental conditions” (Radaelli
2000, 40). Isomorphism may help explain why states emulate policies of similar states who have
common ideology (conservative-liberal), political demographic and economic characteristics and
“channels of cultural commonality and historic connection”. In vertical influence, the policy is
diffused from national government to states (Berry and Berry 2007). MacGarvie (2005) finds
that “technological knowledge diffuses faster across countries that share a [common official]
language or that are geographically proximate.”
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Walker (1969) emphasizes the role of interstate communication in the process of
diffusion. In a national interaction model, when potential adopters interact with officials from
adopting states, their probability of adoption increases. Their probability of adoption is
proportional to the number of interactions they have with already adopted state officials (Gray
1973a). The model assumes that during any time period, each potential adopter is equally likely
to adopt the policy. The variable that influences the probability of adoption is the previous
cumulative number of adopters, but not all potential adopters are similar.
Common norms emerge with increased interaction and socialization within networks.
Common norms are appropriate behaviors within certain context for actors (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, 891). Networks of professionals, regulators, and international organizations can be
platforms for the development of common norms. Through socialization in these networks actors
develop similar views about effectiveness of policies. Lee (2013) compares Northeast Asia and
European energy cooperation. The history of European cooperation on energy initiatives
suggests that economic integration, institutional development and policy coordination are
prerequisites for energy cooperation. It suggests domestic efforts and sub-regional institutional
buildup for Northeast Asian cooperation. It highlights the regional multilateral institutions as a
useful platform for renewable energy coordination and cooperation. How does the ratification
and signing of multilateral environmental agreements affect renewable energy policy adoption?
Advocacy groups, epistemic communities, common language, cultural heritage and
religion can be used to test the effect of emulation (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).
Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf (2012) state that pressure from environmental groups
motivate countries to promote renewable sources technologies. Jenner et al. (2012) find that the
presence of International Solar Energy Association has positive and significant effect on states to
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adopt regulations (RPS, feed-in tariffs) that support electricity generation from renewable energy
sources (RES-E). Lyon and Yin (2010) test for the effect of American Energy Association on the
adoption of RPS.
According to Finnemore’s constructivist IO theory, elite government officials socialize in
IOs and adopt policies as appropriate state behavior. For example, government officials'
socialization in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
has led to the diffusion of state science bureaucracies (Kim 2013). On the other hand, Kim
(2013) argues constructivists IO theories ignore the role of international non-government
organizations, which have mediated the diffusion of national human rights organizations.
Saikawa (2013) argues that as the number of countries adopting emission standards
increases, it changes the norms for other countries on environmental issues. It becomes more
appropriate and encourages other countries to adopt the standards. The increased number of
epistemic communities and transnational movements encourage the use of the emulation
mechanism. When the carrot or stick is not involved through external and go-between actors, the
process of diffusion will be categorized as emulation mechanism.
In the emulation mechanism, as go-betweens national policy governments or
international organizations in federal systems and international organization can facilitate
socialization by establishing information facilities, organizing conferences and recommending
best practices (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). NGOs, policy professionals, and academics
can influence governments to adopt policies (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).
Socialization or emulation mechanisms aim to change preferences of actors, without
expecting immediate policy change, but rather would lead to long-term policy change (Graham,
Shipan, and Volden 2013). Despite a policy outcome being contained within a jurisdiction
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boundary, if it diffuses to neighboring states (internal actors) it is because of emulation, the
common cultural and historical characteristics and increased interaction.
Increased interaction among actors can lead to norm diffusion (Walker 1969, Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998). In addition, norms can diffuse among external and internal actors who have
similar cultural and historical connections (Berry and Berry 2007). External actors with soft
power can appeal to others by becoming role models (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013).
While socialization through international organizations or more specifically the norm
creation through multilateral environmental agreements do not involve financial incentives or
sanctions in the process of diffusion, it falls under the emulation mechanism, which affects the
effectiveness. It may not affect the payoffs of policy adoption (Braun and Gilardi 2006).

OTHER EXPLANATIONS
States might adopt renewable energy policies for reasons unrelated to the four
mechanisms of diffusion. This study draws a clear distinction between policy adoption and
diffusion. It sees diffusion as a component of policy adoption, but policy adoption may be
influenced by other factors. All examples of policy diffusion are examples of policy adoption,
but not all policy adoptions are examples of diffusion. Internal characteristics of states are used
as controls for policy adoption. A more detailed discussion of these characteristics follows.
There is no consensus among scholars on whether external (diffusion) or internal
determinants are more important in policy adoption. There are scholars who argue for internal
determinants being more important and there are scholars who gave more importance to external
determinants. Stadelmann and Castro (2014) find that internal determinants are more relevant in
explaining policy adoption than international factors. Recent studies claim that domestic factors
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are more important than diffusion factors in policy adoption (Lyon and Yin 2010); (Matisoff
2008). According to Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013) internal characteristics of states play
key role in policy adoption (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). For example, Kelemen and
Sibbitt (2004) show that economic liberalization and political fragmentation affect the spread of
American-style legal systems around the world.
According to the previous studies presented in the below table, the factors that have
positive effects on renewable energy adoption can be categorized as political factors,
environmental concerns, economic factors, renewable energy endowment and international
factors.

Political factors
Policy adoption is a combination of factors including motivation for policy change,
availability of resources and barriers that prevents policy change (Walker 1969). Public opinions
and uncertainty about the effect of to be adopted policy is an obstacle to policy adoption (Berry
and Berry 1990).
Political ideology may affect RPS adoption (Lyon and Yin 2010). Biresselioglu and
Zengin Karaibrahimoglu (2012) emphasize on the role of government orientation. According to
them leftist and center oriented governments are more likely to adopt renewable energy than
right oriented governments. They find that right oriented governments have negative significant
effect on renewable energy consumption. Contrary to Biresselioglu and Zengin Karaibrahimoglu
(2012), White (2009) finds that government orientation and green party representation in
legislature do not have significant effect on renewable energy adoption. However, he finds that
proportionality has positive and significant effect on renewable energy consumption. Stable
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democratic regimes, support from both ruling and opposition parties in the case of Germany and
political factors are highlighted as key in political category to have positive association with
renewable sources adoption (Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013); (Schreurs 2012); (Gallagher 2013).
Matisoff (2008) finds positive and significant relationship between renewable energy policy
adoption (RPS) and citizen liberalism. Carley (2009) finds that political institutions have
significant effect on the percentage of renewable energy in electricity generation across US states
(Carley 2009).
Private interests affect RPS adoption (Lyon and Yin 2010). Jenner et al. (2012) ask what
drives states to adopt regulations (RPS, feed-in tariffs) that support electricity generation from
renewable energy sources (RES-E). The findings show that the presence of International Solar
Energy Association is positively correlated with the regulation adoption. Jenner, Ovaere, and
Schindele (2013) examine how financial contributions by conventional energy interest groups
(CEI) and renewable energy interest group (REI) affect RPS adoption. Their findings show that
REI contributes more to Democrats and CEI donates more to Republicans state-level policy
makers between 1998-2010. They found that CEI donations have negative significant effect on
RPS adoption in a state while REI donations have positive and significant effect on RPS
adoption. Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf (2012) state that pressure from environmental
groups motivate countries to promote renewable sources technologies. Marques and Fuinhas
(2012) find that European Union’s established industries’ lobbies and renewable energy sources
consumption are negatively associated.
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Table 4 Barriers to Renewable Energy
Monopolistic structure of utilities (state owned public utilities (subsidization of electricity,
regulated vs open market)
Lobbying effect of fossil fuel (contribution of fossil fuel as a percentage of GDP)
Long term non-renewable energy agreements with suppliers

Economic factors
Electricity sector subsidization is highlighted in the literature to be a barrier to the
generation of renewable energy sources in the market because of the absence of competitiveness
in terms of price. According to Bayülgen (Winter 2013) subsidization of electricity as a stateowned industry made it harder for the renewable energy to enter the electricity market. A study
shows that the monopolistic structure of Turkish natural gas sector and the lobbying power of
fossil fuel sector make the entry of renewables harder. Turkey is taking pride in being a transit
country between the neighboring supplier and the European consumers and energy
interdependence has become central to its foreign policy (Bayülgen Winter 2013).This study
argues that the main obstacles to renewable energy reform is political not technical and financial
in Turkey. Turkish government has not reduced the dominance of fossil fuel in its energy policy
despite external pressure, political stability, civic activism and favorable public opinion. Energy
policy in Turkey favors fossil fuel over renewables (Bayülgen Winter 2013).
Zhang (2008) looks at Asia’s renewable energy policies. He suggests that Asia needs to
get rid of its subsidies on fossil fuel energy so that they reflect the right prices in order to adopt
clean energy (Zhang 2008). Burns (1982) argues that in order for solar energy to achieve a
substantial market penetration, it needs to be competitive with the price of fossil fuel energy.
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Carley (2009) finds that deregulation and electricity price have significant effect on the
percentage of renewable energy in electricity generation across US states (Carley 2009).
Electricity market concentration has a negative effect on policy adoption (Jenner et al.
2012). States with regulated electricity markets or cost-based pricing are more likely to adopt
RPS with in-state requirement than states with restructured electricity markets or competitive
markets (Lyon and Yin 2010).
Lyon and Yin (2010) conduct an empirical study on the adoption of renewable portfolio
standards (RPSs) in the US states. They examine the political and economic factors that
contribute to the adoption of RPSs in US states. They find that states with slower economic
growth are slower in adopting RPS. Local environment conditions and preference effects are not
significant. Whether there is an in state requirement or not depends on the current level of
renewable energy development. States that have a higher developed renewable energy capacity,
are less likely to adopt an RPS with in-state requirement. Carley (2009) finds that gross state
product per capita, and electricity use per person have significant effect on the percentage of
renewable energy in electricity generation across US states (Carley 2009).
Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) look at factors that affect renewable energy adoption. The
dependent variable is adoption of non-hydro renewable energy (NHRE), which is measured by
the per capita NHRE per kilowatt hours (kWh) in developing countries between 1980-2010.
They include renewable energy technology (RET) policies, growth in electricity consumption,
secondary enrollment and per-capita income among their independent variables. Economic and
regulatory instruments, per capita income and schooling level, and stable democratic regimes
have positive and statistically significant effect on NHRE. There is a negative effect from
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institutional and strategic policy support programs and growth of electricity consumption. There
is no significant effect from financial sector development (Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013).
GDP is identified as a determinant of renewable energy consumption in various studies;
therefore; it is included here. Countries’ prosperity allows for investment in renewable sources of
energy (Grossman and Krueger 1995). Salim and Rafiq (2012) find that GDP is a significant
factor in the consumption of renewable energy. As GDP increases one percent, the consumption
of renewable energy increases 1.228 percent in the emerging economies (Salim and Rafiq 2012).
Sadorsky (2009) finds that per capita income has positive and statistically significant effect on
per capita renewable energy consumption in the emerging economies. “In the long term, a 1%
increase in real income per capita increases the consumption of renewable energy per capita in
the emerging economies by approximately 3.5%” (Sadorsky 2009).
Erdogdu (2013) finds that there is a negative relationship between energy intensity of
GDP and renewable energy R&D. Countries with higher energy intensity of GDP have lower
budget for R&D in renewable energy. He measures energy intensity by dividing energy supply
over GDP to show how much energy is used for producing one unit of GDP. Overall his results
show that deregulation of electricity market leads to lower government spending on energy
R&D. He explains this result by claiming that countries with high energy intensity of GDP invest
in technologies that produce large amounts of energy to meet their high energy needs rather than
focusing on renewable energy technology that produce lower amount of energy. Among the
countries with highest energy intensity of GDP are USA, Canada, Finland, Czech Republic and
Korea (Erdogdu 2013).
Jenner et al. (2012) argue that unemployment affect policy adoption (RPS, feed-in-tariffs)
positively. Per capita income and renewable energy consumption are positively associated
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(Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013); (Sadorsky 2009). While Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) use per capita
non hydro renewable energy, Sadorsky (2009) uses per capita renewable sources consumption as
the dependent variable. Schreurs (2012) argues that economic benefits to small- and mediumsized businesses motivates Germany’s renewable energy adoption. Gallagher (2013) argues that
economic motive is a key factor in renewable sources adoption. Salim and Rafiq (2012) argue
that income (GDP) is a major factor for renewable sources consumption. Economic benefits from
major wind energy manufacturing companies motivate countries to promote renewable sources
technologies (Colgan, Keohane, and Van de Graaf 2012).
It is important to control for the effect of oil prices, it might be that increased oil prices is
the motivation for countries to adopt the policies simultaneously, which would not be because of
diffusion, but rather a common response to rising prices. Failure to include this variable might
lead to false conclusion about policy diffusion.

Factor endowments
Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) look at factors that affect renewable energy adoption. The
dependent variable is adoption of non-hydro renewable energy (NHRE), which is measured by
the per capita NHRE per kilowatt hours (kWh) in developing countries between 1980-2010.
They include hydro share, coal production, and gas production among their independent
variables. There is a negative effect from fossil fuel production. Carley (2009) finds that natural
resource endowments have significant effect on the percentage of renewable energy in electricity
generation across US states (Carley 2009). Diverse energy mix increases the probability of
NHRE adoption (Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013).
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Jenner et al. (2012) ask what drives states to adopt regulations (RPS, feed-in-tariffs) that
support electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E). The findings show that
solar potential measured as global radiation in kwh per square meter, and unemployment rate as
a percent of total work force are positively correlated with regulation adoption. Matisoff (2008)
finds positive and significant relationship between renewable energy policy adoption (RPS) solar
density and the criteria pollutant index. Lyon and Yin (2010) conduct an empirical study on the
adoption of renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) in US states, which examines the political and
economic factors that contribute to the adoption of RPSs in US states. Local environment
conditions and preferences effects are not significant. Whether there is an in state requirement or
not depends on the current level of renewable energy development. States that have higher
renewable energy capacity developed, are less likely to adopt an RPS with in-state requirement.

Environmental concern
In addition, environmental concern is another main factor highlighted in previous studies.
Global warming and climate change concern policy makers on how to reduce Carbon Dioxide
(CO2) emissions and other greenhouse gases that are produced by energy consumption. If the
concentration of greenhouse gases keeps increasing, the temperature at the earth’s surface will
continuously rise. With the industrial revolution, the amount of CO2 emission increased as
burning coal to produce electricity and factories increased. In 2005 CO2 reached 379 parts per
million, an increase of 35% from pre-industrial revolution period. Average global temperature
increased by 0.76 degree Celsius since the end of the 1800s. Increased temperature could have
adverse effects on the living habitat. Although most of CO2 is natural, humans generate a great
portion of CO2 by burning fossil fuel. Growth in GDP and population growth increase human
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generated carbon. Other major sources of emissions are deforestation and burning bio mass
(Yergin 2011).
Countries are under pressure by the environmental groups to mitigate their CO2 emission.
One of the barriers to clean energy transition is the high cost of clean energy. Technological
innovation can reduce the cost of transition to clean energy. Renewable energy research,
development and demonstration (RD&D) is a route towards adopting clean energy, which can
lead to mitigation of CO2 emission. There are previous studies on how pollutant emission
increases renewable energy consumption, but there is not much focus on the role of pollutant
emission on RD&D. Salim and Rafiq (2012) find that pollutant emission is a significant factor
for renewable energy consumption. Their examination shows that one percent increase in
pollutant emission increases renewable energy consumption by 0.033% in emerging economies
(Salim and Rafiq 2012). Renewable energy sources endowment is also identified as a significant
factor for adoption of renewable sources (Gallagher 2013). Jenner et al. (2012) find that solar
radiation is a significant factor for policy adoption (RPS, feed-in tariffs). On the other hand,
Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) find that fossil fuel production is not a significant factor.
Geopolitical concerns are barrier to renewable energy adoption. Podobnik (1999) argues
that the interaction of three systemic dynamics--geopolitical rivalry, commercial competition,
and social unrest--paved the way to shift from coal regime to petroleum in the twentieth century
(Podobnik 1999). While acknowledging the challenges that countries face in terms of energy
such as not having secure energy supplies, environmental threats due to climate change, loss of
biodiversity, water scarcity, growth in energy consumptions of individuals and industrial needs,
economic and geopolitical concern influences countries’ decisions on their energy policies.
ÜSTÜN (2012) examines Turkey’s energy and environmental policy and its geopolitical and
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economic needs and the agreements with the oil producing countries. Many factors such as
“droughts, water scarcity, the passage of energy tankers from Black Sea and the decline of
biodiversity force Turkey to use clean energy; on the other hand, economic and geopolitical
concerns influence Turkey’s decisions in having agreements with energy producing countries
(ÜSTÜN 2012).
Gallagher et al. (2011) find that the investment in research, development and
demonstration (RD&D) in energy has been volatile with an increase in the late 1970s, shrank in
the next two decades with a decline in 1997 followed by a gradual increase during the 2000s.
The investment has been dominated on research in nuclear and fossil fuel. While Brazil, Russia,
India, Mexico, China and South Africa (BRIMCS) have been significant in the energy sector,
little data is available about public and private investment in those countries. Similar to
International Energy Agency (IEA) their investments have been predominantly on nuclear
technology and fossil fuel (Gallagher et al. 2011).
Some of the top oil importers also have the highest budget for renewable sources RD&D.
According to IEA data for 2011 these countries were the United States, Japan, Germany, Korea,
France, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. Only two of the IEA members in the top oil importers
(Turkey & Belgium) in Figure 2 are not in the list countries who are leading in renewable energy
sources RD&D. However, it does not report the budget for non-IEA members from Asia &
Oceania. According to Renewable 2014 Global Status Report (Network 2014) Asia & Oceania
region, which is the most dependent on foreign energy, has the highest investment on renewable
power and fuels. The investment in the Americas has been volatile. Europe’s investment, which
used to have the highest investment, has declined. Asia & Oceania where the main investors are
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China and India surpassed Europe in 2012 and surpassed Americas in 2009. Africa & the Middle
East has the lowest investment (Network 2014).
Dependence on foreign sources of energy is a great concern for the highly dependent
countries, which are also major or emerging economies of the world. The concern for energy
security (affordability and supply), vulnerability of energy sources infrastructure to terrorist
attacks and natural disaster, the dominance of nationalized oil companies, increasing demand for
the energy with the growth of emerging economies, environmental consequences of fossil fuel
consumption are some of the challenges the world faces today. Most importantly there is only
limited reserves of conventional energy sources available in the world. These sources are not
sustainable and will deplete sometime in the future. Diversification of energy mix and energy
sources is seen as one of the main solutions for energy security (Bahgat 2006). As sustainable
development is highly dependent on renewable energy sources and to achieve energy security,
countries need to develop renewable sources of energy.
Encouraging domestic production is valuable not only in decreasing the dependence, but
also sustainable development. Development of technology will be vital for domestic production
and decreasing dependence on foreign energy sources. This transition will ultimately become
possible through investment in renewable sources research, development and demonstration
(RD&D) to make renewable sources of energy more competitive in the world market.
World demand for energy is increasing. Energy dependency is measured by the
difference between total primary energy consumption and energy production in different regions.
According to the data from US Energy Information Administration (EIA) three regions (Asia &
Oceania, Europe & North America) are highly dependent on foreign energy. There is an
increasing trend in energy dependency of Asia and Oceania region. It has surpassed Europe’s
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energy dependency. There has been a decreasing trend in North America’s energy dependence
because of the energy boom in the United States. Central & South America, Africa, Middle East
and Eurasia produce more energy than they consume.
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RESEARCH DESIGN

To examine the diffusion of renewable energy policies, this study applies mixed methods.
A statistical model will allow testing multiple hypotheses with a large sample size. In addition,
an agent-based model is used to complement the statistical analysis. Studies use empirical
findings to develop agent-based models for better understanding of the dynamics behind an
observation. Others use theoretically informed agent-based models to compare with empirical
findings (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010).
The section will present the hypotheses for each of the mechanisms. Then it will discuss
the specification and estimation techniques for the statistical model; the operational measures of
all variables; and the data sources. The section ends with the discussion of developing an agentbased model.

DIFFUSION MECHANISMS’ HYPOTHESES
This section discusses the hypothesis for each mechanism. First, it presents suasion
mechanism’s hypotheses followed by competition, learning and emulation respectively. There
are eighteen hypotheses in total.

The Suasion Mechanism: Hypotheses
“[S]tudies linking policy diffusion to soft coercion should show that the policy ideas
actively promoted by strong countries are more likely to be put into practice in weaker countries
structurally or situationally dependent on them” (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).
Membership in similar regional or multilateral organizations, preferential trade agreements
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(PTAs), and military alliance can be used to examine their effect on policy outcome when the
sticks or carrots of suasion are involved.
The European Union can use its coercive power to impose policies (e.g. renewable
energy targets) on its members. While the EU imposes renewable energy targets, it does not
impose the adoption of RPS/FIT specifically. Jenner et al. (2012) examine the effect of EU
membership, representing EU Directive 2001/77/EC on generation of electricity from renewable
energy sources (RES-E) on policy adoption (RPS, FIT). Because it is the first binding directive
that obliges nation-states' legislators to support RES-E, it can be treated as a coercion
mechanism.
International organizations and powerful countries can coerce countries through financial
incentives to affect policy change. International climate policy components such as the Clean
Development Mechanisms (CDM) target developing countries and provide them with financial
incentives (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). To examine the effect of coercion from international
organizations, one can use CDM projects as a proxy measure.
Hegemonic countries can influence or coerce other countries. To examine this effect
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) use former colonizers’ policy adoption effect on the developing
countries as they continue to have strong economic and political ties.
Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett (2007) suggest some ways to test for coercion. One way
to illustrate that the coercion mechanism is at work is to test for adoption of a policy while
countries are negotiating trade agreements; accession to the EU or the WTO; or loan
disbursement from the IMF. In addition, studies should illustrate that countries subject to aid,
loans or security dependence are adopting policies promoted by powerful actors. “[T]he
preferences of the U.S. government, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund
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(IMF), and the World Bank may shape policy in countries reliant on those entities for trade,
foreign direct investment, aid, grants, loans, or security” (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007).
Together, these previous studies suggest four hypotheses about suasion:

H1a

Countries that are members of the European Union are more likely to adopt renewable
energy policies than non-EU states.

H2a

Countries for which their former colonizers adopted RPS/FIT are more likely to adopt
them.

H3a

Countries with CDM projects are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT than countries without
them.

H4a

Countries with high levels of FDI are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS than countries with
lower levels of FDI.

The above hypothesis will examine the effect of different crucial actors on policy
diffusion. The European Union and CDM are go-between actors. Former colonizers and FDI
show the effects of external actors.

The Competition Mechanism: Hypotheses
To test the effects of competition on policy diffusion, Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett
(2007) provide some operational measures. First, it is important to identify what policies are
important for a country and its competitors. Exporting countries are affected by wage and
welfare policies elsewhere. Investment seekers compete on policies that reduce security or
political risks and contractual hazards. In case of competition in a local market, the competition
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is with a trade partner. In other cases, countries compete in a third country’s market. For
example, if country A and B are competing in C’s market, when A reduces trade barriers, B may
follow A for gaining access to C’s market. For countries who are seeking foreign direct
investment, one may consider countries with similar social capital, infrastructure or natural
resources endowment.
Trade openness can be used as a proxy for competition. Neumayer (2002) finds that trade
openness promotes multilateral environmental cooperation. Exporting countries support those
multilateral environmental agreements that do not hinder their economic interests. For example,
fossil fuel exporters are less likely to sign the Kyoto Protocol because they see it as a threat to
their economic interest. When the trade provisions in multilateral environmental agreements
accommodate the interest of the exporters, they are more likely to cooperate. A measure of
trade openness is membership to the World Trade Organization. Other proxy measures include
the natural log of the sum of exports and imports divided by gross domestic product (GDP); the
natural log of imports as a percentage of GDP; the natural log of exports as a percentage of GDP;
the index of openness from the Fraser Institute; and the index of trade openness from the
Heritage Foundation. The natural log of the variables are used to avoid the potential problem of
hetroscedasticity (Neumayer 2002). Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) use trade intensity and net FDI
inflow, which are measures of competition, to find the drivers of renewable energy adoption.
Policies diffuse from external actors to internal actors when they are competitors or
trading partners (Berry and Berry 2007). In other cases, external and internal actors compete in
third countries’ market or they might be competing for a third country’s investment in the case of
foreign direct investment (FDI) (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007).
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In the competition mechanism, the most important relationships among actors are
horizontal (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006). External and internal actors who compete are
more likely to have similar economic structures (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). Stadelmann and
Castro (2014) find significant effects of GDP per capita on FIT adoption in emerging and
developing countries. Income level (low, medium, high) can be used to measure competition
among countries.
The literature provides various measures of competition. Stadelmann and Castro (2014)
use membership to similar economic and regional blocks, trade openness and countries with
similar economic structure as proxies for competition. Baccini, Lenzi, and Thurner (2013) define
competitors as main trade partners. Prakash and Potoski (2006) use the main exporter’s market
or partner(s) as a measure of competition. Saikawa (2013, 13) states that adoption by an
importing country puts pressure on the exporting country to adopt the policy as well. Adoption of
an exporting country gives it a competitive advantage. Geographic proximity is another proxy for
measure of competition.
These findings suggest three hypotheses about the competition mechanism of diffusion:

H5a

Countries are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS if their main export partner(s) (competitor)
adopted them.

H6a

Countries are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS if their competitors with CDM have adopted
the policies.

H7a

Countries are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT if their competitors with FDI adopted them.
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Countries are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT if their prime competitors for trade and
investment have done so. FDI will be used to measure competition between the receivers.
However, it can be a measure of suasion if considered in terms of recipients and investors. The
same can be true for CDM, the recipients compete for it, while from the perspective of relation
between CDM providers and recipients, it is a measure of suasion. The hypotheses will examine
the effects of external actors in the competition mechanism.

The Learning Mechanism: Hypotheses
Berry and Berry (2007) argue that states emulate each other because they learn from each
other; they adopt policies that they perceive as successful elsewhere. The percentage of
renewable energy in electricity generation, CO2 emission per capita and economic growth could
be used to measure RPS/FIT success. The following hypotheses test the learning mechanism of
diffusion:

H8a

In comparing countries, those in regions with a high share of renewable energy are more
likely to adopt FIT/RPS than those in regions with a low share of renewable energy.

H9a

In comparing countries of the world, the average share of renewable energy is higher in
countries with FIT/RPS than countries without them.

H10a In

comparing countries, those in regions with lower average carbon emissions are more

likely to adopt FIT/RPS that those in regions with high average carbon emissions.
H11a

In comparing countries of the world, the average carbon emissions are lower in countries
with FIT/RPS than countries without them.
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H12a

In comparing countries, those in regions with higher average economic growth are more
likely to adopt FIT/RPS than those in regions with lower average economic growth.

H13a In

comparing countries of the world, the average economic growth is higher in countries

with FIT/RPS than countries without them.

In the above hypotheses, the effects of external actors in the learning mechanism are
considered. Covadonga (2004) assumes that governments are rational learners choosing to
privatize. Governments use their prior beliefs of the impact of privatization on growth a year
before they choose to privatize. In each period, a year before they adopt the policies, the
countries will observe the average rate of renewable energy consumption, CO2 emissions and
economic growth for countries with the policies and without the policies. Governments will use
this information to change their prior belief about the effectiveness of the policies.

The Emulation Mechanism: Hypotheses
In addition, by introducing a new independent variable and a broader reach, this study
will contribute by examining whether and how socialization in international organizations affects
the policy diffusion process. It investigates the question: how does membership in multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) affect the diffusion of domestic renewable energy policies?
The purpose is to examine the diffusion of renewable energy policies, whether socialization or
membership in these networks or multilateral environmental agreements affect the adoption of
RPS and FIT.
Stadelmann and Castro (2014) argue that the international climate regime and the
emission targets of transition countries under the Kyoto Protocol are not strict enough to force
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countries into action. Therefore, multilateral organizations will be used as a proxy to examine
socialization, which is one of the emulation processes. The independent variables are
membership in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) such as Kyoto Protocol from the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety. Neumayer (2002) categorizes MEAs as continuous and suggest that Cox proportional
Hazards model or survival model is the appropriate estimation method. The model will also
include independent variables to test the domestic determinants of renewable energy policy
adoption.
MacGarvie (2005) uses geographic proximity as a proxy for communication barriers
between two countries and measures the distance between the capital of two countries of the
citing and cited patents.
Acting as go-betweens, national policy governments in federal system and international
organizations can facilitate socialization by establishing information facilities, organizing
conferences and recommending best practices (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). NGOs,
policy professionals, academics can influence governments to adopt policies (Simmons, Dobbin,
and Garrett 2006).
These previous studies suggest the following hypotheses concerning the emulation
mechanism of policy diffusion:

H14a States

with a higher percentage of neighbors with the renewable energy policy are more

likely to adopt renewable energy policy.
H15a

States with a higher percentages of countries with FIT/RPS that share a common
colonizer historically are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT
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H16a States

with higher percentages of countries with FIT/RPS that share a common language

are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT
H17a

Countries that are signatories to the Cartagena multilateral environmental agreement are
more likely to adopt renewable energy policies.

H18a

Countries that are signatories to the Kyoto multilateral environmental agreement are
more likely to adopt renewable energy policies.

The above hypotheses will examine the effects of external actors (neighboring countries,
countries with common cultural/historical features) and go-between actors (MEAs) on internal
actors. When and where policy diffusion occurs--in other words, the process of diffusion rather
than the end result--“the existence and nature of the linkages among internal, external, and go
between actors may influence which diffusion mechanisms are used” (Graham, Shipan, and
Volden 2013). Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013) suggest the examination of diffusion
mechanisms and the interaction of crucial actors. Previous studies do not look at the interaction
of neighboring states’ and the policy advocates’ influence. It is not known whether their
interaction reinforces the learning processes or substitutes it. While the literature identifies the
actors and the mechanisms, it does not examine the existence and linkages among the crucial
actors and the diffusion mechanisms. Not only that, Braun and Gilardi (2006) suggest that policy
change is driven by change in effectiveness and payoffs, which are affected by diffusion
mechanisms through change in beliefs and preferences. For example, learning should be used in
combination with some measures of payoff. They illustrate that learning by itself cannot affect
the policy change but rather changes the beliefs about effectiveness of policy.
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RESEARCH METHODS
Since the dependent variable in this study is dichotomous, that is, whether RPS/FIT is
enacted is coded as 1 or not coded as (0), pooled random-effects logistic regression (logit) and
event history methods will be used. There are some disadvantages in regression models that
examine time series (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). Two of the problems with regression
models are “right censoring” and “time varying covariates”. Ordinary least squares regression
models assume that time-varying predictors are fixed. Independent variables explain the
variation in duration of change from one state to the other. For example, any state that does not
adopt a policy during a period of observation is right censored (that is, future policy adoption is
not directly observed). In this case, regression models fail to distinguish a state that has not
adopted a policy by the end of the observation period from states that adopted a policy at the end
of the period of observation. By using logit or pobit models, one loses information on when an
event occurs. They give inefficient estimates with larger variances relative to event history
estimates. To address these issues, event history models are considered for a robustness check
whether the variables behave consistently across specifications within pooled logit models and
within event history models and across pooled logit models and event history models.
An event history model’s dependent variable is not one or zero. It analyzes the
probability of an event occurring in a given time. How long does it take until a given event takes
place? It solves the problem of serial correlation. How long does it take until a state adopts
FIT/RPS?
Event history modeling focuses on duration, timing of events, and patterns and causes of
change. “One indicator of issue innovation and diffusion might be to record the duration of time
before adoption occurs” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1415).
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Why Use Agent-Based Models?
Statistical models allow observing correlation of regularities. However, because they use
aggregate and/or pooled data, they do not allow directly observing how states change their
preferences and make decisions. Agent-based models can close this gap by making it possible to
model how actors receive information and update their preferences. “Agent-based models can be
used to develop models based on agents making decisions with simple strategies that can explain
the observed behavior in experiments” (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010 ,178).
Conventional theories of collective action claim that actors make decisions based on
rational utility maximization. However, the empirical findings challenge these predictions. The
empirical findings show different outcomes in how individuals manage collective action. “The
findings suggest the importance of communication, trust, and reciprocity, normative
considerations, interactions among multiple types of actors, and the cognitive challenges
presented by complex ecological systems” (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010 ,194). Agentbased models use agents with a heterogeneity of attributes and preferences to explain outcomes.
This justifies the use of agent-based modeling to study collective action and how individuals or
agents act collectively to manage the commons in a sustainable way.
Agent-based simulation is used as a tool to analyze complex system. Social phenomena
are complex in nature. Complexity refers to non-linearity, decentralization, and self-organization.
A number of scholars including (Axelrod 1984, Jervis 1997, Rosenau 1990) used this concept.
Geller and Moss (2008) describe complexity as a type of condition in which an agent’s behavior
and social interaction combine to generate macro-level outcomes that could not be predicted
from knowledge of the behavior and nature of interactions alone.
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ABM is an appropriate approach to analyze the relationships among actors and outcomes.
In ABM terms, these can be rules that explain why or how the behavior of A influences the
behavior of B. This study will contribute by examining the interactions using ABM rules and
developing a new model.
According to Macy and Willer (2002, 155) a diffusion model would “start with some
distribution of practices and a rule by which agents decide whether to abandon current practice in
favor of one used by another agent.” An advantage of simulation is that it focuses on processes
rather than equilibria (Johnson 1999, 1522). “They can thus supply insights on how different
diffusion processes may lead to the same equilibrium (e.g. convergence) and more generally on
the characteristics of diffusion processes, whereas formal analysis permits conclusions only on
equilibria that are achieved, and thus gives much less information on the diffusion process itself”
(Braun and Gilardi 2006, 316). According to Elkins and Simmons (2005) policy diffusion is an
uncoordinated process, which cannot easily fall under the umbrella of rational decision making.
Braun and Gilardi (2006) suggest that ABM can be used in contexts where changes can be
applied to various parameters that may affect diffusion outcomes at aggregate level. They specify
decision rules, which depend on payoffs and effectiveness that are affected by the decisions of
other states through various decision mechanisms. Simulation could be used to model the
aggregate pattern of diffusion that emerges from interdependent policy choices.
In the model, there will be leading countries that have already adopted the policies at the
setup prior to simulation based on leader laggard and threshold models. Walker (1969) finds that
because of their size, wealth and cosmopolitan nature, some states are leaders in policy
innovations. “Similarly, the go-betweens of policy entrepreneurs and epistemic communities
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influence when and where policies spread” (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013, 697). In Leaderlaggard models states emulate pioneers and leaders who are economically developed.
Threshold models state that early adopters have low threshold values. They have strong
preferences for policy change, which lead them to policy change even when no one else adopted
the policy. Their payoffs and effectiveness change independent of others’ behavior. They face
higher transaction costs than potential adopters. They face uncertainty about decision-making
process.

DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION
For the statistical model, the study uses time-series cross-sectional data covering FIT and
RPS adoption between 1990 and 2011. The first enactment of FIT was in 1978 and the second
enactment in 1990; however, because of lack of availability of data and occurrence of the first
diffusion, the study begins from 1990. There are 1958 observations (See appendix 3). Some of
the independent variables originally considered, will be dropped because of missing data (see
Table 6). Data for RPS/FIT policies and some of the independent variables were compiled from
Renewables 2014 Global Status Report (REN 21). The independent variables’ data sources are:
World Bank Development Indicators (WDI), Eurostat Database, International Energy Agency,
World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI), Central European Free Trade Agreement,
International Environmental Agreements, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Research and
Expertise on the World Economy (CEPII), and U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
Table 5 presents the data sources and operationalization of each variable.
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In 1990 only two countries had adopted a FIT policy. This number exceeded to 69 in
2013 (69 countries with known years of adoption and this number grows to 76 including the
countries with unknown years of adoption). There are fewer countries which have RPS, but the
number is growing. In 1999 only one country had RPS policy and this numbered reached to 15 in
2013 (This number exceed to 25 including the countries with unknown years of adoption).

Table 5 Data Operationalization
Variables operationalization
Feed-in tariff 1 dummy

Abbreviation
fit

Sources
Renewables
2014 Global
Status
Report
EU

#
1,
2

Actor
Interna
l

Ha
DV

+EU membership/non members
(non=1,2)
+former colonizer with/without FIT
(1,2),
+CDM, dummy (non=1,cdm=2)

eumem

3

H1a

5

cdm

CEPII,
created
UNFCCC

+Foreign direct investment (net inflows
(% of GDP), new investment inflows
less disinvestment) divided by GDP
(positive fdi =2, negative fdi=1)
+ %Main export partners (competitor)
with RPS/FIT
% of competitors with CDM

fdi

WDI

7

Gobetw
extern
al
Gobetw
extern
al

comfit

CIA
Factbook
create

8

H5a

+% of competitor with FDI

compfdi

+ Regional difference in mean
renewable electricity share of FIT and
nonFIT (Total Renewable Electricity
Net Generation (Billion
Kilowatthours)/Total Electricity Net
Generation (Billion
Kilowatthours)*100

regelshare_fit
.nf

extern
al
10 extern
al
11 extern
al
12 Extern
al

colonizer_fit

compcdm

EIA

6

H2a
H3a
H4

H6a
H7a
H8
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Table 5 continued: Variables
Abbreviatio Sources
operationalization
n
+ World difference in mean renewable wfit_elshare_
regelshare_fit EIA
electricity share of FIT and nonFIT
.nf

#

Actor

1
2

Extern
al

H9

+Regional difference in mean CO2
regfit_co2.no
emissions (metric tons per capita) of fit nfit
& nonfat countries

CreatedWDI

1
3

Extern
al

H10

+world difference in mean CO2

wfit_co2_no
nfit

CreatedWDI

1
3

Extern
al

H11

+ Regional difference in mean GDP
growth (annual %) of FIT and nonFIT
countries
+ World Difference in mean GDP
growth

regfit_gdpg.n
onfit

CreatedWDI

1
4

Extern
al

H12

wfit_gdpg_n
onfit

CreatedWDI

1
4

Extern
al

H13

+% of neighboring states with FIT

nei_fit

1
6
1
7

Extern
al
Extern
al

H14
a
H15

2
0
2
2
2
1

Extern
al
Gobetw
GoBetw

H16

+% of countries with the same
colonizer having FIT, countries
without a colony coded 0

CIA fact
book created
Commoncolo CEPII,
ny_fit
created

+ % countries with common language
coml_FIT
with FIT
+Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
cartagena
dummy
+Kyoto Protocol from the United
kyoto
Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, dummy
+CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)
Co2em
+Global oil price
goilpr
+GDP per capita (Current US$)
gdppc
+Population
popul
Government Orientation, -right(2), center govorient
(3), +left(4)
System (presidential(2),
system
parliamentary(3))
-Crude Oil Proved Reserves (Billion
oilres
Barrels)=Total Resource Area (km^2) at
+wind
wind
50m, Classes 3-7
+solar= total potential solar energy per
solar
year MWh/year

CEPII,
created
IEAD
IEAD
WDI
EIA
WDI
WDI
WBDPI

13
24
25
26

WBDPI
EIA
Data
Catalogue
Data
Catalogue

28
29

27

30
31

Extern
Goal
interna
betw
interna
l
l
interna
l
interna
linterna
l
interna
l
interna
l

Ha

H17
H18
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
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Table 6 Controls not Included Because of Missing Data
Controls missing data

Abbreviati Missing Source
on

+Energy import, net % of energy use

eimport

748

WDI

26

-Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of
total)
Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)
eupc
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP % per kg
of oil equivalent
-Oil rents (% of GDP)

ffecpt

721

WDI

25

eupc

670

WDI

24

gdppueu

721

WDI

25

oilgdp

665

WDI

23

+education (the % of gross secondary
school enrollment)
+School enrollment, secondary (% net)

seconsgro
ss
seconsnet

765

WDI

27

1727

WDI

61

+Unemployment, total % of total labor
force
Net ODA received (% of gni)

unem

1309

WDI

46

odapgni

831

WDI

29

682

EIA

24

Energy Intensity - Total Primary Energy
einten
Consumption per Dollar of GDP (Btu per
Target
percent
final energy
from Power
Year 2005
U.S.ofDollars
(Purchasing
Renewable
Share of heavy industry as % of
GDP(paper products+ nonmetallicindustry
+ basic metal industry)/gdp for each year
Restructured electricity product market
regulation (PMR) in the electricity sector
Renewable energy, Total, % of total energy
generation
Renewable Energy Sources Govt R&D in
Million NC (nominal)
Renewable Energy Sources Total RD&D in
Million USD (2013 prices and PPP)
International
solar energy society (unknown year of
chapter)
+biomass resources
+hydro resources

%
missing

0
dataoec
d
dataoec
d
dataoec
d
IEA
IEA
sustaina
bledeve
lopmen
t.un.
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Figure 1 Total number of countries with FIT and RPS Policies 1990-2013

About 39 percent out of 196 countries in the world have adopted FIT. Only 13 percent
(about 25) have adopted RPS. Some of these countries have dropped the policies and the data
about the years of adoption for some of these countries are unavailable. There are a few countries
that have adopted both RPS and FIT.
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Table 7 Frequency Table
Variables
EU member
Former colonizer with RPS
Former colonizer with FIT
CDM
Foreign direct investment
Kyoto Protocol
Cartagena Protocol
Government Orientation - right
Center
Left
Other
Presidential
Parliamentary

FIT
25
18
38
19
62
68
65
18
8
20
22
26
42

Percent FIT
36
26
55
28
90
99
94
26
12
29
32
38
61

RPS
5
3
6
4
13
15
11
6
3
4
2
4
11

Percent RPS
33
20
40
27
87
100
73
40
20
27
13
27
73

Table 7 shows frequency distribution of FIT and RPS countries and other variables.
Almost all FIT and RPS countries have membership in multilateral agreements (Kyoto,
Cartagena, and Montreal Protocols). About 90 percent of FIT and 87 percent of RPS countries
are recipients of foreign direct investment. In addition, 55 percent of FIT and 40 percent of RPS
countries had former colonizers with FIT. Around 61 percent of FIT and 73 percent of RPS
countries have parliamentary governments.
Table 8 presents the frequency and percent of each variable. There are 28 European
Union members. High percentages of countries are members of multilateral agreements (Kyoto
99 percent, Cartagena 83 percent) and are the recipients of foreign direct investment. About 57
percent and 42 percent are presidential and parliamentary governments. Around 38 percent and 8
percent of countries have FIT and RPS policies. Governments of the right, center and left are
respectively 18, 8, and 28 percent of the countries. In addition, about 23 percent of the countries
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Table 8 Frequency Distribution of Variables
Variables
EU membership
Former colonizer RPS
Former colonizer FIT
CDM
Foreign direct investment
Kyoto Protocol
Cartagena Protocol
Government Orientation - right
Center
Left
Other
Presidential
Parliamentary
FIT
RPS

Frequency Percent
28
16
60
33
129
72
42
23
165
92
179
99
150
83
32
18
15
8
51
28
82
46
103
57
75
42
69
38
15
8

have CDM. Around 33 percent and 72 percent have former colonizer with RPS and FIT
respectively.
Figure 2 shows the average rate of growth and dispersion of FIT and Non-FIT countries.
FIT countries have lower rates of growth than Non-FIT countries. This information is only

Figure 2 Average Rates of Growth & Dispersion under FIT/ Non-FIT 1990-2011
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descriptive and only shows correlations. The data cannot inform about the direction of causality
and association between growth and FIT adoption. Figure 2 also shows that FIT countries were
hit harder by the 2008 recessions. Their growth rates have declined dramatically. The figure also
reveals that the FIT countries had lower consistency and higher growth variation than those
countries without FIT policies.
Figure 3 and Table 9 show the average rate of growth and dispersion of RPS and nonRPS countries. RPS countries have lower rates of growth than non-RPS countries. This

Table 9 RPS/non-RPS Descriptive Statistics
RPS

Non-RPS

Variable

Mean

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Minimum Maximum

Growth

-0.8

3

5

4

0

6

Renewable Energy

19

10

27

43

41

45

CO2

9

7

12

4.8

4.6

5

Figure 3 Average Rates of Growth & Dispersion under RPS/non-RPS 1998-2011
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information is only descriptive and only shows correlations. The data cannot inform about the
direction of causality in association between growth and RPS adoption. Figure 3 also shows that
RPS countries were hit harder in the 2008 recessions. Their growth rates have declined
dramatically. The figure also reveals that the non-RPS countries had lower consistency and
higher growth variation than those countries with RPS policies. There has been an increase in
variation in growth during 2007-2009 and since then it has decreased. Average growth in nonRPS countries is greater than RPS countries except in 2010.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of FIT adoption based on government orientation and
system in the year of adoption. In Figure 4 government orientation represents countries that do
not fall under right and left categories based on their platform on economic issues or there is no
information available. The center category represents those countries where the ruling party is
centrist (example social-liberal context where private enterprises are advocated). The
categorization is based on Database of Political Institutions of the World Bank.

Figure 4 Percent of Countries with FIT Based on Orientation/ System of Government
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FIT seems more popular among parliamentary than presidential system of governments.
About 55 percent of parliamentary governments and only 27 percent of presidential system of
government adopted FIT. However, there is not much difference in the distribution of FIT based
on government orientation in the year of adoption. About 47 percent of right- and left-oriented
governments adopted FIT. Left-, right- and center-oriented governments adopted 35, 22 and 12
percent of FIT policies respectively. Parliamentary and presidential governments adopted 59 and
41 percent of RPS respectively.
The percent of parliamentary-system governments that adopted RPS is double that of the
presidential system of governments. About 11 percent of parliamentary and five percent
presidential governments adopted RPS. There is not much difference between the right- and leftoriented governments in terms of RPS adoption.
The percentage of centrist governments which adopted RPS is the highest. About 14, 12
and 20 percent of RPS policies are adopted by left-, right- and center-oriented governments

Figure 5 Percent of Countries with RPS Based on System/Government Orientation
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respectively. Parliamentary and presidential governments adopted 11 and 6 percent of RPS
policies respectively.
RPS adoption is most popular in Asia. Figure 6 shows that the highest percentage of
countries that adopted RPS are in East Asia and the Pacific followed by South Asia. The
percentage of countries that adopted RPS in East Asia and Pacific, South Asia and Europe and
Central Asia are 29, 25 and 13 percent respectively. Around 49 percent of FIT policies are
adopted in Europe and Central Asia. East Asia/ Pacific and America each has adopted 13 percent
of all FIT adoptions. Sub-Saharan Africa has adopted 12 percent of FIT policies.

Figure 6 Percent of Countries with FIT/RPS in Each Region

On the other hand, FIT is most popular in Europe and Central Asia. Figure 6 shows
percentage of countries in each region that adopted FIT. The percentage of countries that adopted
FIT in Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa and East Asia and
Pacific are 69, 50, 30 and 26 percent respectively. East Asia and the Pacific is on the top of the
list in terms of percentage of RPS policies adoption while America is in the bottom of the list.
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East Asia/Pacific, Europe/Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Middle East/North
Africa have adopted 40, 28, 12, 8,8 and 4 percent respectively.
Figure 7 shows that the percent of high- and middle-income countries which have
adopted FIT and RPS are higher than low-income countries. The percent of high income, uppermiddle income, lower-middle income and low income countries that adopted FIT are 43, 45, 33
and 14 respectively. In addition, the highest percentage of FIT policies are adopted by high
income countries. High income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low-income
countries adopted 38, 33, 22 and 7 percent of FIT policies respectively. Around 76 countries
adopted FIT policies. Some of these countries have dropped the policies and the data about the
years of adoption for some of these countries are unavailable.
The percent of high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income and low-income
countries that adopted RPS are 15, 13, 13 and 3 respectively. In addition, high-income countries
have adopted the highest percentage of RPS policies. While there is around a 10-percent gap
between upper and lower middle-income countries in the adoption of FIT, it is the same in terms
of RPS policies. High income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low-income

Figure 7 Percent of Countries Adopted FIT/RPS by Income Level
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countries adopted 40, 28, 28 and 4 percent of RPS policies respectively.

CONCLUSION
This chapter lays out the research design. A mixed statistical method of pooled randomeffects logistic regression and event history will be used to analyze the data and test the
hypotheses. These two methods will allow for robustness check whether the variables behave
consistently across specifications within pooled logit models and within event history models
and across pooled logit models and event history models. To complement the statistical models
by making it possible to model how actors receive information and update their preferences,
agent-based model will be developed. This chapter also discussed the sources and
operationalization of the data. In the next chapter author presents the results of statistical analysis
of four specifications of event history and four specifications of random-effects pooled logit
regression.
Using the findings of previous studies, an agent-based model of diffusion will be built.
Because an agent-based model provides a micro level analysis of the interactions between the
crucial actors in the diffusion of policies, it is a useful method for theory and hypothesis
generation, especially when empirical data about actor preferences are scarce. The next chapter
will discuss the development, experimentation with and analysis of the agent-based model.
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AGENT-BASED MODEL

The previous chapter presented hypotheses, operational measures, and the research
methodology. In the next chapter, a random effects regression analysis will test the hypothesis
using large sample data. An event history analysis also will seek to explain the effects on timing
of diffusion. One advantage of statistical models is that they allow observing correlation of
regularities. However, they do not permit direct observation of how states change their
preferences and make decisions. Agent-based models can close this gap by making it possible to
model how actors receive information and update their preferences. “Agent based models can be
used to develop models based on agents making decisions with simple strategies that can explain
the observed behavior in experiments” (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010 ,178).
Conventional theories of collective action claim that actors make decisions based on
rational utility maximization. However, empirical findings have challenge this assumption.
These findings show different outcomes in how individuals manage collective action. “The
findings suggest the importance of communication, trust, and reciprocity, normative
considerations, interactions among multiple types of actors, and the cognitive challenges
presented by complex ecological systems” (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010 ,194). Agentbased models use agents with heterogenous attributes and preferences to explain outcomes. This
justifies the use of agent-based modeling to study collective action and how individuals or agents
act collectively to manage collective action problems in a sustainable way.
This chapter's agent-based model of policy diffusion adopts and builds upon Ring’s
=

, ,

to represent three parameters of theoretical interest to him: hierarchy,

neighborhood and identity. He hypothesizes norm adoption is a function of these three factors.
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Based on theories of policy adoption, policy diffusion is influenced or the result of interaction of
three sets of actors: external actors, internal actors and "go-betweens" or intermediators. In this
chapter’s extension of Ring’s model, other nation-states that have already adopted the policy are
the external actors. An internal actor is represented by nation-states adopting the policy and the
people in those nation-states. Go-betweens are intergovernmental organizations.
This chapter presents agent-based model by discussing the simulated environment and
agents. Then it discusses the rules for interaction for each mechanism. It displays the
initialization of the model with plots. Finally, it provides the run results and conclusions.
An agent-based model (ABM) is a computer simulation that represents people as "agents"
or autonomous objects that execute algorithms written by the modeler. In an ABM, agents
interact with other agents and with the environment. The interaction rules guide agents’
interaction. In this chapter's model of policy diffusion, agents signal each other about a policy
choice i. At each step of the simulation run, two agents, a receiver and a sender, are activated.
The sender sends a signal to the receiver agent. When an agent receives a signal, it evaluates the
benefits and costs of adoption and then updates its policy choice accordingly. An agent that
sends the signal is the sender and the agent that updates its policy choice is the receiver. The
study builds the model in NetLogo, a free and widely used integrated development environment
for agent-based models (Wilensky 1999).

THE ENVIRONMENT AND AGENTS
The model represents a world with five “regions”. In this respect, the model represents a
spatially explicit world in which policy diffusion occurs among geographically positioned
agents. For ease of visualization, the model shades each region a different color. The model
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includes 20 nation-states and 20 internal actors, one per patch in each region. Within each region,
there is one intergovernmental organization; all the nation-states in the region are members of the
organization, analogous to a regional trading arrangement or governance organization such as the
Organization of American States.
The model uses three “breeds” or types of agents: intergovernmental organizations (the NetLogo
code uses the primitive “IGOs”), internal actors (“i_actors”) and nation states (“nation_states”).
The nation-states, i_actors and IGOs have star, people and circles shapes to facilitate
visualization of the simulated social system. The “world” consists of one hundred nation-states
and one hundred internal actors. There are five intergovernmental organizations. Each actor in
the model either is committed (i=1) or not committed (i=0) to a policy: although the choice is
nominal in the model, for purposes of this study the nominal choice represents the mitigation of
carbon dioxide emissions. If the agent is an IGO or I_actor, the agent is committed to and prefers
carbon dioxide mitigation. If a nation-state, the nation-state already has the policy. Agents that
have committed to the policy will have white colors.

Internal Actors initialization
Below are the variables associated with internal actors. Internal actors are people-shaped
with pink color except the ones that have adopted the policy, i.e. those with value i=1. The ones
committed to the mitigation of carbon emissions are colored white.
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Figure 8 Agent Types

The number of committed internal actors (i=1) is set through a user-interface slider called
“person=1”. The slider permits the researcher to conduct quasi-experiments that assess the effect
of the number of internal actors on policy diffusion. These actors are colored white.
Each internal actor has a reelection value between 0 and 1. The reelection parameter
shows whether policy makers who had adopted policy i were reelected. If the value is less than
the value of slider “reelection=1”, reelection gets a value of 1, otherwise 0. The slider permits the
researcher to conduct quasi-experiments to assess the effect of the prospects for reelection on
policy diffusion.
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Each internal actor has a competitiveness value between 0 and 1. Competitiveness
represents whether policy i is competitive. If the value is less than the slider
“competitiveness=1”, the competitiveness value is set at 1, otherwise 0.
Initialization of IGO actors
The variables for IGOs agents and their attributes are as follows: The initial number of
IGOs committed to the policy (i=1) is set through a user-interface slider called “IGO=1”. By
allowing the initial number of committed IGO agents to vary, the ABM permits quasiexperimentation to assess the effect of initial adoption on policy diffusion.
Each IGO has nation-states as members. The nation-states that are located in the same
simulated region as the IGOs are their members. If more than fifty percent of its members have
value of i=1, the receiver nation-states gets a value of 1. At each step of the simulation run, two
agents, a receiver and a sender are activated. One agent, which is the sender, sends a signal to the
receiver. Based on the signal received, the receiver nation-state makes a decision on whether to
adopt policy i or keep the status quo.

Initialization of nation-state agents
The model provides nation-state agents with several properties. The initial number of
nation-states that have adopted the policy (i=1) is set through sliders “probability-i=1”. At
initialization, each nation-state agent draws a random number from a uniform distribution
bounded by 0 and 1. If the drawn value is less than the probability-i=1 threshold, the nation-state
agent becomes an initial adopter (i.e. its value of i takes a value of 1). Otherwise the nation-state
is not an adopter (i=0). This formulation allows the ABM to conduct quasi-experiments to assess
whether the number of initial-adopter nation-states affects the speed of policy diffusion.
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Each nation-state has a utility value. This initial utility is set by drawing a number from a
normal distribution with a mean of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1. The benefit of the policy π
to a given country i is the difference between utility of the sender (us) and the utility of receiver
(ur):

πi= us – ur

Each state has a benefit of compliance c and cost for non-compliance c' with the policy
choice i. These values of the compliance and non-compliance variables are drawn from a normal
distribution with a mean of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1. This permits the model to calculate
the costs of non-compliance C as:

C = cr' – cr
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Figure 9 Competitors

The model tests whether the distribution of power in the international system affects the
likelihood and speed of policy diffusion. To do so, at initialization the model distributes power
among nation-states using three different distributions. The Poisson Distribution represents a
hegemonic distribution: a single great power and many lesser states. The Normal Distribution
represents a distribution of power more analogous to a multipolar world: many middle powers
with a few large and small powers. Finally, the uniform distribution represents a perfectly
multipolar world: each state has power equal to every other state. This formulation of the ABM
allows the study to examine policy diffusion in different “worlds”. The researcher chooses the
power distribution using a chooser in the model’s user interface.
The ruling-p parameter represents whether the ruling party of a nation-state is a majority
in the legislature and supports policy i (1) or not (0). For example, leftist parties are more likely
to support mitigation of carbon emissions than rightist parties. This formulation allows the model
to simulate domestic politics and their effect on policy adoption. At initialization, the ruling-p
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parameter draws a random value from a uniform distribution bounded by zero and 1. If the
random value is less than a threshold value set by the party=1 slider, the nation-state gets a value
of 1, otherwise it takes the value of 0.
Each nation state has five competitors. The competitors are selected randomly at
initialization. If more than fifty percent of their competitors have adopted the policy (that is,
i=1), the receiver nation-state adopts the policy.

AGENTS’ INITIALIZATION
All the agents have a dependence value, which is drawn randomly from a normal
distribution with a mean of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1. The literature shows that powerful
countries and multilateral organizations shape policies of countries that are structurally
dependent on them. The dependence parameter examines the effect of how countries’
dependence affects their policy choices.
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Figure 10 Initialization

At initialization, the model assigns to each agent a “popularity”. Each agent draws a
random number from a uniform distribution bounded by zero and 1, and compares the draw to a
threshold set by a model slider labeled “popularity=1”. If the randomly drawn value is less than
the slider “popularity=1”, the agent receives a popularity value of 1; otherwise it receives a value
of 0. Some policies receive greater public support than others. This parameter examines how
popularity of a policy among general public affect its adoption.

MODEL EXECUTION: TO ACTIVATE A DYAD
To enact communication between agents, at run time the ABM will choose a dyad of
agents, one a sender of its policy choice and the other a receiver. The runtime procedure
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proceeds as follows. One of the patches will set its color red and one of the agents will set its
color green, yellow or sky blue. The nation-state in the red color patch will become a receiver
and one of the other color agents will become a sender. If the color of the patch is sky blue, a
nation-state will be the sender. If there is an IGO on the patch, it will turn green and the IGO will
be the sender. If the color of patch is yellow, a domestic actor (i_actor) is the sender of the
signal.

FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE RATE AT WHICH DIFFUSION OCCURS
The agent-based model incorporates algorithms that simulate the four mechanisms of
policy diffusion: coercion, competition, emulation, and learning.

Variables for the Coercion Mechanism
Adopting Ring’s (2014) model, the ABM in this study test for three different distributions
of power. The power distributions (Poisson, Uniform, Normal) represent hypothetical
assumptions about hierarchy in the global system. In the Poisson distribution, there are many

Figure 11 Sender Is Nation-state (Sky Blue), IGO (green) & Actor (Yellow)
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more weak actors than there are strong actors. This distribution indicates a high level of
inequality in the global system. There are a few powerful actors, some middle level and a large
number of weak actors. In the uniformly distributed global system, the assumption is that all
states have equal levels of power. The third assumption is that there are more middle-level actors
with a few powerful and a few weak actors. This type of distribution is represented by the normal
distribution. While some distributions might be more realistic than others, this implementation
allows for testing whether the model’s findings are robust to various assumptions about the
power distribution in the international system.
In the ABM, coercion is a top-down approach in which powerful actors affect the policy
preferences of weaker actors. By contrast, competition, learning and emulation are bottom-up
approaches. For this reason, one would expect policy diffusion by coercion to occur more
quickly in a Poisson (hegemonic) world than in the normal or uniform distributions of power.

Hs > HR ⇒ ”top-down”
Hs – HR ≤ 1 ⇒ “bottom up”

International organizations and national governments in a federal system may use
coercive strategies through grants and aid requirements; pre-emptive laws; sanctions; or military
force (Graham, et al. 2013). Membership in similar regional or multilateral organizations,
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), and military alliances can be used to examine their effect
on policy outcomes when coercion is involved. To test for the use of carrots and sticks as tools of
policy change, the study uses “costs” of compliance and non-compliance. “[S]tudies linking
policy diffusion to soft coercion should show that the policy ideas actively promoted by strong
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countries are more likely to be put into practice in weaker countries structurally or situationally
dependent on them” (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006, 791). The dependency variable

1. Power distribution (Poisson, Uniform, Normal) pick one
2.

Dependence (random-normal 2.5 1)

3. dependency = dependence-s – dependence-r
4. Compliance (random-normal 2.5 1)
5. non-compliance (random-normal 2.5 1)
6. cost = non-compliance-r – compliance-r
7. popularity=1 (slider 0 1)
8. popularity: (random-float 0 1) if greater than popularity=1, get value of 1 otherwise 0
9. popularity-iactor : sender is i-actor with popularity=1
examines the effect of how strong states promote policy ideas in weaker countries that are
structurally or situationally dependent on them.

The model also examines the role of domestic actors in the shaping of nation-states’
policy choices:
The preferences of policy makers may be based on individual opinions and experiences
or may be induced by the desires of the electorate, interest groups or others. Such
preferences often affect the range of policy choices that policy makers consider, and
therefore preferences influence the likelihood of any particular policy spreading from one
government to the next. (Graham, etal 2013, p.685)
The model also examines the role of domestic actors in the shaping of nation-states’
policy choices. In this study, the variable i represents the preferences of policy makers and
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intergovernmental organization. The popularity-iactor variable simulates whether a policy is
more popular than a threshold among internal actors, who may influence the policy makers to
change the policy.
Variables for the Competition Mechanism
To simulate mechanisms of competition, the ABM uses operational measures derived
from previous empirical studies of competition and policy diffusion. The literature provides
various measures of competition, most of which derive from trade relationships among nationstates. Stadelmann and Castro (2014) use membership in a common economic and regional
block, trade openness, and countries with similar economic structure as proxies for competition.
Baccini, Lenzi, and Thurner (2013) define competitors as a state’s main trade partners. Prakash
and Potoski (2006) use a state’s main export market or partner(s) to identify a nation-state’s
competitors. Saikawa (2013) suggests that adoption by an importing country puts pressure on the
exporting country to adopt the policy as well. Adoption by the exporting country gives it a
competitive advantage. “Simmons and Elkins (2004) found that a country is more likely to
liberalize its international economic policies following similar reform among its competitors,
defined as countries with which it shares similar trade relationships” (Gilardi 2016, p.10).
Policies diffuse from external actors to internal actors when they are competitors or trading
partners (Berry and Berry 2007). In addition, in the competition mechanism the most important
relationships among actors are horizontal rather than vertical (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett
2006). External and internal actors who compete are more likely to have similar economic
structures (Stadelmann and Castro 2014). Hierarchy examines the similarity of countries'
economic structure. This study’s ABM defines a nation-state’s competitors as its trade partners.
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The trade partners are chosen randomly at initialization of the simulation. At run time, the model
does not explicitly model a trading relationship; rather, by treating actual processes of trade as
exogenous to the model, the ABM allows the researcher to focus on the fact of an interdependent
relationship rather than volumes of trade. This allows it to test how the behavior of a country’s
trade partners affect its policy adoption.

Variables for the Emulation Mechanism
As Gilardi (2016) argues, intergovernmental organizations facilitate policy diffusion
through the socialization of its members—that is, through the construction of regulative norms
that identify “proper” behavior and roles for nation-states. The difference from the coercion
mechanism is that intergovernmental organizations’ socialization does not influence its members
through material incentives or sanctions. For example, Stadelmann and Castro (2014) argue that
the international climate regime and the emission targets of transition countries under the Kyoto
Protocol are not strict enough to force countries into action. In this study’s implementation, joint
membership in a multilateral organizations will be used as a proxy to examine policy diffusion
through socialization. In the emulation mechanism, as go-betweens international organization
can facilitate socialization by establishing information facilities, organizing conferences and
recommending best practices (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). NGOs, policy professionals,
and academics among others can influence governments to adopt policies (Simmons, Dobbin,
and Garrett 2006).
MacGarvie (2005) uses geographic proximity as a proxy for communication barriers
between two countries, and measures the distance between the capitals of two countries. In this
study’s ABM, geographic proximity, which reduces communication and cultural barriers, is used
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1. neighbors: nation states in the same region
2. party=1 (slider 0 1)*
3. ruling-p ( random-float 1) if less than slider “party=1”, gets value of 1 otherwise 0.
Policy makers’ preferences are based on desire of policy advocates.
4. p-r: receiver with ruling-p = 1
5. my-members : igos members are nation states in the same region as the igo
6. member_i : mean (i) of igo members (my-members)
7. mem_i : sender igo with more than 50 percent of its members with (i)
to measures similarities among actors or nation-states. Those in closer geographic proximity
communicate and socialize more often.

Variables for the Learning Mechanism
Policy makers learn from earlier adopters about the consequences, benefits and costs of
policy adoption. The policy consequence is the success of the policy elsewhere. Berry and Berry
(2007) argue that states emulate each other because they learn from each other; they adopt
policies they perceive as successful elsewhere. One political consequence is reelection to office.
Policy makers imitate a policy if elsewhere voters reelected those who enacted the policy
(Gilardi 2010). Assuming it is a democracy, electorates influence policy makers’ preferences
through elections. In the simulation, every adopter is given a binary variable of reelected/not
reelected. In the model, “learning” occurs when a receiver checks two variables of a sender:
whether or not it adopted the policy, and whether or not its reelection value is 1. A receiver is
more likely to adopt (“learn”) if both of the sender’s variables are equal to 1
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1. utility (random-normal 2.5 1)
2. reelection=1 (slider 0 1)*
3. reelection (random-float 1) if greater than “reelection=1” slider, reelection gets value
of 1 (reelection of those who adopted the policy earlier) otherwise 0.
4. reelection-s: sender is an i-actor with reelection=1 and i=1

INTERACTION
One advantage of agent-based modeling is that the researcher can use quasi-experimental
techniques to measure interactive effects among model parameters. That is, by explicitly
manipulating parameter values, the ABM researcher can determine whether parameter
interactions enhance, mitigate, or have no effect on the systemic behavior of interest. This study
tests for the following interactions effects.

The Coercion Mechanism
As in the real world, in the model nation-states exercise coercion through both power
differentials and asymmetric interdependence. When the sender is a nation-state that has adopted
the policy (that is, with i=1), the receiver will also adopt the policy (set its i-value to 1) if two
conditions are satisfied: the sender has power greater than the power of receiver (hierarchy > 0),
and dependence of receiver is greater than the dependence of sender (dependency > 0). Actors
other than states can also use coercive mechanisms. When the sender is an IGO that has adopted
the policy, the receiver will set its i-value to 1 if the cost of non-compliance is greater than or
equal to the compliance cost (cost >= 0). Finally, when the sender is an i-actor with i=1 (i=1
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illustrates that the internal actor’s policy choice is i) and its popularity is greater than the
threshold popularity=1, the receiver will set is i-value to 1. The popularity=1 is a slider in the
interface and its value is set before running the model.

The Competition Mechanism
“Competition” among agents in the model reflects both differences in relative power and
the policy choices of competing states. When the sender is a nation-state with i=1, hierarchy <=
1 and fifty percent or more of the receiver’s competitors have i=1, the receiver will set its i-value
to 1. The competitors have symmetric power. Their power relation is horizontal rather than
vertical.
When the sender is an i-actor with i=1 and competitiveness has a value less than the
threshold (competitiveness = 1), the receiver will adopt the policy (that is, set its i-value to 1).
Competitiveness represents that this policy i is competitive relative to other policies. For
example, currently because of low prices of conventional energy prices, the renewables can not
compete with conventional energy.

The Emulation Mechanism
When the sender is a nation-state with i=1, hierarchy <= 1 and the receiver and sender are
in the same region, the receiver will set its i value to 1. The sender and receivers have relatively
equal power. There is not large power difference between them.
When the sender is an IGO with i=1 and fifty percent or more of IGO members adopted
the policy, the receiver will set its i value to 1. The receiver will adopt the policy if fifty percent
or more of the members of the organization it is member to adopted the policy.
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State

Coercion
i=1
hierarchy > 0
Dependence-r
>dependence-s

IGO

(i = 1
noncompliance-r
>=compliance cost-r

Internal
Actor

Signaler is. . .

Table 10 Interaction Rules

i=1
popularity =1

Mechanism of Diffusion
Competition
Emulation
i=1
hierarchy <= abs
1
compet_i >= 0.5

i=1
hierarchy <= abs
1
Ns=Nr
i =1
mem_i = 1

i=1
competitiveness
=1

i= 1
ruling-r =1

Learning
i=1
benefit >0
hierarchy <=
abs 1
i =1

i= 1
reelection-s =
1

When the sender is an i-actor with i=1 and the ruling-p has a value of 1 (less than the
threshold party=1) the receiver will set its i value to 1. The ruling-p parameter gets a value a
binary value of 0 or 1. When the ruling party has a majority in the parliament and supports policy
i, it gets a value of 1. If the ruling party does not have a majority in the parliament it gets a value
of 0. When ruling party has control of legislature of a nation-state, it can adopt its policy choice
easier than when ruling party is not a majority.

The Learning Mechanism
The adopting nation-state is seeking for a solution to its policy problem. It looks at others'
policy choices actively for a successful policy. When the sender is an adopter nation-state,
hierarchy <= 1 and the utility of the sender is greater than or equal to the utility of receiver
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(benefit >= 0) the receiver will set its i value to 1. If policy i increases the utility of the receiver,
the receiver will adopt policy i.
When the sender is an IGO with i=1, the receiver will set its i value to 1. IGO’s preferred
policy choice is i, the receiver nation-state learns about the policy i through information provided
by the IGO.
Nation-states learn not only about the policy consequences, but also about the political
consequences of a policy. The policy makers look at how policy adoption affected the reelection
of policy makers in other nation-states. When they see that policy adoption did not cost them
their office, they become more confident about the political consequence of the policy adoption.
When the sender is an i-actor with i=1 and the reelection of sender has a value of 1, the receiver
will set is i value to 1.

PLOTS
The results of one simulation run are presented in figures four through eight. For this
simulation, the model parameters were arbitrarily set at probability-i=1 (0.11); person=1 (40);
reelection=1 (0.69); competitiveness=1 (0.69); IGO=1 (5); popularity=1 (0.69); party=1 (0.69);
and power distribution = Poisson. The plot titled “Proportion of States with i=1” shows the
percent of nation-states with policy i at each time tick. The multiple lines in figure 9 “Regional
Difference” shows the percent of nation-states in each region with policy i. Figure 10 “Power
Difference” illustrates the average power of nation-states with and without policy i. Figure 11
“Compliance Difference” shows the mean compliance of nation states with policy i and mean
non-compliance of nation-states without policy i.
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Figure 12 Non-Convergence the Receiver Nation-state (Red Patch) Not Turning
White

Figure 13 Convergence: The Receiver Nation-state (Red Patch) Turned White
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Figure 14 Left to Right Emulation, Learning & Competition

Figure 15 Coercion: Poisson, Uniform, Normal

Figure 16 Competition Normal, Uniform, Poisson

Figure 17 Emulation, Normal, Uniform, Poisson
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Figure 18 Learning Normal, Uniform, Poisson

Figure 19 Learning Poisson Regional Difference

Figure 20 Learning Poisson Power Difference

Figure 21 Learning Poisson Compliance Difference
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TYPICAL RUN FOR EACH MECHANISM
For an initial evaluation of the model, I ran the simulation for each hypothesized
mechanism of diffusion, allowing the simulations to run until all nation-states had adopted the
policy (i.e. full diffusion was complete). The following four figures show a typical run for each
mechanism. The simulations use the same main parameters and the parameters specific to each
mechanism as specified in the previous section. For the simulation of the competition
mechanism, the simulated community of states converge on full policy adoption. Competition
has a typical S-curve. Hence the process is not linear. The early stages of diffusion are slow and
in the end stages there are a few holdouts who take a while to adopt. The regional differences are
small. The maximum regional difference of the proportion of nation states with and without the
policy is 35 percent. There is a 35 percent difference between the region with the highest and that
with the lowest number of adopters. That difference is in the earlier steps of the run. The
maximum power difference of nation-states with and without i is close to equal. The highest
difference is 0.125. The maximum compliance cost difference of adopters and non-adopters is
0.67. Mostly the compliance cost for adopters and non-adopters is close to equal. This difference
is in the second quarter of the run time.
For emulation, there is full diffusion of the policy. The rate of adoption in the later steps
of the run time becomes very flat. In the later stages of diffusion, there are a few holdouts that
take a long time before full diffusion. For the emulation mechanism, full diffusion of the policy
takes longer than competition and coercion, but it approximates the time to full diffusion for the
learning mechanism. The maximum power difference is one, which is close to the end of second
quarter of simulation run time. The maximum difference in compliance costs is 0.79. The
difference in compliance is calculated subtracting the mean compliance cost of nation-states with
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i from mean non-compliance cost of nation-states without i. The compliance cost ranges from 1
to 5. In a simulation run when this difference is the highest, that value is recorded. The maximum
regional difference of proportion of nation-state with and without i is 0.45, which is in the earlier
steps of simulation run. It suggests that in the emulation mechanism a policy first diffuses within
regions before diffusing across regions.
For the coercion mechanism, there is full diffusion of the policy. The maximum power
difference is 0.43. This difference is a relatively small value. Maximum power difference is
calculated subtracting mean power value of countries without i from mean power value of
countries with i. When this value is the highest in a simulation run, it is recorded. Power value
ranges from 1 to 5. The proportion of nation states with i in each region is approximately equal
except in the earlier stage of the process. The maximum regional difference of states with and
without i is 0.35, which is in the earlier stages of the run. In the simulation of the coercion
mechanism, policies diffuse within regions in the earlier stages of the process. The maximum
difference in compliance and non-compliance costs is 0.40.
For the learning mechanism, there is full diffusion of the policy. Under this mechanism,
the simulation takes longer to converge on full policy diffusion than under either coercion and
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Figure 22 Competition Mechanism. Top to Bottom Run Time 428, 561, 792
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Figure 22 Continued

competition mechanisms. The maximum power difference is approximately equal. The
maximum regional differences of the proportion of states with i is 0.40, which is in the earlier
steps of the run. Diffusion through learning occurs within regions before it occurs between
regions. The maximum compliance difference is also small. It happens at earlier steps of the run.
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Figure 23 Emulation Mechanism. Top to Bottom Run Time 260, 792, 2594
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Figure 23 Continued
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Figure 24 Coercion Mechanism Top to Bottom Run Time 313, 587, 1445
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Figure 24 Continued
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Figure 25 Learning Mechanism Top to Bottom Run Time 198, 394, 1086
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Figure 25 Continued
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIMULATED DATA
To examine the effect of each factor on the diffusion of policies, each diffusion
mechanism is simulated 100 times. For each run, the experiment measured seven dimensions of
the emergence of policy diffusion:
1. the time until full diffusion as measured by the number of steps in the run;
2. the largest power difference between states within a run;
3. the largest difference between regions in the proportion of adopters;
4. the largest difference in compliance and noncompliance costs within a run;
5. the last step at which the power difference was greater or less than zero;
6. the last step at which the difference in compliance-noncompliance costs was
greater than or less than zero; and
7. the last step at which regional differences are greater or less than zero.
The maximum power difference is the maximum average power difference between
adopter and non-adopter nation-states in each simulation run. The maximum compliance
difference is the maximum difference of average compliance of adopter and non-adopter nation
states. The maximum regional difference is the maximum difference among regions in the
proportion of adopter to total nation-states in the region in each simulation run. “Last tick power”
is the last step in simulated time at which occurs the maximum average power difference
between adopter and non-adopter nation-states. “Last tick comply” is the last step in time at
which occurs the maximum average compliance difference between adopter and non-adopter
nation states. “Last tick region” is the last step in time at which occurs the maximum difference
among regions in the difference in proportion of adopter nation-states.
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The results of these 400 simulation runs are compiled into a dataset. The unit of
observation is simulated step in time, for a total n = 19,179. The data is used to run regression
tests that examine the partial effects of model parameters on the seven measures of policy
convergence listed above. The parameters of theoretical interest are the initial probability of
adoption (probability-i=1); the four diffusion mechanisms (learning, emulation, coercion and
competition); the number of initial internal actors (person=1); the distribution of power among
nation-states (Poisson, uniform, normal); and the initial number of IGOs committed to the policy
(IGO=1). The analysis specifies a full regression that includes all model parameters, as well as
several more parsimonious specifications that include only a subset of the estimators. By
comparing the full and parsimonious specifications, one can examine the consistency of the
estimates. Such consistency would suggest that the theoretical findings are insensitive to choices
of model specification, thus increasing our confidence in the inferences we draw. Tables 29-35
present the results of the regression analysis.
The number of initial adopters; the four diffusion mechanisms; the number of internal
actors; the number of initial IGOs; and the distribution of power all consistently affect the rate of
time to full adoption. The variable “probability–i=1” is significant in all five specifications with
a consistent, negative sign. The negative coefficient implies that this parameter reduces the time
to policy adoption; as expected, the more initial adopters of the policy, the faster the diffusion of
the policy will be. The variable “local actor” is statistically significant in three of the
specifications with a consistent negative sign. As expected, as the number of people committed
to carbon mitigation increases, the time to full policy diffusion decreases. The number of initial
IGOs supporting adoption is statistically significant in three of the specifications with consistent
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negative sign. As expected, as the number of IGOs committed to carbon mitigation increases, the
time to full adoption decreases.
Interestingly, the adoption rate is faster in a Poisson distribution of power than in a state
system characterized by the normal distribution. The adoption rate expedites with a few large
powers compared to a system with more middle powers and fewer weaker and stronger states. In
a uniform system, the rate of adoption is lower than a system with normal distribution of power.
This is an interesting finding: whereas a uniformity of state power may create a “balance” of
strategic stability, the ABM suggests that in such a world policy diffusion will occur more
slowly.
In the simulations that use the learning and competition mechanisms, the rate of adoption
is faster than in those that use the coercion mechanism. Conversely, adoption takes longer
through emulation than coercion. These results suggest that learning and competition are more
effective mechanisms of policy diffusion than is coercion, ceteris paribus.
Because three parameters—of the number of the initial adopters, the number of internal
actors, and the number of IGOs—are all measured on a scale of 0 to 1, one can directly compare
the magnitude of each parameter’s effects. The magnitude of effect of number of initial state
adopters is the highest on rate of adoption. The IGO parameter has a higher magnitude of effect
than the person variable. Interestingly, while IGO has a statistically significant effect on the rate
of adoption in when learning or emulation is the mechanisms of diffusion, it shows no such
effect on the rate of adoption when competition or coercion is the mechanism.
Unsurprisingly, the initial distribution of power among nation-states influences the
maximum power difference between adopters and non-adopters. As table 12 illustrates, the initial
Poisson distribution is statistically significant in four of the regression specifications with a
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consistently positive sign, indicating a larger emergent power difference on average. The
uniform distribution of power is significant in all five of the specifications with a consistently
positive direction of effect. For the maximum power difference dependent variable, the initial
probability of adoption (probability-i=1) is only significant in the coercion specification. The
person and IGO parameters are not significant in any of the specifications, suggesting perhaps
unsurprisingly that these parameter have no effect of the emergent power differences between
adopters and non-adopters. Interestingly, learning, emulation and competition each have a
significantly positive effect on the maximum power distribution. The reelection, competitiveness
and party parameters are statistically significant and have a positive effect on maximum power
difference. An increase in the number of reelection of policy makers who had adopted the
policies increases the probability of power difference. An increase in the number of the ruling
parties that support policy i, increases the power difference. An increase in the popularity of
policy i has negative effect on maximum power difference. An increase in the popularity of
policy i among internal actors increases the probability of power differences. An increase in the
competitiveness of policy i increases the likelihood of power difference.
As shown in Table 13, for the maximum difference among regions in the proportion of
adopters, the probability of initial adoption is significant in all five of the specifications with
consistent positive direction of effect. This is a bit surprising because the probability of initial
adoption is the same for all regions at the time of initiation. The Poisson, uniform and IGO
parameters are significant only in one of the specifications. The party parameter is significant in
the simulations of the emulation mechanism with a negative direction of effect. Only emulation
is significant with a positive effect. Popularity, reelection, and competitiveness show no
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meaningful effect on the emergent regional differences in the proportion of states adopting the
policy.
Table 14 shows that for the measure of the size of differences in compliance costs, the
probability of initial adoption (probability-i) is significant in two of the regression specifications:
the parsimonious specification of only the coercion mechanisms (column 3 i) and the full
specification. In both specifications, the direction of effect is negative, suggesting the greater
probability of initial adoption reduces the differences in compliance costs. The IGO variable is
significant in only one specification, but in a surprising way: in the specification of the coercion
mechanism, the IGO variable has a positive direction of effect, suggesting that the greater the
number of IGOs supporting a policy, the greater the emergent differences in compliance costs.
Learning, emulation, competition and popularity are statistically significant with a negative
direction of effect, contributing to a reduction in differences in compliance costs. Reelection,
competitiveness, party, person, Poisson, and uniform show no significant effects in any of the
specifications.
Table 16 illustrates that for the dependent variable that measures the last step at which the
power difference is greater or less than zero, the probability of initial adoption (probability-i) is
statistically significant in all five specifications with consistent negative direction of effect. This
suggests that along with the time to full policy diffusion, a larger of number of initial adopters
also reduces the time at which power differences remain between adopters and non-adopters. The
Poisson distribution of power is significant only in the parsimonious specification of the
competition mechanism (Table 16 column 6), with a positive direction of effect. The uniform
distribution of power is significant only in the competition specification with a negative direction
of effect. The IGO parameter is significant in three specifications: the full, coercion and
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emulation specifications, each time with a negative coefficient indicating a reduction in the time
to the elimination of power differences between adopters and non-adopters. Competitiveness,
reelection, popularity, learning, emulation and competition are significant with negative
directions of effect in competition, learning, coercion and in full specification respectively, all
reducing the time to the elimination of power differences. The person parameter is not significant
in any of the specifications.
As shown in Table 17, for the dependent variable that measures the last step at which
differences in compliance costs were nonzero, the probability of initial adoption (probability-i) is
statistically significant in all five specifications with a consistently negative direction of effect.
This illustrates that the larger the number of initial adopters, the quicker the differences in
compliance costs disappear. The IGO parameter is significant in three specifications: the full,
learning and emulation specifications with consistently negative directions of effect. This
suggests that IGOs resolve differences in compliance costs: the larger the number of IGOs
advocating for a policy, the quicker compliance cost differences converge to zero. The uniform,
Poisson and person parameters are significant only in the parsimonious competition
specification, with positive, negative and negative signs respectively. The competitiveness
(competition specification), party (emulation specification), reelection (learning), popularity
(coercion), competition and learning (full) parameters are statistically significant with negative
direction of effect. Emulation is significant with a positive direction of effect in full
specification.
For the dependent variable that measures the last step at which regional differences in
adoption exist, the probability of initial adoption (probability-i) is significant in all the
specifications with a consistently negative direction of effect. Once again, as shown in table 15
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the number of initial adopters significantly reduces the time to policy diffusion, measured in this
case as the time at which regional differences in policy adoption disappear. The uniform and
IGO parameters are significant in two of the specifications, the full specification and the
parsimonious emulation specification. The person parameter is significant only in the
competition specification with a negative direction of effect. The party (emulation specification),
competitiveness (competition), reelection (learning), popularity (coercion), competition and
learning (full specification) parameters are statistically significant with negative directions of
effect. Emulation is significant with a positive direction of effect in full specification. The
Poisson distribution of power shows no meaningful effect in any of the specifications.
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Table 11 Time to Full Diffusion
Time to Full Diffusion

Full
Intercept 3251.8
(37.65)
probability- -1604.8
i=1
(34.74)
Learning -1142.6
(22.0546)
Emulation 1042.6
(22.2273)
Competitio -1294.6
n
(22.03)
popularity=
1
reelection.1

***
***

Coercion
Learning
4948.9 *** 2141.4 ***
(77.70)
(29.00)
-1377.2 *** -694.5
***
(78.19)
(27.47)

***
***
-4273.1
(61.32)

***
-1285.3
(27.47)

***

Poisson

-923.8
(21.18)

-1.4
(0.71)
-78.7

*
***

(19.09)
Uniform

86.5

***

(19.08)
igo=1

-55.1
(5.20)

Emulation
6272.9 ***
(75.95)
-2574.5 ***
(58.77)

***

competitive
ness.1
party.1
person=1

Competition
1795.4 ***
(21.89)
-775.1
***
(20.65)

***

-3.2
(1.42)
7.0

*

-0.2
(0.50)
-42.7

(38.30)

(13.47)

6.1

40.0

(38.30)

(13.43)

-15.2

-20.2

(10.43)

(3.66)

Adjusted R-squared
0.49
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05

**

-0.9
(0.38)
-79.8
(10.12)

**

75.1
(10.12)

***

-0.03
(2.75)

***
-2530.8 ***
(65.68)
*
-1.5
(1.52)
*** -198.2 **
*
(41.03
)
*** 224.9
**
*
(41.03
)
-185.3 **
*
(11.17
)
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Table 12 Maximum Power Difference
DV= max-power-difference
Full
Coercion
Learning
Intercept
1.00
*** 1.22
*** 0.48
***
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.05)
-0.19
*** 0.03
probability- -0.02
i=1
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.04)
Learning
-0.49
***
(0.01)
Emulation
-0.54
***
(0.01)
Competition -0.59
(0.01)
popularity=1

Competition
0.35
***
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.04)

***
-0.41
(0.04)

***

reelection.1

0.04
(0.04)

competitiveness.1

0.15
(0.04)

***

party.1

person=1
Poisson
Uniform

igo=1

Emulation
0.38
***
(0.04)
0.03
(0.03)

0.16
(0.03)
0.0002
(0.0004)
0.06
***
(0.01)
0.21
***
(0.01)

0.0004
(0.001)
0.06
*
(0.02)
0.44
***
(0.02)

0.002
-0.001
(0.003)
(0.01)
Adjusted R-squared
0.16
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01
‘*’ 0.05

0.001
(0.001)
0.05
*
(0.02)
0.14
***
(0.02)

-0.0002
(0.001)
0.12
(0.02)
0.11
(0.02)

0.0002
(0.01)

0.003
(0.01)

***
***

***

0.001
(0.001)
0.02
(0.02)
0.14
***
(0.02)

0.01
(0.01)
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Table 13 Maximum Regional Difference

Intercept
probabilityi=1
Learning
Emulation
Competition

Full
0.43
(0.00)
-0.20
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.004
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)

***

***

DV=max-regional-difference
Coercion
Learning
Competition
0.43
*** 0.43
*** 0.41
***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)

Emulation
0.46
***
(0.01)

-0.20
(0.01)

-0.21
(0.004)

***

-0.20 ***
(0.01)

-0.19 ***
(0.01)

*

popularity=1

-0.0003
(0.004)

reelection.1

-0.01
(0.01)

competitiveness.1

-0.01
(0.01)

party.1
person=1

-0.00005
(0.0001)

Poisson

0.003

Uniform

***

-0.00020
(0.0001)
*

0.002

(0.001)

(0.003)

0.001

0.001

-0.00003
(0.0001)
0.001
(0.00
3)
0.002
(0.00
3)

(0.001)
(0.003)
0.0000
igo=1
3
0.0001
0.001
(0.0004
(0.00
)
(0.001)
1)
Adjusted R-squared 0.25
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05

0.00004
(0.0001)
0.005
(0.00
3)
0.007
(0.00
3)
0.000
(0.00
1)

-0.05
***
(0.005)
-0.00002
(0.0001)
0.005
(0.003)

*

-0.002
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.001)

*
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Table 14 Maximum Compliance Difference

Full
Intercept
probability-i=1
Learning
Emulation
Competition
popularity=1

0.83
(0.02)
-0.09
(0.02)
-0.17
(0.01)
-0.16
(0.01)
-0.17
(0.01)

DV= max-compliance-difference
Coercion
Learning
*** 0.99
(0.04)
*** -0.23
(0.04)
***

Competition

*** 0.61
*** 0.67
(0.04)
(0.04)
*** -0.02
-0.01
(0.04)
(0.04)

0.68
(0.03)
-0.10
(0.03)

***
***
-0.27
(0.03)

***

reelection.1

0.05
(0.04)

competitiveness.1

-0.06
(0.04)

party.1
person=1

***

Emulation

-0.0002
-0.001
0.0004
0.001
Poisson
0.002
0.01
(0.01)
(0.02)
Uniform
-0.01
-0.02
(0.01)
(0.02)
igo=1
0.001
0.01
*
0.003
(0.01)
Adjusted R-squared 0.02
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05

0.001
0.001
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.01)

-0.001
0.001
-0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.004
(0.01)

0.01
(0.03)
0.0002
0.001
0.02
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.005
(0.01)
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Table 15 Last Step Maximum Region

Full
Intercept 0.43
(0.00)
probabili -0.20
ty-i=1
(0.003)
Learning -0.003
(0.002)
Emulatio 0.004
n
(0.002)
Competi -0.002
tion
(0.002)
popularity=1
reelection.1

***
***

DV=max-regional-difference
Coercion
Learning
0.43
*** 0.43
***
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.20
*** -0.20
***
(0.01)
(0.01)

Competition
0.41
***
(0.01)
-0.19 ***
(0.01)

*

0.0003
(0.004)
-0.01
(0.01)

competitiveness.1

-0.01
(0.01)

party.1
-0.00005
-0.00020
-0.00003
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
0.003
*
0.002
-0.001
(0.001)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Uniform 0.001
0.001
-0.002
(0.001)
(0.003)
(0.003)
0.0000
igo=1
3
0.0001
0.001
(0.0004)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Adjusted R-squared 0.25
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05
person=
1
Poisson

Emulation
0.46
***
(0.01)
-0.21
***
(0.004)

0.00004
(0.0001)
0.005
(0.003)
0.007 *
(0.003)

-0.05
***
(0.005)
-0.00002
(0.0001)
0.005
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)

0.000
(0.001)

-0.002 *
(0.001)
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Table 16 Last Step Maximum Power Difference

Intercept
probabilityi=1

DV= lasttick_power
Full
Coercion
Learning
Competition
Emulation
1863.0 *** 3501.4 *** 940.2
*** 614.3
*** 1931.3 ***
(34.62)
(75.81)
(36.71)
(26.17)
(88.49)

-689.4
(31.95)
Learning
-998.8
(20.28)
Emulation
-356.7
(20.44)
Competition -1133.0
(20.26)
popularity=1
reelection.1

*** -1154.2
(76.29)
***

*** -347.4
(34.77)

*** -340.6
(24.69)

***
***
-2918.4
(59.83)

***
-559.1
(34.77)

competitivene
ss.1

***

-237.0
(25.32)

party.1
person=1

*** -801.0 ***
(68.47)

0.0
-2.5
0.2
(0.65)
(1.39)
(0.63)
Poisson
6.9
-55.8
-13.5
(17.56)
(37.37)
(17.05)
Uniform
-2.8
65.3
-13.2
(17.54)
(37.37)
(17.00)
igo=1
-13.3
** -24.2
* -3.1
(4.78)
(10.17)
(4.64)
Adjusted R-squared 0.20
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05

-0.2
(0.45)
67.3
(12.09)
-25.3
(12.09)
0.9
(3.29)

***
-885.3 ***
(76.53)
2.3
(1.77)
*** 29.9
(47.80)
* -37.8
(47.80)
-27.0 *
(13.01)
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Table 17 Last Step Maximum Compliance Difference
DV= lasttick_comply
Full
Coercion
Learning
Intercept
2088.5 *** 3436.6 *** 1108.3 ***
(38.75)
(83.95)
(36.26)
probability- -1078.8 *** -1232.8 *** -404.5 ***
i=1
(35.76)
(84.48)
(34.34)
Learning
-861.7 ***
(22.70)
Emulation 236.4 ***
(22.88)
Competition -905.1 ***
(22.68)
popularity=1
-2944.4 ***
(66.26)
reelection.1
-618.7 ***
(34.34)
competitiven
ess.1
party.1
person=1

-0.7
-2.2
(0.73)
(1.54)
Poisson
-6.1
37.2
(19.65)
(41.39)
Uniform
34.3
-28.6
(19.64)
(41.39)
igo=1
-32.1 *** -6.0
(5.35)
(11.26)
Adjusted R-squared
0.22
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’
0.01 ‘*’ 0.05

0.5
(0.62)
-16.3
(16.84)
20.5
(16.79)
-13.4
**
(4.58)

Competition
1093.2 ***
(29.46)
-541.7 ***
(27.79)

Emulation
3565.0 ***
(99.66)
-1599.0 ***
(77.11)

-564.2 ***
(28.51)
-1784.0 ***
(86.19)
-1.0
*
0.1
(0.51)
(2.00)
-38.9
** -6.7
(13.62)
(53.83)
49.4
*** 95.9
(13.62)
(53.83)
1.2
-110.0 ***
(3.71)
(14.65)
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CONCLUSION
This chapter presented the agent-based model, the results of simulation and the regression
analysis of data generated from the ABM. The analysis examined several measures of policy
diffusion including the time to full diffusion; the average power of adopters and non-adopters;
the proportion of adopters in each region; the average difference in compliance cost of adopters
and non-adopters; the time of the maximum power difference between adopters and nonadopters; the time of the maximum compliance difference between adopters and non-adopters;
and the time of the maximum regional difference of proportion of adopters were analyzed.
The analysis found that the number of initial adopters, commitment of the people and the
influence of intergovernmental organizations expedite the process of policy diffusion. An
international system with large number of weak states and small number of super powers
(Poisson distribution of power) accelerates the time to full adoption. A perfectly multipolar
international system (uniform distribution of power) slows the time to full diffusion. Learning
and competition lead to faster diffusion; coercion takes more time to diffuse policy; and
emulation is consistently the slowest diffusion mechanism.
Diffusion through coercion tends to increase power differences between adopters and
non-adopters while learning, emulation and competition tends to decrease it. In the coercion
mechanism, the weaker states adopt the policies through suasion. However, the more powerful
ones are less likely to be influenced by the superpowers. Therefore, the power of non-adopters is
greater. In learning, emulation and competition the more powerful and less powerful ones are
equally likely to adopt the policy in the early stage of diffusion because the difference between
power of non-adopters and adopters is lower than in coercion. In coercion there are some
powerful holdouts up to later stages in the diffusion process. It suggests that the earlier powerful
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adopters indirectly influence the powerful holdouts by first influencing the weaker nation states
dependent on them. The powerful hold outs eventually converge their policies. For example,
during the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union could first influence the weaker
states reliant on them. There were some relatively powerful nation states, which were neutral and
did not side with neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. However, with the fall of the
Soviet Union more countries liberalized their economies, which eventually led the more
powerful holdouts to also liberalize their economies. The highest power difference is in the
initial stages of diffusion process in learning, emulation and competition. The Poisson and
uniform distributions of power increase the average power difference between adopters and nonadopters. The number of initial adopters decreases power difference. Likewise, the number of
initial adopters is negatively associated with regional differences. With an increase in the number
of initial adopters, there is a decrease in regional difference. There is a higher regional difference
in emulation than coercion.
The difference in compliance costs between adopters and non-adopters is lower in
learning, emulation and competition than in the coercion. The cost is higher for the adopters in
coercion than in learning, emulation and competition. However, as the number of initial adopters
increases, the cost decreases for the adopters in coercion and in the full specifications. The
number of IGOs and the difference in compliance cost of adopters and non-adopters are
positively associated. With an increase in the number of IGOs, the costs increase for the adopters
in the coercion specification. The number of initial adopters and the difference in compliance
costs have a negative association.
With an increase in the number of initial adopters, powerful and weak nation-states are
equally likely to adopt the policies. The persistence of maximum power differences is negatively
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associated with the number of initial adopters. When the number of initial adopters increases,
maximum power difference between adopters and non-adopters decreases. This suggests that if a
few nation-states adopt a policy, they are the powerful ones and they lead less powerful
countries. However, when a policy is adopted by a large number of nation-states initially, there
are both powerful and less powerful nation-states among them. In emulation, learning and
competition power difference between adopters and non-adopters is small. In coercion the power
difference between adopters and non-adopters is large. It is negatively associated with learning,
emulation and competition. With an increase in the number of IGOs, power difference between
adopters and non-adopters decrease. In the full regression specification and the coercion
specification, the persistence of maximum power differences is negatively associated with the
number of IGOs. In a more equal international system, the difference between the power of
adopters and non-adopters decreases. The uniform power distribution is negatively associated
with it in the competition specification. When there are only very few powerful states, the power
difference between adopters and non-adopters is larger. It is positively associated with the
Poisson power distribution in the competition specification.

Table 18 Diffusion of Kyoto Protocol by Region
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The persistence of maximum differences in compliance costs is negatively associated
with the initial number of adopters. Interestingly, it is negatively associated with learning and
competition and positively associated with emulation, suggesting that emulation adds to longterm differences in compliance costs. In learning and competition the highest cost difference
between adopters and non-adopters is early in the diffusion process; however, it is in the later
stage of diffusion process in emulation. Since difference in cost is generated from subtracting
cost of adopters from cost of non-adopters, whenever the cost closely equal on adopters and nonadopters the difference is low. In competition and learning the cost is more equal on adopters and
non-adopters. The persistence of these costs is negatively associated with internal actors’
commitment to the policy in the competition model. It also is negatively associated with the
number of IGOs in the full regression specification as well as the more parsimonious learning
and emulation specifications. It is positively associated with the uniform distribution of power in
competition. It is negatively associated with the Poisson distribution of power in the competition
specification.
The differences in regional differences decrease in the later stages of diffusion process in
every mechanism. The persistence of maximum regional differences associates negatively with
the number of initial adopters. Regional difference decreases when the number of initial adopters
increases. Countries from every region adopt the policy when there is a large number of initial
adopters. With a few number of initial adopters, the regional differences increase. The policy
diffuses within region first before diffusing between regions. As Table 18 illustrates the example
of membership of Kyoto. The Kyoto Protocol, which has a large number of initial adopters and
members from each region, has low regional difference in terms of proportion of adopters from
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Table 19 FIT Diffusion Regional Variation

each region. The proportional increase in number of adopters in each region is proportional to the
number of initial adopters from each region.
The competition and learning mechanisms are negatively associated with regional
differences while emulation is positively associated. In emulation, the highest regional
differences occur in the later stages of the diffusion process. However, in learning and
competition the highest regional differences occur in the earlier stage of the diffusion process. In
the emulation and full specifications, the highest regional difference is likely to occur in the
initial stage of diffusion process when the number of IGOs increases. In competition and
learning policies diffuse between regions, but in emulation the policies diffuse within regions
before diffusing between regions. Table 19 illustrates the regional variation of FIT diffusion.
Through the emulation mechanism with a few initial adopters, the policy has initially diffused
within Europe and Central Asia before diffusing to other regions.
The number of people committed to the policy is negatively associated with it in the
competition specification. The uniform power distribution is positively associated with it in the
full and emulation specifications. The number of IGOs is negatively associated with it in the full
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and emulation specifications. An increase in the number of IGOs committed to the policy
decreases regional differences in emulation and full specifications. With an increase in the
number of IGOs, the cost on adopters is the highest in the initial stages of adoption in emulation,
full and learning specifications.
The next chapter will present the results of statistical analysis. The findings show that
diffusion of renewable energy policies has occurred mainly through emulation and coercion
mechanisms. The variables EU membership, common language, CDM and FDI are positively
associated with the policies’ diffusions.
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STATISTICAL RESULTS

The previous chapter presented the agent-based model, the results of simulation and the
regression analysis of data generated from the ABM. The analysis examined several measures of
policy diffusion including the time to full diffusion; the average power of adopters and nonadopters; the proportion of adopters in each region; the average difference in compliance cost of
adopters and non-adopters; the time of the maximum power difference between adopters and
non-adopters; the time of the maximum compliance difference between adopters and nonadopters; and the time of the maximum regional difference of proportion of adopters were
analyzed.
The analysis found that the number of initial adopters, commitment of the people and the
influence of intergovernmental organizations expedite the process of policy diffusion. An
international system with a large number of weak states and a small number of super powers
(Poisson distribution of power) accelerates the time to full adoption. A perfectly multipolar
international system (uniform distribution of power) slows the time to full diffusion. Learning
and competition mechanisms lead to faster diffusion; coercion takes more time to diffuse policy;
and emulation is consistently the slowest diffusion mechanism.
This chapter presents the results of statistical tests of the four diffusion theses. To
examine the robustness of these statistical findings, the research uses several model
specifications that interrogates the consistency of estimates across different statistical
assumptions. The variables are tested in eight specifications, four random effect logistic
regressions and four event history models. In brief, there is a robust finding of support for the
emulation and suasion mechanisms of policy diffusion, but little support for learning and
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competition. Estimates that behave consistently increase the confidence when making references.
In the following two sections, the results of random effect logistic regression models and event
history models are discussed. First, four models of random effect logistic regression for FIT and
RPS are presented. Then, four event history models for RPS and FIT are discussed. The findings
of eight models are then compared to test for consistency of the estimates.
The independent variables are divided into four categories: suasion, emulation,
competition, and learning. Each independent variable will be examined under four specifications:
pooled random-effects logistic regression models that are fully specified; pooled random-effects
logistic regression that are parsimonious specifications for each mechanism; fully specified event
history models; and parsimonious event history models for each mechanism. The full models
include all the independent variables and the controls, and the parsimonious models for each
mechanism include only the independent variables for the given mechanism and all the controls.

RANDOM EFFECTS LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS
Table 20 shows the results of random effect logistic regression models for the FIT
dependent variable, that is, whether (1) or not (0) a state adopts FIT. The full model includes the
independent variables for all four mechanisms of diffusion and the controls. The suasion model
only includes the variables for the suasion mechanism and the controls. And for each mechanism
there is a separate model that includes all the control variables.
Two of the four variables (EU membership, and FDI) of the suasion model are significant
in both the full and the parsimonious models and their directions of effects are as hypothesized,
that is, positively associated with the adoption of FIT. In the competition model only one of the
three independent variables is significant, but none of them is significant in the full model.
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Competitors’ adoption of FIT in the competition model is significant with the expected positive
direction of effect. The direction of effect of a competitor’s FIT is inconsistent across the two
models. In the emulation model, two of the five independent variables (common language and
common colonial history) are statistically significant with the expected positive direction of
effect. However, only one common language is significant in both the emulation and the full
model with a positive direction of effect. Two of the six independent variables (the difference in
the share of renewable energy and CO2 share of FIT and Non-FIT countries within each region)
are significant in both the learning and full models with a negative direction of effect. Control
variables including time, system, CO2 emissions, solar and wind are statistically significant and
consistent in five, four, two, two and two models respectively.
Table 21 shows the results of random effect logistic regression models for RPS. The full
model includes all the variables and the controls. The suasion model only includes the variables
for the suasion mechanism and the controls. For each mechanism there is a separate
parsimonious model that includes all the control variables.
One of the four independent variables (EU membership) of the suasion model is
significant in both the full and the suasion models, and the direction of effect is positive as
hypothesized. CDM is significant only in the full model with a positive direction of effect. None
of the three independent variables of the competition mechanism is significant in either the full
model or in the competition model. In the emulation model, three of the four independent
variables (the percent of common language countries with RPS, the percent of states with a
common colonial history with RPS) are statistically significant with expected positive direction
of effect in both the full and emulation models. Neighbors’ adoption of RPS is statistically
significant with a negative direction of effect in both logit models. Only in the full model, the
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Cartagena agreement is statistically significant with a negative direction of effect. (The Kyoto
variable is omitted from the RPS logit models because there is no variation in Kyoto adoption in
the sample after adoption of RPS. All countries with RPS are members of Kyoto.)
Two of the six independent variables for learning (the difference in the share of
renewable energy of RPS and Non-RPS countries within each region, and the difference in the
GDP growth of RPS and Non-RPS countries in the world) are statistically significant. For both
variables he direction of effect is positive in the full model. None of the learning variables are
statistically significant in the parsimonious learning model. In the full model, the difference in
the GDP growth of RPS and Non-RPS countries in the world is significant and the direction of
effect is negative.
Control variables including adoption of wind energy; adoption of solar energy; CO2
emissions; oil reserves; population size; type of government; and a time variable (to control for
serial correlation) are statistically significant and consistent in three, five, three, one, two, one
and four models. The direction of effect for wind and centrist government is negative and the rest
of them have a positive direction of effect. Wind is significant and positively associated in the
emulation, suasion and competition models. Solar is significant with a positive direction of effect
in all the five models. CO2 emission is significant and positively associated in the suasion,
competition and learning models. The measure of oil reserves is significant with a positive
direction of effect only in the full model. Population is significant in the full and emulation
models. The measure of centrist governments is significant with a negative direction of effect
only in the learning model. Time is significant and positively associated in all four of the models
except emulation model.
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Table 10 FIT Models, Random-Effects Logit
Variable
FDI
EU membership
CDM
colonizer_ RPS/FIT
Neighbors
Cartagena
Kyoto
Common colonial
history
Common language
Competitors’
RPS/FIT
Competitors’ CDM
Competitors’ FDI
Regional
renewables share
Regional CO2
emission
Regional GDP
growth
World CO2 emission
World GDP growth
World renewables
share
wind
solar
CO2emission
GDPG
oilreserve
globaloilprice
GDPPC
Population
System
Government type
3
4

Full
5.08
15.17***
1.63
-0.76
-0.03
0.5
5.48

Suasion
2.92*
13.75***
0.15
0.54
-

Competition
-

Emulation
-0.01
1.03
2.68

Learning
-

10.10*
0.42***

-

-

5.62
0.37***

-

-3.34
1.97
0.38

-

4.65*
1.17
0.79

-

-

-0.10*

-

-

-

-0.06*

-0.79**

-

-

-

-0.42*

-0.25
0.59
0.18

-

-

-

-0.23
-0.06
0.28

0.02
0
0.00*
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
1.36
-1.34
0.41

0.00***
0
0.00*
0
0
0
0
0
4.57***
0.06
1.18

0
0
0.00***
0
0
0.01
0
0
8.34***
-0.55
0.49

0
0.00**
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
3.01*
-0.89
0.13

-0.01
0.00***
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8.84***
-0.45
1.38
3365.87
_cons
1387.02* 3161.70*** -3571.40*** 1021.18** ***
_cons
4.88*** 5.30***
5.84***
4.81***
5.59***
N
3117
3117
3310
3310
3310
ll
-134.47
-270.4
-284.39
-155.88
-285.85
time
0.66*
1.55***
1.76***
0.49**
1.66***
Signif. codes: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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Table 21 RPS Models Random-Effects Logit
Variable
FDI
EU membership
CDM
colonizer_ RPS/FIT
Neighbors
Cartagena
Kyoto
Common colonial
history
Common language
Competitors’
RPS/FIT
Competitors’ CDM
Competitors’ FDI
Regional renewables
share
Regional CO2
emission
Regional GDP
growth
World CO2 emission
World GDP growth
World renewables
share
wind
solar
CO2emission
GDPG
oilreserve
globaloilprice
GDPPC
Population
System
Government type

Full
8.38
46.17**
23.79**
-6.1
-0.96*
-19.06*
(omitted)
258.93**
*
1.34***

Suasion
1.67
10.73***
5.92
-0.2
-

Competition
-

Emulation
-0.66*
-0.51
(omitted)

Learning
-

-

-

128.59***
1.87***

-

-6.25
-5.77
20.72

-

-7.01
1.64
1.22

-

-

-0.86*

-

-

-

-0.06

-1.5

-

-

-

0.13

1.76
-2.59
-7.93*

-

-

-

0.5
-0.66
-1.39

-0.00**
0.00***
0.00*
0
0
0.03
0
0
5.6
-2.36
-1.53

-0.00**
0.00***
0
0
0.02
0.03
-0.01**
0.01*
1.71
-11.94*
-2.48

0.01
0
0.00***
0.01***
0
0
0.03
0
0
5.33
-6.83*
-2.61

-4036.29***
5.36***
3310
-76.75
1.99***

-3039.89*
6.16***
2522
-27.72
1.48*

-5042.03***
6.11***
1956
-71.44
2.48***

-1.36
0
-0.00*
0.00***
0.00***
0
0.00**
0
0
0.03*
0
0.01
0.02
0
0
0.01**
0
0.87
2.64
3 -5.4
-2.62
4 -3.02
-2.1
_cons
8918.34* 3421.56***
_cons
5.01***
5.37***
N
1888
3117
ll
-17.87
-72.95
time
4.35*
1.67***
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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EVENT HISTORY MODELS
Pooled logistic regression models help explain whether diffusion mechanisms explain
why states adopt FIT and/or RPS. They do not explain, however, when states adopt these
policies. To help understanding the timing of adoption, and whether diffusion mechanisms
explain this timing, one can use an event history model (sometimes called a hazard model).
Table 22 presents the estimates for the event history models. As in the pooled logistic regression
models, the analysis uses both a full model specification that includes all four diffusion
mechanisms plus controls; and parsimonious specifications that test each diffusion mechanism
separately while controlling for rival factors. These specifications allow the analysis to assess the
consistency of the estimates under different specifications and assumptions; those estimates that
behave consistently increase the confidences in the inferences one may draw.
In both the full and suasion FIT event history models, two of the suasion variables (EU
membership and FDI) are statistically significant with a positive direction of effect. A positive
direction of effect in event history models speeds up the diffusion process. In both the full and
emulation FIT event history models, one of the emulation variables (a common language with
adopters) is statistically significant with a positive direction of effect. None of the competition
variables is significant. None of the emulation models is significant in either the full or
parsimonious emulation models. However, the difference in CO2 between regions with FIT and
non-FIT is significant with a negative direction of effect in the full model of FIT adoption. The
difference in GDP growth of FIT and non-FIT countries of the world is statistically significant in
the learning event history model with a positive direction of effect.
The controls for CO2 emissions, the global price of oil, and system (coded 2 presidential,
3 parliamentary) are statistically significant in three, four, and three models respectively. CO2
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emissions is statistically significant in the suasion, competition, and emulation event history
models of FIT with a positive direction of effect. The global oil price is significant with a
negative direction of effect (as expected) in all the event history models except the parsimonious
competition model. FIT diffuses faster in parliamentary system of government than in
presidential system. System (coded 2 presidential, 3 parliamentary) is significant with a positive
direction of effect in the suasion, competition and learning event history models for FIT
adoption.
In the full event history model for RPS adoption, EU membership, CDM, FDI, average
difference in CO2 emissions within regions of countries with and without RPS, average
difference in GDP growth within regions of countries with and without RPS, common former
adopted the policy, common language and Kyoto are statistically significant. As expected the
direction of effects of EU membership, CDM, FDI, average difference in GDP growth within
regions of countries with and without RPS, percentage of countries with common former
colonizer adopted RPS, common language and Kyoto Protocols are positive. However, average
difference in CO2 emissions within regions of countries with and without RPS has a negative
direction of effect. Therefore, hypothesis 1, 3, 4, 10, 12, 15, 16 and 18 are accepted.
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Table 22 FIT Models: Event History (Estimates as Betas)
Variable
FDI
EU membership
CDM
Colonizer_RPS/FIT
Neighbors
Cartagena
Kyoto
Common colonial
history
Common language
Competitors’
RPS/FIT
Competitors’ CDM
Competitors’ FDI
Regional
renewables share
Regional CO2
emissions
Regional GDP
growth_
World CO2
emission
World GDP growth
World renewables
share
wind
solar
CO2emission
GDPG
oilreserve
globaloilprice
GDPPC
Population
System
Government type 3
Government type 4
_cons
_cons
N
ll

Full
13.88***
0.98**
0.61
-0.44
-0.01
0.5
-1.38

Suasion
14.56***
1.10**
0.7
0.22
-

Competition
-

Emulation
-0.01
0.38
-1.21

Learning
-

0.44
0.05***

-

-

-0.27
0.05***

-

-0.83
0.06
1.78

-

-0.21
0.62
1.14

-

-

0.01

-

-

-

0.01

-0.14*

-

-

-

-0.08

0.08

-

-

-

-0.01

0.63
0.14

-

-

-

0.46
0.25*

-0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.00***
0.00***
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.05*
-0.02*
-0.02
-0.03**
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.42
0.90**
0.98**
0.36
0.21
0.21
0.05
0.37
0.48
0.16
0.06
0.35
7919.88** 3355.27*** -3259.51***
-3309.68***
6.94***
6.08***
6.06***
6.08***
2662
2662
2847
2847
303.11
217.54
215.19
293.71
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

-0.02
0
0
0.00***
0
0
-0.03*
0
0
1.02**
0.1
0.19
6278.40**
6.72***
2847
222.05
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Table 23 RPS Models: Event History (Estimates as Betas)
Variable
FDI
EU membership
CDM
Colonizer_RPS/FIT
Neighbors
Cartagena
Kyoto
Common colonial
history
Common language
Competitors’
RPS/FIT
Competitors’ CDM
Competitors’ FDI
Regional renewables
share
Regional CO2
emission
Regional GDP
growth
World CO2 emission
World GDP growth
World renewables
share
wind
solar
CO2emission
GDPG
oilreserve
globaloilprice
GDPPC
population
system
Government type
Gov 3
Gov 4
_cons
_cons
N
ll

Full
14.11***
9.31*
2.49**
-1.18
-0.05
-6.56
9.03*

Suasion
14.17***
1.96
2.60***
-0.57
-

Competition
-

Emulation Learning
-0.03
-2.13**
15.83***
-

14.97***
0.12**

-

-

11.09***
0.07***

-

-10.77
2.13
4.06

-

-1.49
0.77
0.11

-

-

-0.07

-

-

-0.02

0.42*

-

-

0.02

0.74**
-0.37
-0.71

-

-

0.2
0.06
-0.14

0
0
0.00*
0
0
0.04
0
0
2.02
-0.1
0.78

0.06
0
0
0
0
0.00*
0.02
0
0
1.11
-1.43
-0.56

-690.18
4.44
3239
66.26

-707.85
4.52
1885
39.59

-0.3
-0.00*
0
0
0
0.01*
0.12***
-0.00**
0
3.65*
0.09

0
-0.00*
0
0.00**
0
0
0
0
0.00*
0
-0.02
0
0
0
0
0
0.98
1.32
-1.09
-1.43
-0.59
-0.58
-9219.77 3510.93* -4036.51*
7.09*** 6.12***
6.27***
1832
3046
3239
81.45
43.78
37.04
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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In the RPS event history full specification the controls wind power, oil reserves, the
global price of oil, GDP per capita and system (presidential coded 2, parliamentary coded 3) are
statistically significant. While wind power and GDP per capita have a negative direction of effect
(that is, they slow the process of policy diffusion), oil reserves, the global price of oil and system
(presidential coded 2, parliamentary coded 3) have positive direction of effect (that is, they speed
up the process of policy diffusion). In the RPS event history suasion model FDI and CDM are
statistically significant. As expected both have a positive effect on RPS adoption. In the suasion
event history specification only the control oil reserve is statistically significant with a positive
direction of effect.
In the RPS event history competition model, none of the independent variables is
significant. Only the controls for wind and solar power are statistically significant with negative
and positive effects respectively. In the RPS event history emulation model, Cartagena, Kyoto,
common former colonizer, common language and the control for CO2 emissions are statically
significant. Kyoto, common former colonizer and common language and CO2 emissions as
expected are positively associated with RPS adoption in the emulation model. Contrary to
expectation, Cartagena has a negative effect. In the RPS event history model for the learning
mechanism, none of the independent variable is statistically significant. Only the control, oil
reserves, as expected has a statistically significant and positive effect.

HYPOTHESIS EXAMINATION UNDER FOUR SPECIFICATIONS OF FIT MODELS
Each independent variable is examined in four models (two event history and two
random effects logistic regression models). There are parsimonious models for each mechanism
that include the independent variables of a given variable and all the controls. There are full
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models that include all the variables in the four mechanisms and the controls. This estimation
approach allows one to compare the effect of a hypothesized variable under different modeling
assumptions.
For the models of the suasion mechanism of policy diffusion, wo out of four variables are
statistically significant and two of them are not statistically significant in any of the FIT models.
EU membership and FDI in four and three models respectively. CDM and adoption of FIT by a
former colonizer are not statistically significant in any of the FIT models. Therefore, hypothesis
two and three are rejected.
EU membership is statistically significant in all four of FIT models (FIT-full event
history, FIT-suasion event history, FIT-suasion random-effect logistic regression and FITsuasion random-effect logistic regression). EU membership has a consistent positive direction of
effect as expected in hypothesis one. This consistency in significance and direction of effect
allows one to accept hypothesis one.

Table 24 FIT Suasion Models

Hypothesis
1

Total
Significant
4

Variables
EUMembership
2
Colonizer0
FIT/RPS
3
CDM
0
4
FDI
3
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖

Event history
Full Suasion
✔
✔

Random-effects Logit
Full Suasion
✔
✔

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖
✔

✖
✔

✖
✖

✖
✔
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FDI is statistically significant in three of the four FIT models (FIT-full event history,
FIT-suasion event history and FIT-suasion random-effect logistic regression). FDI has a
consistent positive direction of effect as expected in hypothesis four. Therefore, hypothesis four
is accepted in FIT-full event history, FIT-suasion event history and FIT-suasion random-effect
logistic regression.
In the FIT emulation models, two out of six variables are statistically significant.
Adoption by a country with common language is significant in all four of the FIT models.
Common colonizer is only significant in the full pooled random effects logistic regression
model; therefore, hypothesis 15 is accepted. Common colonizer has a positive direction of effect
as expected in hypothesis 15. Common language is statistically significant and has a consistent
positive direction of effect in all four of the models. Therefore, hypothesis 16 is accepted.

Table 25 FIT Emulation Models

Hypothesis
14
15

Total
Significant
0
1

Variables
Neighbors
Common
colonial
history
16
Common
4
language
17
Cartagena
0
18
Kyoto
0
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖

Event history
Full Emulation
✖
✖
✖
✖

Random-effects Logit
Full
Emulation
✖
✖
✔
✖

✔

✔

✔

✔

✖
✖

✖
✖

✖
✖

✖
✖
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Table 26 FIT Competition Models

Hypothesis
5

Total
Significant
1

Variables
Competitors’
RPS/FIT
6
Competitors’ 0
CDM
7
Competitors’ 0
FDI
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖

Event history
Random-effects Logit
Full Competition Full
Competition
✖
✖
✖
✔
✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

In Table 26, which compares the estimations across four specifications of the FITemulation models, only competitor’s FIT adoption is statistically significant. Only in one model
is competitor’s FIT adoption statistically significant and the direction of effect is positive as
expected in hypothesis 5. Based on the competition random-effects logistic regression model,
hypothesis 5 is rejected because of omitted variable bias; there is not a lot of confidence in that
variable. However, it is not consistent and not significant in the full models.
Three of the variables are statistically significant in at least in one of the learning FIT
models. Three of the variables, average difference in GDP growth of countries with and without
FIT within regions, Average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without FIT in
the world and average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and without
FIT in the world are not statistically significant in any of the models. Therefore, hypotheses 9, 11
and 12 are rejected. Average difference in renewable energy share within regions of countries
with and without FIT is statically significant in two of the logit models, but not in any of the
event history models. The direction of effect is consistent and negative in both logit models.
However, the hypothesis stated an expectation of a positive direction of effect. According to the
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logit models’ results, then, hypothesis eight is accepted. Average difference in CO2 emissions
within regions of countries with and without FIT is statistically significant in three of the models.
The direction of effect is consistent and negative in all three of the models. Hypothesis 10
is accepted. Average difference in GDP growth of countries with and without FIT in the world is
only significant with a positive direction of effect as expected in learning event history model.
Therefore, hypothesis 13 is rejected because of omitted variable bias; there is not a lot of
confidence in that variable. However, it is not consistent and not significant in the full models.
In terms of the strength of the mechanisms that may explain FIT diffusion, there is strong
support for suasion and to a lesser degree strong support for emulation. For learning and
competition there is moderate and weak support respectively. Suasion and emulation each have
one variable that are significant in all four models. The suasion mechanism’s hypothesis 1, EU
membership, and emulation mechanism’s hypothesis 16, common language, are statistically

Table 27 FIT Learning Models
Total
Significant
Hypothesis
8
9
10
11
12
13

Variables
Regional
renewables share
World renewables
share
Regional CO2
emission
World CO2
emission
Regional GDP
growth
World GDP growth

Event history

Random-effects Logit

2

Full
✖

Learning
✖

Full
✔

Learning
✔

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

3

✔

✖

✔

✔

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

1

✖

✔

✖

✖

Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖
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significant with positive direction of effect in all four of the models. Suasion mechanism’s
hypothesis four, FDI, is statistically significant with consistent positive effect in three of the
models. Learning mechanism’s hypothesis 10, Average difference in CO2 emissions within
regions of countries with and without FIT, is statistically significant with negative direction of
effect in three of the models.
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Table 28 FIT Models
Hypothesis
Suasion
1
2
3
4
Competition
5
6
7
Learning
8
9
10
11
12
13
Emulation
14
15
16
17
18

Variables

Total
Event history
Random-effects Logit
Signific Full Parsimonious Full
Parsimonious
ant

EU-Membership
Colonizer-FIT
CDM
FDI

4
0
0
3

✔
✖
✖
✔

✔
✖
✖
✔

✔
✖
✖
✖

✔
✖
✖
✔

Competitors’
RPS/FIT
Competitors’
CDM
Competitors’ FDI

1

✖

✖

✖

✔

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

Regional
renewables share
World renewables
share
Regional CO2
emission
World CO2
emission
Regional GDP
growth
World GDP
growth

2

✖

✖

✔

✔

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

3

✔

✖

✔

✔

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

1

✖

✔

✖

✖

Neighbors
Common colonial
history
Common
language
Cartagena
Kyoto

0
1

✖
✖

✖
✖

✖
✔

✖
✖

4

✔

✔

✔

✔

0
0

✖
✖

✖
✖

✖
✖

✖
✖

Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖
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Table 29 RPS Suasion Models

Hypothesis
1

Total
Event history
Random-effects Logit
Significant Full Suasion Full
Suasion
3
✔
✖
✔
✔

Variables
EUMembership
2
Colonizer-RPS 0
3
CDM
3
4
FDI
2
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖

✖
✔
✔

✖
✔
✔

✖
✔
✖

✖
✖
✖

There is the strongest support for EU membership and common language in four models.
There is moderate support for FDI and Average difference in CO2 emissions within regions of
countries with and without FIT in three models. There is weak support for Average difference in
renewable energy share within regions of countries with and without FIT in two logit models.
There is very weak support (one model only) for common colony, competitors’ FIT, average
difference in GDP growth of countries with and without FIT in the world in full logit,
parsimonious logit, and parsimonious event history models respectively. In fit models there is no
support for colonizer-FIT, CDM, neighbors’ FIT, Cartagena, Kyoto, competitors’ CDM,
competitors’ FDI, average difference in GDP growth of countries with and without FIT within
regions, Average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without FIT in the world
and average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and without FIT in the
world.
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Table 30 RPS Emulation Models

Hypothesis
14
15

Total
Significant
1 (-)
4

Variables
Neighbors
Common
colonial
history
16
Common
4
language
17
Cartagena
2 (-)
18
Kyoto
2
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖

Event history
Full Emulation
✖
✖
✔
✔

Random-effects Logit
Full
Emulation
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✖
✔

✔
✔

✔
✖

✖
✖

HYPOTHESIS EXAMINATION UNDER FOUR SPECIFICATIONS OF RPS MODELS
Overall there is moderate support for the suasion mechanism in the RPS models. There is
moderate support (significant in three of the models) for EU membership and CDM. There is
weak support for FDI, which is statistically significant in only one of the models. There is no
support for a colonizer’s adoption of RPS.
Hypothesis 1, EU membership, is statistically significant with the expected direction of
effect (positive) in the full event history model, random-effects logit full and suasion models.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is accepted. Hypothesis 3, CDM, is statistically significant with
expected (positive) direction of effect in three models: the full event history, parsimonious
suasion, and random-effect logit full models. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is accepted. FDI is
statistically significant with positive direction of effect in two event history models.
There is strong support for the emulation mechanism in explaining diffusion of RPS.
Competitors’ RPS and common language are statistically significant with expected direction of
effect (positive) in all four models. Therefore, hypothesis 15 and 16 are accepted. Cartagena is
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statistically significant in the event history emulation and logit full models. Hypothesis 17 is
accepted; however, not with a positive, but instead a negative direction of effect.
Being signatory to Kyoto Protocols is statistically significant in two event history models
with positive direction of effect. Therefore, hypothesis 18 is accepted. Hypothesis 14, neirps is
statistically significant in the logit full and parsimonious models. Hypothesis 14 is accepted;
however, the direction of effect is negative.
There is no support for the competition mechanism in explaining the diffusion of RPS.
None of the competition variables are statistically significant. Therefore, hypotheses five, six and
seven are rejected.

Table 31 RPS Competition Models

Hypothesis
5

Total
Significant
0

Variables
Competitors’
RPS/FIT
6
Competitors’ 0
CDM
7
Competitors’ 0
FDI
Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖

Event history
Random-effects Logit
Full Competition Full
Competition
✖
✖
✖
✔
✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

✖

There is very weak support for the learning mechanism in explaining RPS diffusion.
None of the learning variables are significant in both the event history and logit models.
Hypothesis 10 and 12, average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without RPS
within regions and average difference in GDP growth of countries with and without RPS within

137
Table 32 FIT Learning Models
Total
Significant
Hypothesis
8
9
10
11
12
13

Variables
Regional
renewables share
World renewables
share
Regional CO2
emission
World CO2
emission
Regional GDP
growth
World GDP growth

Event history

1-

Full
✖

Learning
✖

Random-effects
Logit
Full
Learning
✔
✖

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

1

✔

✖

✖

✖

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

1

✔

✖

✖

✖

1-

✖

✖

✔

✖

Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖

regions are only statistically significant in event history full models. Hypothesis 10 and 12 are
accepted. Hypothesis 8, average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and
without RPS within regions and hypothesis 13, average difference in the GDP growth of
countries with and without RPS in the world, are statistically significant in the full logit models.
Hypothesis 8 and 13 are accepted; however, their directions of effects are negative. Hypothesis
9, average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and without RPS in the
world and 11, average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without RPS in the
world are rejected.
Emulation, suasion learning and competition mechanisms are strong, moderate, very
weak and without support respectively in terms of explaining RPS diffusion. Two variables of
the suasion mechanism are statistically significant. The suasion mechanism’s hypothesis 15,
common former colonizer, and hypothesis 16, common language, are statistically significant
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with a positive direction in all four RPS models. Two variables of the suasion models—
hypothesis 1 about EU membership and hypothesis 3 about CDM—are statistically significant in
three of the models. The learning mechanism’s hypothesis 8,10,12 and 13 are significant in one
of the models. None of the competition mechanism’s variables, hypothesis 5 through 7, is
statistically significant.
The strongest support is for hypothesis 15 common former colonizer, and hypothesis 16,
common language, in four models. There is moderate support for EU membership and CDM,
which are statistically significant in three models. There is weak support for FDI, which is
statistically significant, in two logit models. There is very weak support for average difference in
the renewable energy share of countries with and without RPS within regions, average difference
in CO2 emissions of countries with and without RPS within regions, average difference in GDP
growth of countries with and without RPS within regions, average difference in the GDP growth
of countries with and without RPS in the world, which are only significant in one of the models,
full logit, full event history, full event history and full logit models respectively. In the RPS
models, there is no support for former colonizer, competitor’s CDM, competitor’s FDI,
competitor’s RPS, average difference in CO2 emissions of countries with and without RPS in the
world, average difference in the renewable energy share of countries with and without RPS in the
world.

COMPARISON: RESULTS OF FIT AND RPS MODELS
There are eight models in total for RPS and FIT. In order to check for robustness a
comparison is made across all eight models. The findings for emulation and suasion are robust in
both RPS and FIT. The emulation variable of sharing a common language (hypothesis 16) is
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statistically significant with a positive direction of effect in all eight models. The emulation
variable of sharing a common colonial history (hypothesis 15) is statistically significant with a
positive direction of effect in all four RPS models, but there is no consistent finding for it in the
FIT models. There is a robust finding for EU membership (hypothesis 1) in both RPS and FIT
models. There is a robust finding for EU membership (hypothesis 1) in both RPS and FIT
models. EU membership is statistically significant with a positive direction of effect in three and
four models RPS and FIT respectively. There is robust finding for CDM (hypothesis 3) in RPS
models but not in FIT models. There is a robust finding for FDI (hypothesis 2) in the FIT
models, but not in the RPS models. There is no significant finding for the colonizer variable
(hypothesis 2), which is not significant in any of the models.
There are robust findings for learning in the FIT models, but not in the RPS models. In
FIT models, there is a robust finding for the learning variable, the average difference in CO2
emissions within region of countries that adopted the policy and those that have not, but not in
RPS models. It is statistically significant in three of the FIT models with a negative direction of
effect. There is a robust finding that the competition mechanism is not a predictor of RPS and
FIT diffusion.
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Table 33 RPS Models

Hypothesis
Suasion
1
2
3
4
Competition
5
6
7
Learning
8
9
10
11
12
13
Emulation
14
15
16
17
18

Variables

Total
Event history
Random-effects Logit
Significant Full Parsimonious Full
Parsimonious

EU-Membership
Colonizer-RPS
CDM
FDI

3
0
3
2

✔
✖
✔
✔

✖
✖
✔
✔

✔
✖
✔
✖

✔
✖
✖
✖

Competitors’
RPS/FIT
Competitors’
CDM
Competitors’ FDI

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

Regional
renewables share
World renewables
share
Regional CO2
emission
World CO2
emission
Regional GDP
growth
World GDP
growth

1-

✖

✖

✔

✖

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

1

✔

✖

✖

✖

0

✖

✖

✖

✖

1

✔

✖

✖

✖

1-

✖

✖

✔

✖

Neighbors
Common colonial
history
Common language
Cartagena
Kyoto

2 (-)
4

✖
✔

✖
✔

✔
✔

✔
✔

4
2 (-)
2

✔
✖
✔

✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✖
Omitted Omitted

Codes: Significant ✔, Not significant ✖

The results of eight specifications presented in this chapter show robust findings of
support for emulation and suasion, but little support for learning and competition. In the
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emulation mechanism, there is a robust finding for common language. In the suasion model there
is a robust finding of support for EU membership. In addition, there is a robust finding that
competition is not the driver of RPS and FIT diffusion. The findings for the learning mechanism
in diffusion of RPS are not robust. However, there is a robust finding for learning variable,
average difference in CO2 emissions within regions of countries with and without FIT, in the FIT
learning models.

PROBABILITY PROFILES OF FIT AND RPS MODELS
Probability profiles are generated to show the magnitude of effect of the independent
variables on the dependent variable. While the results of regression and event history models
show the direction of effect and statistically significance of the variables, they do not show the
magnitude of effect on the dependent variable. Probability profiles allow the calculation of the
effect of values of a given independent variable on the dependent variable. For example, it
allows the separate calculation of effect of each value of a dummy variable, EU membership,
with a value of zero and one on RPS adoption. Therefore, in order to find out which factor has
the greatest effect on the probability of adoption, probability profiles are calculated for the
statistically significant variables.
The probability profiles for the pooled logit full RPS model, pooled logit full FIT model,
event history full RPS model, and event history full FIT model are presented in the next four
tables. In the pooled logit full RPS and FIT models, EU membership has the greatest effect. In
the probability profile of event history full FIT model, FDI has the greatest effect.
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Table 34 Comparison FIT and RPS Models
Hypothesis
Suasion
1
2
3
4
Competition
5
6
7
Learning
8
9
10
11
12
13
Emulation
14
15
16
17
18

Variables

RPS Models
Significant

FIT Models
Significant

Total
significant

EU-Membership
Colonizer-RPS/fit
CDM
FDI

3
0
3
2

4
0
0
3

7
0
3
5

Competitors’ rps/fit
Competitors’ CDM
Competitors’ FDI

0
0
0

1
0
0

1
0
0

Regional renewables share
World renewables share
Regional CO2 emission
World CO2 emission
Regional GDP growth
World GDP growth

10
1
0
1
1-

-2
0
-3
0
0
1

-3
0
(+1, -3)=4
0
1
(-1, +1)=2

Neighbors
Common colonial history
Common language
Cartagena
Kyoto

2 (-)
4
4
2 (-)
2

0
1
4
0
0

-2
5
8
-2
2

Pooled logit RPS probability profiles show that EU membership has the highest
magnitude of effect on RPS adoption. The probability of RPS adoption in the pooled logit full
RPS model for positive FDI is .029 and the probability of RPS adoption for negative FDI is .03.
There is one tenth of a percent (0.001) difference between probabilities of RPS adoption in
countries with positive FDI and negative FDI.
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The probability of RPS adoption for non-EU member is 0.03 and for EU member it is
.05. Hence, the probability of RPS adoption is two percent higher for EU members. The
probability of adoption for non-CDM countries is .03 and for CDM countries it is 0.035. There is
half a percent increase in the probability of adoption for countries with CDM. The probability of
adoption for a Cartagena member is 0.03 and 0.035 for non-members. There is half a percent
decrease in the probability of adoption for Cartagena members.
Pooled logit probability profiles for full FIT model show that once again EU membership
has the greatest magnitude of effect on FIT adoption. The probability of FIT adoption for nonEU member is 0.11 and for EU member it is .28. Hence, the probability of FIT adoption is 17
percent higher for EU members. The probability of FIT adoption in a pooled logit full FIT model

Table 35 Pooled Logit Probability Profiles Full RPS Model
Delta-method
Predictive
Margins

Variables
FDI
1
2

0.028
0.0298

1
2

0.03
0.05

1
2

0.0276
0.0347

Std. Err.

z

P>z

0.0025025 11.32
0.0013549 21.97

[95%
Conf.

Interval]

0 0.0234172 0.0332267
0 0.0271092 0.0324204

EU
membership
0.0066993
0.0154067

4.1
0 0.0143413 0.0406021
3.26 0.001 0.0199668
0.08036

CDM
0.0016587 16.62
0.0046233 7.51

0 0.0243241 0.0308262
0 0.0256748 0.0437978

1 0.0354879
0.0062065 5.72
2 0.0297563
0.0013585 21.9
N
1861
Model VCE:
OIM
Expression: Pr(rps=1 assuming u_i=0), predict(pu0)

0 0.0233233 0.0476524
0 0.0270937 0.0324188

Cartagena
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Table 36 Pooled Logit Probability Profiles Full FIT Model
Margin

Delta-method
Std. Err.
z

P>z

[95% Conf. Interval]

FDI
1

0.1088369

0.023838

2

0.1281259

0.0043609

4.57
29.3
8

0

0.0621153

0

0.1195787

0

0.0984301

0

0.1942065

0

0.1185551

2 0.1324374 0.0067815
0
N 3117
Model VCE: OIM
Expression: Pr(fit=1 assuming u_i=0), predict(pu0)

0.1191459

0.15555
86
0.13667
32

EU
membe
rship
1

0.1051216

0.0034141

30.7
9

2

0.2753785

0.041415

6.65

1

0.1271293

0.0043747

0.11181
3
0.35655
04

CDM
29.0
6
19.5
3

0.13570
34
0.14572
88

for a net positive inflow of FDI is .13 and the probability of FIT adoption for negative FDI is .11.
Positive FDI has a 2 percent higher probability of FIT adoption than non-FDI countries. The
probability of adoption for non-CDM countries is .127 and for CDM countries it is 0.132. There
is half a percent increase in the probability of adoption for countries with CDM.
The probability profile for the full specification of the event history FIT model predicts
that half of countries with negative FDI will adopt FIT by 2033, holding other variables constant
at their mean values. The median adoption time for positive FDI is 2008. The median time of
adoption for EU members is 2008 and the median time of adoption for non-EU member is 2010.
The median time of adoption of CDM is 2009 and it is 2010 for non-CDM countries.
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Table 37 Full FIT Model: Event History Probability Profile
Delta-method
Margin

Std. Err.

2033.01
1
2008.45
9

9.666722
210.31
1.909871
1051.62

z

P>z

[95%
Conf.

Interval]

FDI
1
2

0
0

2014.06
5
2004.71
5

2051.958
2012.202

EU
membership
1
2

2009.96 2.366367
2 849.39
2.013965
2008.07 997.07

0
0

2005.32
4
2004.12
3

2014.6
2012.018

CDM
1
2

2009.92
4
2008.74
7

2.368373
848.65
2.129958
943.09

0
0

2005.28
2
2004.57
3

2014.566
2012.922

N 2662
Model VCE: Robust
Expression: Predicted median _t, predict()

The probability profiles for the full specification of the pooled logit RPS model, pooled
logit full FIT model and event history full FIT model were presented in four tables. The variable,
EU membership, has the greatest effect in the pooled logit full RPS and FIT models. The
variable, FDI, has the greatest effect in the probability profile of event history full FIT model.

CONCLUSION
The statistical estimates provide robust support for the emulation and suasion
mechanisms but not much support for learning and competition mechanisms. In the emulation
models hypothesis 16, common language, is significant with a consistently positive direction of
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effect in all eight of the models. In the suasion models, hypothesis 1 about EU membership is
significant in seven models. There are robust findings that the competition mechanism is not the
driver of RPS and FIT diffusion. Competition variables, competitor’s CDM and competitor’s
FDI, are not significant in any of the models. There is no robust finding for learning in diffusion
of RPS. However, there is a robust finding for Average difference in CO2 emissions within
regions of countries with and without FIT, which is statistically significant in three FIT models
with a negative direction of effect. In addition, the factors EU membership and FDI have the
highest magnitude of effect.
The next chapter discusses the theoretical findings and conclusions of the study. There
are robust findings of support for emulation and suasion mechanisms, but there is little support
for learning. The statistical findings show that diffusion of RPS and FIT are not through
competition mechanism.
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CONCLUSIONS AND THEORETICAL FINDINGS

The diffusion of RPS and FIT are more likely to have occurred through emulation and
suasion than through learning or competition. There are robust statistical findings for emulation
and suasion, but there is little support for competition in the diffusion of RPS and FIT policies.
This is consistent with empirical data since currently renewable energy sources cannot compete
with conventional sources of energy. Currently, the prices of conventional sources of energy is
lower than renewable sources of energy. Using renewables do not give competitive advantage to
either producers or consumers. There is also a robust finding of support for learning in the
diffusion of FIT, but not in RPS diffusion. Countries are seeking a solution that mitigates carbon
emissions, diversifies their energy needs, and improves their energy security.
The following eighteen hypotheses are tested using event history and random-effects
logistic regression specifications. The findings show robust support for hypothesis 1, 3, 15 and
16 in the RPS models. There is robust support for hypothesis 1, 4 and 16 in FIT models.
Therefore, these hypotheses are accepted and the remainder of them are rejected.

Coercion Hypotheses
H1a

Countries that are members of the European Union are more likely to adopt renewable
energy policies than non-EU states. (Accepted for both FIT and RPS)

H2a

Countries for which their former colonizers adopted RPS/FIT are more likely to adopt
them. (Rejected)

H3a

Countries with CDM projects are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT than countries without
them. (Accepted for RPS)
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H4a

Countries with high levels of FDI are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS than countries with
lower levels of FDI. (Accepted for FIT).

Competition Hypotheses
H5a

Countries are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS if their main export partner(s) (competitor)
adopted them. (Rejected)

H6a

Countries are more likely to adopt FIT/RPS if their competitors with CDM have adopted
these policies. (Rejected)

H7a

Countries are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT if their competitors with positive FDI,
foreign direct investment net inflows as a percentage of GDP, (new investment inflows less
disinvestment divided by GDP) adopted them. (Rejected)

Learning Hypotheses
H8a

In comparing countries, those in regions with a high share of renewable energy are more
likely to adopt FIT/RPS than those in regions with a low share of renewable energy.
(Rejected)

H9a

In comparing countries of the world, the average share of renewable energy is higher in
countries with FIT/RPS than countries without them. (Rejected)

H10a In

comparing countries, those in regions with lower average carbon emissions are more

likely to adopt FIT/RPS that those in regions with high average carbon emissions.
(Rejected)
H11a

In comparing countries of the world, the average carbon emissions are lower in countries
with FIT/RPS than countries without them. (Rejected)
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H12a

In comparing countries, those in regions with higher average economic growth are more
likely to adopt FIT/RPS than those in regions with lower average economic growth.
(Rejected)

H13a

In comparing countries of the world, the average economic growth is higher in countries
with FIT/RPS than countries without them. (Rejected)

Emulation Hypotheses
H14a

States with a higher percentage of neighbors with renewable energy policies are more
likely to adopt renewable energy policy than states with a lower percentage of neighbors
with renewable energy policies. (Rejected)

H15a

States that share a common colonizer with countries that have a higher percentage of
FIT/RPS adoption are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT than states which share a common
colonizer with countries that have a lower percentage of RPS/FIT adoption. (Accepted
for RPS)

H16a States

that share a common language with countries that have a higher percentage of

FIT/RPS adoption are more likely to adopt RPS/FIT than states which share a common
language with countries that have a lower percentage of RPS/FIT adoption. (Accepted for
both RPS and FIT).
H17a

Countries that are signatories to the Cartagena multilateral environmental agreement are
more likely to adopt renewable energy policies than states which are non-signatories.
(Rejected)

H18a

Countries that are signatories to the Kyoto multilateral environmental agreement are
more likely to adopt renewable energy policies than non-signatories. (Rejected)
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Countries that are members of European Union and receive foreign direct investment are
more likely to adopt FIT. The statistical analysis shows that the probability of FIT adoption is 17
percent higher among EU members than non-members. Countries with positive FDI, Foreign
direct investment net inflows (% of GDP) (new investment inflows less disinvestment divided by GDP)

have a two percent higher probability of RPS adoption than those without FDI. In addition, FDI
and EU membership increase the rate of adoption. Holding other variables at their means, the
median time of adoption for EU members is 2008 and it is 2010 for non-EU members. The
median time of adoption for FDI countries is 2008 and it is 2033 for non-FDI countries. The
indicators of suasion (EU membership and FDI) are statistically significant in all four of the
event history models and three of the random effects logistic regression models. These findings
suggest that EU membership and FDI increase the incentives for the countries to adopt FIT.
FIT is more likely to diffuse to countries that share a common language, a significant
indication of emulation diffusion. As the percentage of policy adopters with common language
increases, there is an increase in the adoption of FIT. The percentage of countries with common
language is statistically significant with a consistent positive direction of effect in all the
statistical models of FIT.
For RPS diffusion, the strongest support is for the emulation mechanism, followed by
suasion. There is not much support for competition and learning. For FIT, there is a robust
finding for common language. For RPS, in addition to common language, there is a robust
finding for common colonial experience as measures of emulation in all four of the statistical
models.
CDM and EU membership increase the probability of RPS diffusion. The probability of
RPS adoption is two percent higher for EU members than for non-members. There is half a
percent increase in the probability of RPS adoption for countries with CDM than for countries
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without it. As measures of suasion, there are robust and consistent positive findings for EU
membership and CDM for RPS diffusion. Each of them is statistically significant in three of the
four statistical models. EU membership increases the probability of diffusion of FIT and RPS. In
addition, FDI increases the probability and diffusion of FIT. There is no robust finding for FDI in
RPS diffusion. CDM, for which there is no robust finding in FIT, is a strong predictor of RPS
diffusion.
Agent-based models complement these findings and show that full diffusion through
coercion and emulation take longer than competition and learning. In addition, the initial number
of adopters; people’s commitment to the mitigation of carbon emissions; the number of
intergovernmental organizations committed to mitigation; and the Poisson distribution of power
in the international system expedite full diffusion. When there are one or two super powers in the
international system, the policies diffuse faster than in a multipolar system. This is an interesting
finding: whereas a uniformity of state power may create a “balance” of strategic stability, the
ABM suggests that in such a world policy diffusion will occur more slowly. Initially adoption of
RPS and FIT only started with a single country, and their diffusion through emulation and
suasion explains the slow rate of diffusion of these policies.
The maximum power difference between adopters and non-adopters is higher in a
Poisson distribution, an international system with one or two super powers than a normal system
with many middle powers. Non-adopters have higher power in the Poisson than in the normal
distribution of power. In a multipolar world, powerful and less powerful countries are equally
likely to adopt, but in a single power world the less powerful ones are more likely to adopt. In
addition, the maximum power difference is higher in a uniform system than a normal system.
Weaker states are more likely to adopt in a uniform world than a multi-polar world. The number
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of initial adopters decreases the time to maximum power difference. When there are more initial
adopters, the maximum power difference occurs in the earlier times of diffusion process. In other
words, there are less powerful ones that adopt the policies in the earlier phase of diffusion
process. The maximum power difference between adopters and non-adopters is lower in the
learning, emulation and competition mechanisms than in suasion. Powerful and less powerful
ones are equally likely to adopt. Since in suasion more powerful countries shape the policies of
weaker states dependent on them, the power difference between adopters and non-adopters is
higher. In suasion less powerful states are more likely to adopt. In learning, emulation and
competition, the maximum power difference occurs in the initial phase of diffusion. In coercion
there are more powerful non-adopters in the later stage of diffusion process than in emulation,
learning and competition.
The maximum regional difference in proportion of adopters and non-adopters occurs only
in diffusion through emulation not in other mechanisms. As the number of initial adopters
increase, there is a decrease in the maximum regional difference. However, this difference is
more likely to occur in the initial phase of diffusion. In the competition and learning
mechanisms, the maximum regional difference occurs in the earlier phase of diffusion. In
emulation, the regional difference occurs in the later phase of diffusion.
Maximum compliance cost differences of adopters and non-adopters is lower in
competition, learning and emulation than in suasion. There is more equal cost on adopters and
non-adopters in learning, emulation and competition. In coercion, the cost is greater on adopters
than on non-adopters. In the learning and competition mechanisms, the maximum cost difference
is in the earlier phase of diffusion. In emulation, the maximum cost difference is in the later
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phase of diffusion. With higher number of initial adopters, the maximum compliance cost
difference occurs in the earlier phase of diffusion.

AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study moves beyond the state centric approach and, in the agent-based model,
examines individuals working as activists and the intergovernmental organizations. One of the
study's contributions is that it includes different level of analysis and interactions across them in
diffusion process. Contrary to the literature, this study makes clear distinctions between
indicators of the four mechanisms. In the literature, the focus is more on whether diffusion has
occurred through these mechanisms while indicators overlap across mechanisms. In addition, the
use of agent-based modeling allow for understanding the rate of diffusion through each
mechanism. The findings show that full diffusion through emulation and coercion take longer
than competition and learning. In addition the agent-based model can be adopted to understand
other examples of diffusion such as economic liberalization, metric system, fashion, sports and
etc.
There are several suggestions for future research. Future research can look at the reversal
of adoption. There are countries that have initially adopted the policies, but have dropped later.
This can bring new insights on how it can affect the whole process of diffusion.
Another area of future research is to develop measures of learning variables that better
capture the effect of policy adoptions on the share of renewables, economic growth and
mitigation of carbon emissions. The difference in share of renewables before and after policy
adoption would precisely show how much a country’s renewable share grows after adoption of
the policies. A regional or world difference could also be calculated considering the difference of
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before and after adoption. In addition, measuring carbon emissions by dividing it by GDP before
and after adoption would show the effect of the policy adoption on mitigation of carbon
emissions. Regional and world differences in mean GDP growth before and after adoption would
measure the effect of policy adoptions on economic growth.
In addition, instead of using European Union as a control, future research can use
taxation rate to understand the role of collectivist and individualistic societies as a determinant of
policy diffusion. Do actors that emulate are more likely to learn? Using percentage of renewable
energy share as a dependent variable would allow to understand the link between emulation and
learning in a statistical model combing the learning and emulation variables. It is expected that in
policy diffusion through emulation the share of renewable energy will be low and in policy
diffusion through learning the share of renewables will be higher.
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APPENDICES
A. DATA SOURCES
Variables
Energy import, net % of energy use

r
1

CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)
GDP per capita (Current $US)
Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total)

1
1

Data Source
Word Bank Development Indicators
(WDI)
WDI
http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-indicators
WDI
WDI

GDP growth (annual %)
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP % per kg of oil equivalent)

1
1

WDI
WDI

Net ODA received (% of central government expense)

1

WDI

Net ODA received (% of GNI)

1

WDI

Population

1

WDI, Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014)

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)

1

WDI, MacGarvie (2005)

FDI dummy created using WDI FDI % of GDP data

WDI

Education (the % of gross secondary school enrollment)
secongross
School enrollment, secondary (% net)

1

WDI, Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014)

1

WDI

Unemployment, total % of total labor force

1

Oil rents (% of GDP)

1

WDI, Jenner, Chan, Frankenberger,
Gabel 2012
WDI

Government Orientation

1

Pump price for gasoline ($US per liter)

1

Crude Oil in Dollars per Barrel, Products in Dollars per
Gallon, WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma

World Bank Database of Political
Institutions
http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ4
0
WDI
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_s
pt_s1_d.htm

system2012
execrlc2012

1

DPI2012:
http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ4
0

+EU member

1

Target final energy percent from Renewable

1

Kyoto Protocol from the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change

1

EU, http://europa.eu/abouteu/countries/index_en.htm
Stadelmanna2014
& Castroa
Renewables
Global(2014)
Status Report
OECD Stats, rndata
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSe
IEAD,
Neumayer (2002)
tCode=PATS_IPC#
http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query
=static&file=download_full_dataset.ht
m
Citation: Data from Ronald B.
Mitchell. 2002-2015. International
Environmental Agreements Database
Project (Version 2014.3).
http://iea.uoregon.edu/

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
1
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 1
Layer

IEAD
IEAD
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Crude Oil Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels)

1

EIA
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6&
cid=regions&syid=1980&eyid=2014&
unit=BB

Energy Intensity - Total Primary Energy Consumption per
Dollar of GDP (Btu per Year 2005 U.S. Dollars (Purchasing
Power Parities)

1

EIA
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
iedindex3.cfm?tid=92&pid=47&aid=2
&cid=regions&syid=1980&eyid=2011
&unit=BTUPUSDM

Total Renewable Electricity net generation (Billion Kilowatt eia
Hours)

http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=6&pid=29&aid=1
2

Total Renewable Electricity Net Consumption (Billion
Kilowatt Hours)
+Global Oil Price

eia

Colonizer effect

cepii

CEPII, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et
d'Informations Internationales (French:
Institute for Research on the
International Economy)
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/cepii/cepi
i.asp

+Common colony
Common language
Cdm

cepii
cepii
cdm

CEPII, Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014)
http://www.cepii.fr/distance/dist
CEPII, MacGarvie (2005)
_cepii.dta
Percentage of projects by Host Party of
all registered projects
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/
CDMinsights/index.html

Membership (Central European Free Trade Agreement)

cefta

http://www.cefta.int/
Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014)

eia

% of neighboring states with RPS or FIT

Renewable Energy Sources Govt R&D in Million NC
(nominal)

1

Renewable Energy Sources Total RD&D in Million USD
(2013
prices
andindustry
PPP) as percentage of GDP(paper
Share of
heavy
products+ nonmetallicindustry + basic metal industry)/gdp
for each year (Smith_Urpelainen 2013)

1

Renewable energy, Total, % of total energy generation

1

The world factbook, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publication
s/the-world-factbook/fields/2096.html
Jenner, etal (2012), chandler 2009
IEA
http://wds.iea.org/WDS/TableViewer/t
ableView.aspx
IEA
http://wds.iea.org/WDS/TableViewer/t
OECDstatshttp://stats.oecd.org/index.a
ableView.aspx
spx?queryid=90#
OECD (2014), Renewable energy
(indicator). doi: 10.1787/aac7c3f1-en
(Accessed on 08 December 2014)
http://data.oecd.org/energy/renewableenergy.htm
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Restructured electricity product market regulation (PMR) in
the electricity sector

+biomass resources
+hydro resources
+solar resources

+wind resources

Export/import partners
Export/import partners (accessed 29 oct 15)
Growth of electricity consumption

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/48/
42480328.xls
PMR is used by Smith_Urpelainen
2013
Jenner, Chan, Frankenberger & Gabel
(2012)
Erdogdu (2013) for explanation of the
variable
Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014)
Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014)
Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014)
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset?q=win
d+resources+by+class+and+country&s
ort=score+desc%2C+name+asc&publi
sher=National+Renewable+Energy+La
boratory&ext_location=&ext_bbox=&
ext_prev_extent=106.80084228515625%2C42.0370543
01883806%2C106.15264892578125%2C42.4437279
3752476
Stadelmanna & Castroa (2014)
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset?q=win
d+resources+by+class+and+country&s
ort=score+desc%2C+name+asc&publi
http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfi
sher=National+Renewable+Energy+La
le/Country/AFG/Year/2010/Summary
boratory&ext_location=&ext_bbox=&
https://www.cia.gov/library/publication
ext_prev_extent=s/the-world-factbook/fields/2050.html
106.80084228515625%2C42.0370543
Pfeiffer, Mulder 2013
01883806%2C106.15264892578125%2C42.4437279
3752476
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B. DIFFUSION VARIABLES
Literature Review
Dependent V

IVs

Sources

Diffusion M

Test

RPS adoption

Lyon & Yin,
2010

Control

US states

+ economic growth
/ local environment conditions
/ preferences effects, ?political
ideology, ?private interests, American
solar energy association, No oil price

Proportional
odds model
(Kiefer, 1988)

RPS adoption
in state
requirement
US states

-higher level of renewable energy
development
+ regulated electricity market/ cost
based pricing

Lyon & Yin,
2010

Control

policy
adoption
(RPS, FIT)
EU

+International solar energy
association
/ratio of neighbor with policy and the
total number of states (nbor)
/EU membership (representing EU
Directive 2001/77/EC on generation
of electricity from renewable energy
sources (RES-E). It has been the first
binding directive that obliges state
legislators to support RES-E
+solar potential
+unemployment rate
-electricity market concentration
Electricity price per kwh for private
consumers
No oil price

Jenner, Chan,
Frankenberger
& Gabel,
2012

international solar
energy association=
emulation
nbor=learning bc
chandler (2009)
introduces it as
learning effect
between US neighbor
states
EU
membership=Coercion
bc binding

Proportional
hazard model

FIT adoption
developing
and emerging
economies

-domestic energy production
Stadelmann &
/air quality (so2), +biomass resources, Castro (2014)
+hydro resources, +GDP per capita,
+population, /education, +EU
member, +Common colony, oil price

EU=Learning/coercion
Common Colony=
emulation/learning
Colonizers= coercion

Logit model,
using maximum
likelihood
techniques

energy &
-economic concern
environmental - geopolitical concern
policy
+environmental concern
Turkey

Ustun, 2012

geopolitical concern=
competition bc turkey
as transit state and
having long term
energy contract with
foreign countries
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Dependent V

IVs

Sources

Diffusion M

financial
incentives
through tax
reduction,
grants,
concessional
loans

-domestic energy production
+solar resources
+GDP per capita +population
/education, +democracy, +EU
+Central European Free Trade
Agreement (CEFTA), +former
colonizer % adopted the policy

Stadelmann & EU=Learning/coercion
Castro (2014) Common Colony=
emulation/learning

re Target
adoption

+wind resources, -hydrological
resources +population, /education,
+EU member, +Lag CDM

Stadelmann & EU member=learning,
Castro (2014) coercion

Framework
policies
(strategies,
plans, generic
law)

+population
+Common colony
+Global Environmental Facility
(GEF) funding
+Lag CDM

Stadelmann & Common Colony=
Castro (2014) emulation/learning
GEF funding=
coercion (financial
incentive diffusion)

Technology
knowledge
diffusion

+common language
geographic distance as proxy for
language barrier
FDI
Import of citing country from cited
country
telephone call traffic between two
country

MacGarvie
(2005)

RPS adoption
US states

+ Renewable energy interest groups
contribution to state level policy
makers
-conventional energy interest groups
donations to state level policy makers
No oil price

Jenner etal.,
control
2013Database
of state
incentives for
renewables
and efficiency
(DSIRE)

Renewable
energy
programs and
policies
US states

+*air pollutant per capita
Matisoff,
-*carbon intensive economies (carbon 2008
dioxide tons per thousand of real 2000
chained dollars of Gross State
Product)
-coal and natural gas production
+GSP per capita
+*number of liberal citizens (0
conservative -100 liberal)
+wind capacity
+solar generation capacity
+% of neighboring states adopted

Common language =
emulation/ learning
geographic distance as
proxy for language
barrier= emulation/
learning
FDI = competition
Import of citing
country from cited
country= competition
telephone call traffic
between two country=
emulation/learning

neighboring states
with RPS=
emulation/learning,
competition

Test

regression

Proportional
hazard model
and probit (for
the increase in
share of
renewables
Cross-sectional
analysis to test
for internal
determinants of
policy adoption
and event
history analysis
for diffusion,
probit
maximum
likelihood
regression
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RPS

model

Go-betweens

External

Actors

170
C. DIFFUSION MECHANISMS
Coercion/Suasion
Stadelmann & Castro 2014=Colonizer
Aklin, etal 2014=environmental ministries
Simmons, et al. 2006= policies promoted by strong
countries to be put into practice in weak countries
structurally or situationally dependent on them
Schelling 1960= Unilateral policy leadership

Stadelmann & Castro 2014=EU member
Stadelmann & Castro (2014)= Central European
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
Stadelmann & Castro 2014, Clean development
mechanisms through international orgs
Saikawa 2013=International development assistance
(ODA)
Graham, etal. 2013= national policy governments or
international organizations in federal system and
international organization may use coercive
strategies through grants and aid requirements, preemptive laws, sanctions or military force

Simmons, etal. 2006= Weaker countries are
structurally or situationally dependent on strong
countries that diffuse the policies

Internal

Diffusion Processes
Competition
Stadelmann & Castro 2014=External and internal
actors more likely have similar economic structure,
they compete with each other
Simmons, etal. 2006= most important relationships are
horizontal

Graham, etal. 2013= national policy governments or
international organizations in federal system and
international organization “may help restructure
competitive environments, such as with the European
Union facilitating the reduction of trade barriers or the
US Constitution limiting interstate regulation of
commerce by the states” (693)

Tucker, etal 2012= geographic proximity
Berry & Berry 2007= Internal actor compete with
external actor when trading partner or3rd party in FDI
Dobbin, etal. 2007

Internal

Go-betweens

External

Actors
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Learning
External actor increase the knowledge about
policy effectivness. Their policy adoption
does not have externality effect on the
internal actors or potential adopters. External
actors are not actively promoting and shaping
policy change in potential adopters

Diffusion Processes
Emulation
Matisoff, 08= % of neighboring states with RPS
Walker 1969= interaction between potential and diffusing
countries officials
Berry & Berry 2007=Similar cultural and historical
connections, common norms drive diffusion
Finnemore, etal. 1998=common norms emerge from increased
interaction between external and internal actors
Graham, etal. 2013=Countries with soft power can appeal to
others

Stadelmann & Castro 2014=EU learning
effect on European countries in transition
Capacity building projects under
development and environmental finance
initiatives of international climate policy for
developing countries
Graham, etal. 2013= national policy
governments or international organizations in
federal system and international organization
can facilitate learning

Jenner, etal (2012)= Intersolar energy association
Koppl & Steininger 2012=Renewable energy regime
Simmons, etal. 2006= NGOs, policy profesionals, academics
influence government to adopt policies
Graham, etal 2013=Socialization aims to change preferences
of actors, without expecting immediate policy change, but
rather would lead to long term policy change
Graham, etal. 2013= national policy governments or
international organizations in federal system and international
organization can facilitate socialization by establishing
information centers, conferences recommending best practices

Internal actor active, external actor passive.
Graham, etal. 2013=Policy makers seeking
effective public policies, learn from others
about the success political viability

Stadelmann & Castro (2014)=Common colonial history
Policy makers imitate a policy if else where people reelected
those who enacted the policy (Gilardi 2010)
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D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
variable
time
region*
fit
rps
ccode*
wrps_co2
wrps_gdpg
wfit_co2
wfit_gdpg
regrps_co2
regrps_gdpg
regfit_co2
regfit_gdpg
wind
solar
fdi
co2em
gdpg
gdppc
popul
eumem
cdm
neifit
neirps
sys
system*
gov
govorient*
oilres
goilpr
kyoto
montreal
cartagena
colonizer_rps
colonizer_fit
colonizercode*
comcrps
comcfit
coml_rps
coml_fit
comprps

vars
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

n
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3185
3318
3251
3277
3392
3395
3395
3395
3395
3351
3395
1963
3395
3185
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395

mean
sd
2000.48
6.3
3.63
2.1
0.15
0.4
0.03
0.2
78.63
45.5
4.57
0.7
3.86
1.8
4.56
1.2
3.86
1.9
4.63
3.6
3.83
2.9
4.62
3.6
3.83
3.0
77544.77
388272.9
2041006815.49 4553811811.0
0.94
0.2
4.61
6.6
3.83
7.4
8549.78
13946.5
37450145.91
134742084.0
0.11
0.3
0.07
0.3
14.96
26.3
1.64
8.6
1.43
0.5
3.45
0.7
2.14
0.9
3.27
1.3
7.06
29.3
40.11
26.4
0.75
0.4
0.85
0.4
0.29
0.5
0.13
0.3
0.27
0.4
8.86
4.5
0.01
0.0
0.08
0.2
1.87
9.7
13.72
26.6
0.10
0.2

min
max
1990.0
2011.0
1.0
7.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
157.0
3.9
12.3
-0.5
6.5
3.7
15.4
-3.0
6.8
0.3
18.8
-6.7
12.0
0.2
20.2
-7.1
12.0
0.0
3225342.0
793.7 27373606560.0
1.0
2.0
0.0
68.5
-64.0
150.0
64.8
113738.7
96286.0
1344130000.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
4.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
5.0
0.0
266.8
14.4
99.7
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
16.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
1.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
1.0
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compfit
comcdm
income*
comfdi
income.group*
cname.y*
renew_gen*
elec_gen*
elshare*
wrps_elshare
wfit_elshare
rps_elshare
fit_elshare
regrps_elshare.nrps
reg_rps_co2.nrps
reg_rps_gdpg.nrps
regelshare_fit.nf
regfit_co2.nonfit
regfit_gdpg.nonfit
wfit_co2_nonfit
wfit_gdpg_nonfit
wfit_elshare_nonfit
wrps_co2_nonrps
wrps_gdpg_nonrps
wrps_elshare_nonrps

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
1999
1999
1999
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
3395
1999
1999
1999

0.42
0.08
1.69
0.91
3.44
78.86
898.33
1398.92
148.41
35.41
35.42
35.25
35.25
-15.09
3.98
-1.65
-6.73
3.21
-0.64
4.32
-0.95
-8.13
4.26
-1.59
-16.37

0.3
0.2
0.8
0.1
1.3
45.6
779.3
934.2
174.4
2.8
3.9
15.0
15.6
15.0
4.6
1.7
18.4
4.2
2.7
2.4
1.4
9.3
1.8
1.1
3.8

0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
10.3
7.9
1.0
0.0
-38.5
-10.9
-5.4
-52.8
-8.0
-8.2
1.8
-5.0
-31.2
2.0
-3.2
-24.5

1.0
1.0
3.0
1.0
5.0
157.0
2402.0
3056.0
474.0
38.6
49.8
57.9
88.0
21.5
14.0
5.3
46.4
15.0
8.0
11.6
1.6
15.0
7.8
0.4
-9.3
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colonizer_rps
colonizer_fit
comncolnyrps

1
.067**
**
**
.125 .252
**

**

coml_RPS

.078** 0.028 .318**

coml_FIT

0.022 .087** 0.037 .480** .191**
**

.242 .083

**

**

1
0.017
**

1

*

1
**

cdm
neighborfit

.114 .272 .176 .211 .048 .152
1
0.007 0.018 .074** .287** .184** .405** .116**

neighborps

.167** 0.004 0.028 .200** 0.031 .155** .052* .246**

fdiipc
gdpg
gdppcapita
popul

fdiipc

1
**

.138

Co2em

Co2em

1

comcolonyfit

eumem

eumem

neighbo rps

neighbor_fit

cdm

coml_FIT

coml_RPS

comcolonyfit

comoncolony
_rps

colonizer_fit

colonizer_rps

E. CORRELATIONS

-

-

-

0.031 .143** .182** .460**
.060** .123**
.079**
.069**
.061** .050* .115**
.190** 0.016
.063**
.067** .047* 0.014 .140** 0.003 .122** 0.012
.055** .063** 0.013 .074**
.065**
0.023 0.011
.081**
.079** .235** .407**
.127** 0.011
.056**
.091**
0.003 0.004 .045*
.168**
0.035
0.006

1
1

.446** .162**

1

.173** 0.03 .252**
**

**

**

1
**

.068 .055 .096 .074
1
**
0.014
0.036 .107
0.014
.064**
.451** .157** .495** .585** .154**
-0.01 0.029

.053** .071** .052**

Kyoto

.223** .291** .139** .259** .116** .254** .159** .263** .106** .107** 0.027 .111**

cartagena

.255** .300** .249** .398** .223** .391** .286** .307** .188** .183**

-0.02 0.009
.052**
0.024 .065** 0.026 0.008
Renewbles consumpn 0.005
-0.03 .127** .097** .098** .262**
0.011 0.019
oilres

0.013

goilpr

.355** .360** .299** .485** .210** .356** .375** .375**

system

.097**

govorient

.119**
0.037
.200**
0.036 .067**
0.028
0.025 .135** -.042*
0.015
.222** .106**
.132**
0.002

-.039* .065** .111** .183**
.330** .078** .348** .206** .048*
.237**
.104**
.083** .110**
0.023 .083** .043* .142** 0.039 .174** 0.014 0.019
.052**
0.022
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system

goilpr

Renewables
consumption

oilres

cartagena

Kyoto

popul

gdpg

gdppcapita

E. CORRELATIONS Continued

colonizer_rps
colonizer_fit
comncolnyrps
comcolonyfit
coml_RPS
coml_FIT
cdm
neighborfit
neighborps
eumem
Co2em
fdiipc
gdpg
gdppcapita
popul
Kyoto
cartagena
oilres

1
-.043*

1

.047*

.063**

1

.141** .136** .042*
.071

**

**

.157 .054

**

1
.377

**

.044* .063** 0.031 -.041*

1
.052**

1

Renewbles consumpn -.042* .272** .286** .061** 0.021 .150**
goilpr
system
govorient

1

.102** .205** 0.026 .415** .740** 0.008 .038*

1

.437** .091** 0.035 0.013
.143**
1
.075**
.084**
0.011
.148** .070** 0.014 -.044*
.194**
.226**
.077**
.102**
0.028
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F. OPERATIONALIZATION

Independent variables operationalization
Abbreviation

Sources

#

Actor

Hypothe
sis

RPS dummy

fit

1,2

Internal

DV

+EU membership (non=1,2)

eumem

3

Go-betw

H1a

+former colonizer RPS (1,2) without
colonizers 0
+former colonizer FIT (1,2),
+CDM, dummy (non=1,cdm=2)
+Foreign direct investment, (positive fdi =2,
negative fdi=1)

colonizer_rps

Renewables
2014
EU Global
Status Report
CEPII, created

external

H2a

colonizer_fit
cdm
fdi

CEPII, created
UNFCCC
WDI

5
6

external
Go-betw
external

H2a
H3a
H4a

+ %Main export partners
(competitor)_RPS/FIT
+
%Main export partners
(competitor)_RPS/FIT
%Competitor
CDM
+%Competitor FDI

comfit
comrps
compcdm
compfdi

CIA Factbook
CIA Factbook
create

8
9
10
11

external

H5a

external
external

H6a
H7a

+ Difference in mean renewable electricity
share of FIT and nonFIT countries in each
region, Total Renewable Electricity Net
Generation (Billion
+Difference
in meanKilowatthours)/Total
renewable electricity
Electricity
Net&Generation
(Billion in each
share
of RPS
nonRPS countries
Kilowatthours)*100
region
+ Difference in mean renewable electricity
share of FIT and nonFIT countries in world,

regelshare_fit.n
f

EIA

External

H8a

regrps_elshare.
nrps

EIA

External

H8a

wfit_elshare_no
nfit

EIA

External

H9a

+Difference in mean renewable electricity
share of RPS & nonRPS countries in world

wrps_elshare_n
onrps

EIA

External

H9a

+Difference in mean CO2 emissions (metric
tons per capita) of fit & nonfit countries in
each region
+Difference in mean CO2 emissions (metric
tons per capita) of RPS & nonRPS countries in
each region
+Difference in mean CO2 emissions (metric
tons per capita) of fit & nonfit countries in
world
+Difference in mean CO2 emissions (metric
tons per capita) of RPS & nonRPS countries in
world
Difference in mean GDP growth (annual %)
share of RPS & nonRPS countries in each
region
+ Difference in GDP growth (annual %) of
FIT and nonFIT countries of each region

regfit_co2.nonfi
t

Created-WDI

External

H10a

reg_rps_co2.nrp
s

Created-WDI

External

H10a

wfit_co2_nonfit

Created-WDI

External

H11a

wrps_co2_nonr
ps

Created-WDI

External

H11a

reg_rps_gdpg.n
rps

Created-WDI

External

H12a

regfit_gdpg.non
fit

Created-WDI

External

H12a

4

7

12
12
12
12
13
13
13
13
14
14
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+ Difference in GDP growth (annual %) of
FIT and nonFIT countries in world

wfit_gdpg_nonf
it

Created-WDI

External

H13a

+ Difference in GDP growth (annual %) of
RPS and non-RPS countries in world

wfit_gdpg_nonf
it

Created-WDI

External

H13a

+% of neighboring states with RPS

Nei_rps

created

15

External

H14a

+% of neighboring states with FIT
+Common
colony,
% the
of countries
with the
+%
of countries
with
same colonizer
same colonizer
havingwithout
RPS, countries
having
FIT, countries
a colonythat
coded
were not part of a colony coded 0,
0
+ % of countries with the same colonizer
having RPS, countries without a colony coded
0
+ % countries with common language RPS

nei_fit
commoncolony
Commoncolo
_rps
ny_fit

created
CEPII, created

16
0
17

External
External

H14a
H12a
H15a

commoncolony
_fit

CEPII, created

+ % countries with common language FIT

coml_RPS
coml_FIT

CEPII, created
CEPII, created

19
20

External
External

H16a
H16a

+Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, dummy

cartagena

IEAD

22

Go-betw

H17a

+Kyoto Protocol from the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate
Change,dummy

kyoto

IEAD

Go-Betw

H18a

+The Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer. dummy
+CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)
+Global oil price
+GDP per capita (Current US$)
+Population
Government Orientation, -right, center, +left
System (presidential, parliamentary)

montreal

IEAD

23

Go-betw

H19a

Co2em
goilpr
gdppc
popul
govorient
system

WDI
EIA
WDI
WDI
WBDPI
WBDPI

13
24
25
26
27
28

External
Go-betw
internal
internal
internal
internal

C(control
C
C
C
C
C

-Crude Oil Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels)
+wind =Total Resource Area (km^2) at 50m,
Classes 3-7
+solar= total potential solar energy per year
MWh/year

oilres
wind

EIA
Data Catalogue

29

internal
internal

C

solar

Data Catalogue

14
14

H15a

18

21

30
31

internal
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G. ABM CODE
Setup
There are three types of actors: igos, nation_states and i_actors. At the setup they
are initialized. In addition, competitors are identified for each country. Each country has five
competitors. The countries also become members of international organizations. The six
measures that will be reported at the end of each run are setup.
In the hypothetical world there are 100 countries. One country is located in each cell. The
world is divided into 5 regions. Each country is member of the international organization in their
region. There are 100 people. There is one person in each country.

;Setup and Initialization of Patches
to setup
clear-all
clear-all-plots
create-igos 5 [ set color yellow ]
ask patches [initialize-patches]
ask nation_states [initialize-nation_states]
ask igos [initialize-igos]
ask i_actors [initialize-i_actors]
ask turtles [initialize-turtles]
setup-competitors
setup-members
;; added code for purposes of measurement in behaviorspace
set max-power-difference power-differ
set max-compliance-difference compliance-difference
set max-regional-difference regional-proportion
set lasttick_power 0
set lasttick_comply 0
set lasttick_region 0
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reset-ticks
end
to initialize-patches
sprout-i_actors 1 ; populate the world with 100 agents with one on each cell
sprout-nation_states 1
if pycor < 2 [
set region 0
set pcolor 56 ; A shade of green
]
if pycor >= 2 [
set region 1
set pcolor 8 ; A shade of grey
]
if pycor >= 4 [
set region 2
set pcolor 35 ; A shade of brown
]
if pycor >= 6 [
set region 3
set pcolor 118 ; A shade of violet
]
if pycor >= 8 [
set region 4
set pcolor 127 ; A shade of magenta
]
end
;“Go" and “Activate Dyad" Commands
;Initialization of Agents
to initialize-i_actors
set size .4
set color pink
set shape "person"
set i random 2
set i 0
ask n-of person=1 i_actors [set i 1]
if i = 1 [set color white]
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set reelection random-float 1
ifelse reelection < reelection=1 [set reelection 1] [set reelection 0]
set competitiveness random-float 1
ifelse competitiveness < competitiveness=1 [set competitiveness 1] [set competitiveness 0]
end
to initialize-igos
ask igos [move-to one-of patches with [not any? igos in-radius 2] ]
ask igos [set member nation_states-on neighbors]
ask igo 1 [set membership 1]
ask igo 2 [set membership 2]
ask igo 3 [set membership 3]
ask igo 4 [set membership 4]
ask igo 0 [set membership 0]
ask igo 4 [move-to patch 3 9 ]
ask igo 3 [move-to patch 5 6 ]
ask igo 2 [move-to patch 3 4 ]
ask igo 1 [move-to patch 5 3 ]
ask igo 0 [move-to patch 4 1 ]
set shape "circle"
set color cyan
set size .4
set i random 2
set i 0
ask n-of igo=1 igos [set i 1]
if i = 1 [set color white]
end
to initialize-nation_states
;; NEED TO INITIALIZE ALL THREE TYPES OF ACTORS
set color black
set shape "star"
set size .9
ask nation_states [ if pycor < 2 [
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set membership 0
]]
ask nation_states [ if pycor >= 2 [
set membership 1
]]
ask nation_states [ if pycor >= 4 [
set membership 2
]]
ask nation_states [ if pycor >= 6 [
set membership 3
]]
ask nation_states [ if pycor >= 8 [
set membership 4
]]
set utility-star random-normal 2.5 1
if
utility-star < 1 [set utility 1]
if utility-star >= 1 and utility-star < 2 [set utility 2]
if utility-star >= 2 and utility-star < 3 [set utility 3]
if utility-star >= 3 and utility-star < 4 [set utility 4]
if utility-star >= 4
[set utility 5]
set non-compliance-star random-normal 2.5 1
if
non-compliance-star < 1 [set non-compliance 1]
if non-compliance-star >= 1 and non-compliance-star < 2 [set non-compliance 2]
if non-compliance-star >= 2 and non-compliance-star < 3 [set non-compliance 3]
if non-compliance-star >= 3 and non-compliance-star < 4 [set non-compliance 4]
if non-compliance-star >= 4
[set non-compliance 5]
set compliance-star random-normal 2.5 1
if
compliance-star < 1 [set compliance 1]
if compliance-star >= 1 and compliance-star < 2 [set compliance 2]
if compliance-star >= 2 and compliance-star < 3 [set compliance 3]
if compliance-star >= 3 and compliance-star < 4 [set compliance 4]
if compliance-star >= 4
[set compliance 5]
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if Power-Distribution = "Poisson" [
set power random-poisson 1 + 1
if power > 5 [set power 5]
]
if Power-Distribution = "Normal" [
set power-star random-normal 2.5 1
if
power-star < 1 [set power 1]
if power-star >= 1 and power-star < 2 [set power 2]
if power-star >= 2 and power-star < 3 [set power 3]
if power-star >= 3 and power-star < 4 [set power 4]
if power-star >= 4
[set power 5]
]
if Power-Distribution = "Uniform" [
set power random 5 + 1
if power > 5 [set power 5]
]
set i random-float 1
ifelse i < probability-i=1 [set i 1] [set i 0]
if i = 1 [set color white]
set ruling-p random-float 1
ifelse ruling-p < party=1 [set ruling-p 1] [set ruling-p 0]
ifelse show-power? [set label power ] [set label ""]
set label-color black
end
to initialize-turtles
set dependence random-normal 2.5 1
set popularity random-float 1
ifelse popularity < popularity=1 [set popularity 1] [set popularity 0]
end
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to setup-competitors
ask nation_states
[
set my-competitors n-of 5 nation_states with [ self != myself ]
]
end
to setup-members
ask igo 0
[
set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 56]
]
ask igo 1
[
set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 8]
]
ask igo 2
[
set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 35]
]
ask igo 3
[
set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 118]
]
ask igo 4
[
set my-members nation_states with [pcolor = 127]
]
end
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To go
In the go procedure randomly two agents will be activated at each time tick. One of them
is the receiver nation state and the other is a sender, which can be another nation state, an igo or a
person. These two agents interact. Based on the interaction rules, the nation states decides to
adopt a new policy or keep the status quo. There are separate rules for each mechanism. One of
the four mechanisms is selected in the interface.

to go
activate-dyad
interact
ask nation_states [if i = 1 [set color white]]
if not any? nation_states with [color = black] [stop]
calculate-proportion-i
calculate-proportion-region-i
calculate-power
calculate-compliance
Ask nation_states [set compet_i mean [ i ] of my-competitors]
Ask igos [set member_i mean [ i ] of my-members]
measure-system
tick
end
to activate-dyad
ask patches [
if region = 0 [set pcolor 56] ; Reset the previous sender and receiver
if region = 1 [set pcolor 9] ; to their original color of their region
if region = 2 [set pcolor 35] ; Reset the previous sender and receiver
if region = 3[set pcolor 118] ; to their original color of their region
if region = 4 [set pcolor 127] ; to their original color of their region
]
ask one-of patches [set pcolor red] ; select a random receiver
ask one-of turtles [ifelse any? igos-on patch-here [set pcolor green] [set pcolor random-color]] ;
select a random sender
ask nation_states [
set r? false ; reset the previous receiver
if pcolor = red [set r? true ]]
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ask nation_states [
set s? false ;reset the previous sender
if pcolor = sky [set s? true] ; set indicator for sender and receiver
]
ask igos [
set s? false ;reset the previous sender
if pcolor = red and breed = nation_states [set r? true]
if pcolor = green [set s? true] ; set indicator for sender and receiver
]
ask i_actors [
set s? false ;reset the previous sender
if pcolor = yellow [set s? true] ; set indicator for sender and receiver
]
set i-s count turtles with [ i = 1 and s? = true] ; update the indicators
set i-n count nation_states with [i = 1 and s? = true] ; update the indicators
set i-ig count igos with [i = 1 and s? = true] ; update the indicators
set i-iactor count i_actors with [i = 1 and s? = true] ; update the indicators
set p-r count nation_states with [ ruling-p = 1 and r? = true ]
set commitment-r count nation_states with [ commitment = 1 and r? = true ]
set popularity-iactor count i_actors with [popularity = 1 and s? = true] ; update the indicators
set reelection-s count i_actors with [reelection = 1 and s? = true and i = 1]
set competitiveness-s count i_actors with [competitiveness = 1 and s? = true]
set mem_i count igos with [s? = true and member_i >= 0.5]
end
to measure-compliance
set max-compliance-difference compliance-difference
end
to measure-system
set max-power-difference power-differ
set lasttick_power end-powerdiff
set max-regional-difference regional-proportion
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set lasttick_region end-regiondiff
set max-compliance-difference compliance-difference
set lasttick_comply end-complydiff
end
;Interaction Rules
to interact
if Mechanism = "Coercion" [
if i-n = 1
and hierarchy > 0
and dependency > 0
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1]
]
if i-ig = 1
and cost >= 0
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1]
]
if i-iactor = 1
and popularity-iactor = 1
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1]
]
]
if Mechanism = "Competition" [
if i-n = 1
and hierarchy <= abs 1
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true and compet_i >= 0.5 ] [set i 1]
]
if i-iactor = 1
and competitiveness-s = 1
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1]
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]
]
if Mechanism = "Emulation" [
if i-n = 1
and hierarchy <= abs 1
and neighbor = true
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1]
]
if i-ig = 1
and mem_i = 1
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true ] [set i 1]
]
if i-iactor = 1
and p-r = 1
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1]
]
]
if Mechanism = "Learning" [
if i-n = 1
and hierarchy <= abs 1
and benefit >= 0
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1]
]
if i-ig = 1
[
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1]
]
if i-iactor = 1
and reelection-s = 1
[

188
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set i 1]
]
]
end
;Reporters and Output
to-report regional-proportion
The code to update the largest regional difference within a run
let difference-set [ ]
set difference-set lput proportion-regionA-i difference-set
set difference-set lput proportion-regionB-i difference-set
set difference-set lput proportion-regionC-i difference-set
set difference-set lput proportion-regionD-i difference-set
set difference-set lput proportion-regionE-i difference-set
let maxproportion max difference-set
let minproportion min difference-set
let maxdifference maxproportion - minproportion
ifelse (maxdifference > max-regional-difference)
[
report maxdifference
]
[
report max-regional-difference
]
end
to-report end-regiondiff
let thistime lasttick_region
let difference-set [ ]
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set difference-set lput proportion-regionA-i difference-set
set difference-set lput proportion-regionB-i difference-set
set difference-set lput proportion-regionC-i difference-set
set difference-set lput proportion-regionD-i difference-set
set difference-set lput proportion-regionE-i difference-set
let maxproportion max difference-set
let minproportion min difference-set
let maxdifference maxproportion - minproportion
if (maxdifference >= max-regional-difference)
[
set thistime ticks
]
report thistime
end
to-report compliance-difference
let this-difference compliance-with-i - non-compliance-without-i
if (this-difference > max-compliance-difference)
[set max-compliance-difference this-difference
]
report max-compliance-difference
end
to-report end-complydiff
let thistime lasttick_comply
let this-difference compliance-with-i - non-compliance-without-i
if (this-difference >= max-compliance-difference )
[
set thistime ticks
]
report thistime
end
to-report power-differ
let this-difference power-without-i - power-with-i
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if (this-difference > max-power-difference)
[
set max-power-difference this-difference
]
report max-power-difference
end
to-report end-powerdiff
let thistime lasttick_power
let this-difference power-without-i - power-with-i
if (this-difference >= max-power-difference )
[
set thistime ticks
]
report thistime
end
;max-power-difference
;max-regional-difference
;max-compliance-difference
;lasttick_power
;lasttick_comply
;lasttick_region
to-report igo-membership
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set membership-r membership]
ask igos with [s? = true] [set membership-s membership]
report membership-r - membership-s
end
to-report cost
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set compliance-r compliance]
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set non-compliance-r non-compliance]
report non-compliance-r - compliance-r
end
to-report benefit
ask nation_states with [s? = true] [set utility-s utility]
ask nation_states with [r? = true ] [set utility-r utility]
report utility-s - utility-r
end
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to-report dependency
ask turtles with [s? = true] [set dependence-s dependence]
ask nation_states with [r? = true ] [set dependence-r dependence]
report dependence-s - dependence-r
end
to-report hierarchy
ask nation_states with [s? = true] [set power-s power]
ask nation_states with [r? = true ] [set power-r power]
report power-s - power-r
end
to-report neighbor
ask nation_states with [s? = true] [set neighborhood-s region]
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set neighborhood-r region]
ifelse neighborhood-s = neighborhood-r [set same-region? True] [set same-region? false]
report same-region?
end
to-report trade
ask nation_states with [s? = true] [set tp-s tp]
ask nation_states with [r? = true] [set tp-r tp]
ifelse tp-s = tp-r [set trade? true] [set trade? false]
report trade?
end
to-report random-color
report one-of [sky yellow]
end

to calculate-proportion-i
set-current-plot "Proportion of States with i=1"
let number_i count nation_states with [i = 1]
let number_nation_states count nation_states
let proportion-i number_i / number_nation_states
plot proportion-i
end
to calculate-proportion-region-i
set-current-plot "Regional Difference"
set-current-plot-pen "RegionA"
let number_regionA_i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 0]
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let number_regionA_nation_states count nation_states with [region = 0]
set proportion-regionA-i number_regionA_i / number_regionA_nation_states
plot proportion-regionA-i
set-current-plot-pen "RegionB"
let number-regionB-i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 1]
let number-regionB-nation_states count nation_states with [region = 1]
set proportion-regionB-i number-regionB-i / number-regionB-nation_states
plot proportion-regionB-i
set-current-plot-pen "RegionC"
let number_regionC_i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 2]
let number_regionC_nation_states count nation_states with [region = 2]
set proportion-regionC-i number_regionC_i / number_regionC_nation_states
plot proportion-regionC-i
set-current-plot-pen "RegionD"
let number-regionD-i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 3]
let number-regionD-nation_states count nation_states with [region = 3]
set proportion-regionD-i number-regionD-i / number-regionD-nation_states
plot proportion-regionD-i
set-current-plot-pen "RegionE"
let number-regionE-i count nation_states with [i = 1 and region = 4]
let number-regionE-nation_states count nation_states with [region = 4]
set proportion-regionE-i number-regionE-i / number-regionE-nation_states
plot proportion-regionE-i
end
to calculate-power
set-current-plot "Power Difference"
set-current-plot-pen "Mean-i=0"
set power-without-i mean [power] of nation_states with [i = 0]
plot power-without-i
set-current-plot-pen "Mean-i=1"
set power-with-i mean [power] of nation_states with [i = 1]
plot power-with-i
end
to calculate-compliance
set-current-plot "Compliance Difference"
set-current-plot-pen "compliance-i=1"
set compliance-with-i mean [compliance] of nation_states with [i = 1]
plot compliance-with-i
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set-current-plot-pen "non-compliance-i=0"
set non-compliance-without-i mean [non-compliance] of nation_states with [i = 0]
plot non-compliance-without-i
end
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